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Abstract 
 
I deny morality as I deny alchemy   
    – Nietzsche (Dawn 103) 
What exactly does Nietzsche mean when he describes himself as an ‘immoralist’?  Does he 
really reject all morality?  Confounding the issue, Nietzsche himself seems to take a number of 
conflicting positions on the topic of morality.  What is he really attacking – the moral values 
themselves or merely the effects of those values?  Is he a moral nihilist, or is his criticism simply 
aimed at specific forms of morality?  I maintain that neither of these possibilities is the case.  
Instead, I argue that Nietzsche’s immoralism is best understood in a straightforward literal sense 
– namely, Nietzsche is not a new kind of moralist offering a new moral system but an 
unapologetic iconoclast who challenges, not merely certain forms of morality, but morality itself.  
However, I argue that this does not commit him to some sort of value nihilism.  Nietzsche is not 
opposed to valuing, just moral ways of valuing.  Instead, Nietzsche’s values are related to health 
versus sickness – values that are ultimately rooted in Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power.  I 
maintain that this is what he means by a ‘revaluation of all values’ – he wants to reorient the very 
way in which we (or at least some of us) value. 
Chapter 1 explores Nietzsche’s critique of the various forms of morality while Chapter 2 
establishes the anchor for his revaluation of values in the form of the will to power and his notion 
of health.  In Chapter 3 I examine the sickness of the ascetic ideal while Chapter 4 contrasts 
Paul’s revaluation with Nietzsche’s.  In the final chapter I contrast Nietzsche’s positive ideal of 
health (rooted in the will to power) with the full array of sick types delineated in Chapter 2.    
Based on this analysis, I then articulate Nietzsche’s positive views in connection to major 
features of his thought like the will to power and the eternal return. 
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Introduction 
The following dissertation will explore and analyze Nietzsche’s infamous ‘revaluation of all 
values’ and his notion of ‘slave morality’.  This will require us to engage in a deep analysis of 
concepts like ‘natural’ versus ‘unnatural’, ‘strength’ versus ‘weakness’, and ‘sickness’ versus 
‘health’.  We also have to explain not only the complex mechanisms that create slave moralities, 
the bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal, but also the mechanisms that exploit slave morality and 
the bad conscience.  Much of this critical analysis will be rooted in Nietzsche’s notion of the will 
to power.  The will to power will serve as the bedrock for my critical analysis of Nietzsche’s 
revaluation of values. 
After a detailed survey of Nietzsche’s critique of morality and his status as a morality 
critic, I will focus on the phenomena of slave moralities and the ascetic ideal.  I will try and 
explain just how slave morality culminates in the ascetic ideal.  At this point I attempt to unify 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality with the psychology of slave moralities.  Specifically, I will 
analyze the ascetic ideal in terms of what I will call a desire to be commanded – a complex form 
of closeted autonomy that I will argue is a product of a corruption of the will to power.  This 
condition is therefore a kind of sickness according to Nietzsche.  Finally I will use the Apostle 
Paul as a unique case study and argue that slave moralities cannot simply be understood as 
conspiracies promulgated by some priestly class; nor are they rare products of specific 
conditions.  Instead, I will argue that, to varying degrees, slave moralities are everywhere in 
history and society.  Finally I will delineate Nietzsche’s vision of a ‘higher morality’.   
Chapter 1 will explore the various senses of ‘morality’ Nietzsche utilizes.  This, I will 
argue is necessary because many of Nietzsche’s claims about morality seem to be conflicting and 
at odds with each other.  Accordingly, I argue that Nietzsche is not always careful with his 
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terminology and that he actually refers to various distinct senses of morality.  I maintain that 
there are two primary kinds of morality and four additional senses of the term “morality”.  The 
two primary kinds of morality have to do with the contrast between slave morality and other 
sorts of morality.  I will proceed to lay out some of the defining features of slave morality and 
the conditions under which slave morality emerges.  I will then compare and contrast slave 
morality with various senses of the term “morality” – specifically ‘the morality of mores/custom’ 
and the ‘morality of intention’.  I will then consider two additional kinds of morality, beginning 
with what Nietzsche describes as ‘higher moralities’ in passages like BGE 202 and 32.  I will 
discuss what makes these forms of morality superior to the other senses of morality, and whether 
they should even be considered moralities at all.  The final kind of morality refers to non-
Christian forms of slave morality and will be briefly discussed in this chapter but a lengthier 
discussion will be reserved for Chapter 5.  So this chapter will set up the general framework of 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality and will also attempt to properly situate Nietzsche as a morality 
critic. 
In Chapter 3 I will further address slave morality and the way in which it is ‘sick’ and 
‘unnatural’ according to Nietzsche.  I will argue that it is essential to tie this analysis directly to 
Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘will to power’ and critically assess competing models of the will to 
power offered by philosophers like B. Reginster, B. Leiter, M. Clark, and P. Foot.  In the course 
of this analysis I will explore the nature of the will according to Nietzsche and the ascetic ideal.  
I will draw on J. Richardson’s analysis of what he calls ‘positive/negative’ and ‘active/reactive’ 
wills.  This will help to make clear what Nietzsche considers a healthy and natural will as 
opposed to the sickness of the ascetic ideal.  In order to do this I will also draw on Aristotle’s 
notion of Eudaimonia. 
 ix
Chapter 3 will continue to focus on slave morality and the ascetic ideal.  I will explore the 
psychological mechanisms at work in slave morality and the ascetic ideal.  In particular I will 
analyze what I call the desire to be commanded.  To understand this we will have to discuss how 
slave morality creates and exploits what Nietzsche calls the ‘bad conscience’ and ‘ressentiment’.  
Drawing heavily on passages like GS 347 and HAH 139 I will describe this desire to be 
commanded in terms of various forms of Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and what I will 
call “metaphysical motion sickness”. 
In light of the analysis of the ascetic ideal and slave morality I will focus specifically on 
the Apostle Paul in Chapter 4 and the way in which he not only is the architect of slave morality 
according to Nietzsche but also serves as a very interesting case study in light of Nietzsche’s 
critique of morality.  Specifically the question will be: on what non-hypocritical grounds can 
Nietzsche criticize Paul in the way he does in the Antichrist?  After all, Paul was not an ascetic 
and, like Nietzsche, he was also engaged in a project of revaluating all values.  Moreover he was 
pursuing the difficult task of not only establishing a new moral system but also a new vision of 
man.  So if Paul was in concert with the will to power as laid out in Chapter 2 and was not like 
the ascetic described in Chapter 3, on what grounds can Nietzsche justify his criticism of the 
Apostle Paul?  
In the final chapter I will address Nietzsche’s revaluation of values head on.  With the 
optics of Nietzsche’s moral landscape firmly in place we will try to discern what Nietzsche’s 
positive vision of a ‘higher morality’ would look like. Specifically what exactly does Nietzsche 
mean by higher/noble kinds of morality?  With the first four chapters having established the 
moral landscape as it pertains to Nietzsche’s critique, chapter 5 will discuss Nietzsche’s positive 
views.  Chapter 1 explored Nietzsche’s critique of various forms of morality while chapter 2 
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established the anchor for his revaluation of values in the form of the will to power.  Chapter 3 
then explored the sickness of the ascetic ideal while Chapter 4 contrasted Paul’s revaluation with 
Nietzsche’s.  In Chapter 5 we will now be able to contrast Nietzsche’s positive ideals (related to 
health and the will to power) with the full array of sick types first delineated in Chapter 2.  This 
will allow us to finally articulate Nietzsche’s positive views in connection to major features of 
his thought like the will to power and the eternal return.  This analysis will also allow us to 
compare and contrast Nietzsche’s ‘higher morality’ with moral systems like Kant’s deontological 
ethics.  In the final analysis I will argue that Nietzsche’s ‘higher morality’ really doesn’t 
constitute a morality at all but rather a set of values rooted in health and strength.  In light of this 
I will offer some final thoughts and conclusions regarding slave morality. 
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Chapter I: The Senses of “Morality” 
 
It goes without saying that Nietzsche has much to say on the topic of morality.  But the 
consistency of his views on morality is the subject of a rich debate.  Things he says in one 
passage seem to directly contradict statements in other passages.  For instance compare passages 
like TI 4, BGE 202, WP 268, A 24, and BGE 32, where Nietzsche talks of “higher” types of 
moralities, and says things like “Only one kind of human morality beside which, before which, 
after which many other, above all higher, moralities are possible or ought to be possible” (BGE 
202), with passages like D 103 and GS 116 where he seems to reject morality altogether, 
declaring, “I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises” (D 103).   
This raises several questions: were his views constantly changing?  Are his views 
careless and contradictory?  Or is it rather that his views are so rich and complex that a single 
term like “morality” cannot at all capture the various senses in which he utilizes the term?  I am 
decidedly in favor of the latter proposition and maintain that he is far more consistent in his 
philosophical views of morality than it seems with only a cursory reading.  A more nuanced 
analysis reveals that Nietzsche is in fact being careless with terms like “morality”.  In passages 
like BGE 32 and D 103 the term does not refer to the same concept.  In her article “Nietzsche’s 
Immoralism and the Concept of Morality”1 Maudemarie Clark argues, “When Nietzsche 
occasionally writes of ‘higher moralities’, I take him, in accord with BGE 32, to be using 
‘morality’ in a nontraditional and wider sense, which makes it equivalent to ‘codes for evaluating 
human beings and their conduct’ ” (Clark NICM 17).  I agree with Clark’s interpretation.  There 
simply is no other way to reconcile talk of “higher morality” with a rejection of “all moral 
premises”.  The only alternative to this view is that Nietzsche’s thought contains glaring 
                                            
1 Clark, Maudemarie (1994) “Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality” in R. Schacht (1994) Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (London: University of California) Press) 
[NICM]. 
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inconsistencies.  I submit that Nietzsche was too critical a thinker to allow such an egregious 
cognitive dissonance to permeate one of his primary philosophical topics.  
Accordingly, the aim of this chapter is to identify, properly articulate and, most 
importantly, relate all the different ways in which Nietzsche uses the term “morality”.  While 
there is a fair amount of overlap between several of the uses, I maintain that Nietzsche employs 
multiple notions of the term “morality”.  The first sense is complex but sets the stage and 
provides the framework for understanding the subsequent senses and how they relate to one 
another.  Additionally, in the first section of this chapter we will attempt to properly situate 
Nietzsche as a morality critic.  The primary moral distinctions will help to accomplish this but it 
will require us to discuss not only the different senses of morality but also the different features 
of moral systems.  This will allow us to situate Nietzsche’s various critical comments on 
morality within their proper context.  One of the end goals of this entire work is to delineate the 
optics of the moral landscape as it pertains to Nietzsche’s ‘immoralism’.  Accordingly, this 
chapter will provide an important first step in articulating that landscape. 
 
 
i. The Primary Kinds of Morality and Nietzsche as a Morality Critic 
The first kind of morality employed by Nietzsche refers to sets or codes of values.  However, 
morality in this sense does not refer to just any sets of values – like say values of etiquette or 
local custom – but rather refers to sets of values that are ascribed significant normative value, 
and are at least perceived by members as being more purposeful than arbitrary (even if the 
opposite is in fact the case).  Nietzsche argues that most of these sets of values involve, or are 
even entirely composed of, prejudices (GM Preface 2-3, GS 116, HAH 37, 42, 68, 96).  There 
are of course varying degrees of normative significance and purpose that belong to different sets 
of values.  In Nietzsche’s estimation few sets of values are entirely arbitrary; most have a 
genealogical origin that’s rooted in some purpose or other, but such an account does not 
vindicate or legitimize the normative force of a given value.  Moreover, the real value of values, 
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and their real meaning and purpose, is often forgotten, distorted, or exaggerated by the adherents.  
However, some sets of values are more confused and full of prejudices than others.    
 Often Nietzsche assesses a morality in terms of two considerations: first, its ability to 
successfully achieve and produce desired ends, and second, the value and worth of those ends.  
In this manner Nietzsche simply takes it as a given that all moralities are, in truth, 
conventionalist in nature – which is to say, moral values are simply the product of human 
interactions and there is no moral law that exists objectively in itself.  They are all the product of 
basic human needs in the context of environmental constraints and human competition (GS 116).  
However, some moral systems are more reflective of, and in sync with, basic human needs, and 
more efficient at satisfying them.  A refined and deliberative set of moral values based on social 
contract theory will thus fare much better in Nietzsche’s evaluation than one that is bogged down 
with and clouded by historically rooted prejudices.  Nevertheless even the best and most efficient 
moral system of this type will not fare as well in terms of the other consideration – namely, the 
value of the system’s ends.  This is no doubt the major concern and objection Nietzsche has with 
Utilitarianism.  As we will see, he is concerned with both the form as well as the content of sets 
of values.   
 So where should we situate Nietzsche as a morality critic?  In his article “Nietzsche and 
the Morality Critics,”2 Leiter argues that Nietzsche should be distinguished from other morality 
critics (specifically contemporary Anglo-American critics) in that “he is a genuine critic of 
morality as a real cultural phenomenon, while recent Anglo-American writers are only critics of 
particular philosophical theories of morality” (Leiter NMC 252).  But this view raises an 
interesting question.  Is Leiter correct in considering Nietzsche a unique equal opportunity critic 
of all morality?  As previously mentioned, Clark stops short of this claim and argues instead: “I 
want to make it clear, however, that I do not take this as a claim to reject all morality (or morality 
                                            
2 Leiter, Brian (2001) “Nietzsche and the Morality Critics” in B. Leiter and J. Richardson (2001) Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy: Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NMC]. 
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itself) given every possible understanding of ‘morality’” (Clark NICM 16).  She justifies this 
position by observing that Nietzsche himself spoke of  “noble morality” and “higher moralities”. 
Leiter however goes on to further articulate his view of Nietzsche as a morality critic.  He states, 
“Admittedly, the Morality Critics often present themselves as critics of morality itself – in that 
sense they echo Nietzsche – but, on examination, it is clear that their targets are specific theories 
of morality, consequentialist and deontological” (Leiter NMC 255).  I agree with Leiter that 
Nietzsche is an ‘extramoral’ (NMC 258) critic but this should not obfuscate the fact that 
Nietzsche has his own specific target – namely Christianity.  For this reason I do not consider 
Nietzsche an equal opportunity morality critic distinguished from all others.  In her article 
“Nietzsche: the Revaluation of Values”3 Philippa Foot argues that Nietzsche singles out 
Christianity for the following two reasons: 
 
 
In the first place he is suggesting that what is praised as Christian virtue is largely 
a sham, and that true goodwill would be produced not by teaching the morality of 
compassion but rather the encouraging “a healthy egoism”.  Secondly he is saying 
that judged by its own aims this morality is bad.  Men suffer pity as a sickness, 
and by their pity they do more harm than good (Foot NRV 212-213). 
 
I think Foot’s analysis is correct – especially when she goes on to stress that Nietzsche also 
singles out Christian morality because it is a weapon used by the weak to empower themselves 
and undermine the strong and noble types4.  Clearly Christian morality was the biggest target of 
Nietzsche’s critique (GM III 27, BGE 202, EH “Destiny” 4).    
In addition to Foot’s observations, I would point out that as a moral system Christianity is 
unique among other forms of morality in that it fundamentally and essentially denies that its 
values are a product of convention but rather are real and metaphysically rooted in nature itself.  
The prejudices involved in Christian morality are therefore especially pernicious according to 
Nietzsche.  Fundamentally it is rooted in the prejudiced and dogmatic assertion that it is 
                                            
3 Foot, Philippa (2001) “Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values” in B. Leiter and J. Richardson (2001) Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NRV].  
4 Foot NRV 213. 
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synonymous with, not only morality itself, but also value and meaning.  Additionally Nietzsche 
is deeply skeptical of the value of Christian morality’s values.  This makes it unique and 
disparate from other sets of values or straightforward types of morality.  So this first sense of 
morality actually involves two distinct kinds of morality: there are different forms of what I will 
call “A morality” that refers to distinct and specific sets of normative values – this more general 
use of “morality” leaves open the possibility of higher sets of values that do not involve 
prejudices and are worthy of valuing – and then there is what I will call “B morality” where a 
specific set of values becomes thought of, not as just a set of values among others, but as 
absolute in contrast to all other sets of values that are presumed to be products of convention.  
“All value of all things shines on me.  All value has long been created, and I am all created 
value” (Z I 1) – in other words, when a specific A morality becomes synonymous with morality 
itself.  Accordingly, the rejection of some particular B morality would in no way entail a 
rejection of A morality – something which would however be tantamount to nihilism from the 
perspective of B morality.  But this is the prejudiced perspective of B morality and its so-called 
“absolute” moral values.  Though all moral values (including B morality) are in fact products of 
convention according to Nietzsche, the absolute values of B morality became synonymous with 
morality and valuing itself – subsequently ‘moral values’ became synonymous with ‘absolute 
values’.  Accordingly, B morality would have been better characterized by a term other than 
“morality”.  But maybe the reason he does not do this is to highlight the fact that the very 
problem with B morality is that it fundamentally refuses to acknowledge the distinction between 
A morality and B morality.  From the believer's perspective any values not in perfect concert 
with their B morality are immoral by definition.  I take it this is why Nietzsche specifically states 
that his term ‘immoralism’ involves two negations: 
 
Fundamentally, my term immoralist involves two negations.  For one, I negate a 
type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, 
the beneficent [A morality].  And then I negate the type of morality that has 
become prevalent and predominant as morality itself [B morality] – the morality 
of decadence or, more concretely, Christian morality (EH “Destiny” 4). 
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Clearly Nietzsche considers Christianity to be an instance of B morality. 
 
 
Only one kind of human morality [A] beside which, before which, after which 
many other, above all higher, moralities [A] are possible or ought to be possible.  
But against such a ‘possibility’, against such an ‘ought’, this morality [B] defends 
itself with all its might: it says, obstinately and stubbornly, ‘I am morality itself, 
and nothing is morality besides me!’...  the democratic movement inherits the 
Christian (BGE 202). 
 
 
Nietzsche thus refers to Christianity, or B morality, as “slave morality” and 
maintains it was born out of a hostile revolt against various forms of an A morality (i.e. 
Roman values, Pagan, etc.).  In Nietzsche’s words: “The slave revolt in morality begins 
when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values...  Its action is 
fundamentally reaction” (GM I 10).  It is crucial to note that this process of appropriation 
and reorganization is itself a creative process.  An underlying and somewhat undeclared 
theme of Nietzsche’s entire analysis of morality is that morality is always a creative 
endeavor – which is to say, metaphysically speaking, there simply is no such thing as 
absolute values.  The irony is that the very notion of so called “absolute values” is in fact 
a created value.  As Nietzsche describes: 
 
“The enemy” as the man of ressentiment conceives him – and here precisely is his 
deed, his creation: he has conceived “the evil enemy,” “the Evil One,” and this in 
fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and 
pendant, a “good one” – himself  (GM I 10, [my emphasis]) 
 
Nietzsche’s point is that slave morality’s negation of everything noble is at the same time the 
creation of new, antithetical, moral values in which “pessimistic mistrust of the entire station of 
man will find expression” (BGE 260).   As we will see, the key to the success of B morality is 
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the invention of new moral categories – ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in contrast to A morality’s ‘good’ and 
‘bad’5. 
 In a poignantly titled section “how far the moral sphere extends” in The Gay Science 
Nietzsche says, 
 
As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct it with the aid of all 
our previous experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice.  All 
experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception (GS 
114). 
 
The argument here is that it can appear as if nearly everything is imbued with moral values – and 
moral values do seem to color everything – but this is a kind of illusion.  Just as in the case of 
aesthetic values, we project moral meaning and value into virtually everything through various 
forms of anthropomorphic projections.  Nietzsche clearly views the process of valuing as a 
fundamental and essential part of being a human.  We can no more divorce ourselves from 
valuing and judging than we can divorce ourselves from the necessity of breathing.  In 
Nietzsche’s words, “Life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we 
posit values” (TI 5).   According to Nietzsche valuing is an act of affirmation.  There simply are 
no values, moral or otherwise, that exist in themselves.  Consider the value of the conch in 
Golding’s Lord of the Flies.  Initially it holds significant value for the boys.  But its value and 
meaning is nothing but a product of the boy’s agreement on it and affirmation of it.  When the 
majority of boys cease to affirm its value, it loses it because it had no real moral value in itself – 
it returns to being just a conch.  So if morality just is this projection of values into nature then it 
will indeed essentially involve belief in moral facts according to Nietzsche’s estimation.  
“Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena – more precisely, a misinterpretation” 
(WP 259).   
 
                                            
5 A detailed discussion of these contrasting moral categories will be reserved for the third and final section of this 
chapter.  For our present purposes we need only note that A and B moralities operate with different moral categories. 
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Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to 
its nature – nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as 
a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed it.  Only we have created the 
world that concerns man! (GS 302). 
 
In other words, just as we create complex and ever evolving structures of meaning in terms of 
concepts – like a bee building a honeycomb according to Nietzsche in the Truth and Lie in an 
Extra-Moral Sense – so too do we erect complex structures of value in the domain of morality.  
The trouble is that in both contexts the original value or meaning behind concepts and moral 
values can change or even be forgotten in ways we are completely ignorant of.  As a result of this 
forgetting Nietzsche’s concern is that we all too often end up affirming values that are in fact 
prejudices or no longer worthy of value – and mistakenly come to think of them as ‘moral facts’ 
which we subsequently read back into the nature of things (BGE 108).   
 To properly situate Nietzsche as a morality critic we need to explore why this happens 
and what motivates it.  Robert Guay argues that “morality forms a complex whose center is the 
search for a kind of normative stability” and that this desire compounded with “a belief that these 
conditions [stability and certainty] must be satisfied for a way of life to be legitimate”6 creates a 
need to be commanded that is best satisfied by the genesis of moral rules and facts.  This, Guay 
argues, is why Nietzsche saw fit to do a genealogy of morality rather than a mere analysis7.  I 
think Guay is right in this assessment and in his discussion of the problematic consequences of 
these ‘moral facts’.  He identifies three problems with ‘moral rules’:  
 
One is that insofar as morality takes on an abstracted form, it fails to cover 
matters of genuine responsibility...  The second issue is that morality’s generality 
prevents it from having enough content to know what it means to apply it 
correctly...  The third issue is that morality insists on universality of application, 
where that is inappropriate (Guay HBI 62).   
 
                                            
6 Guay, Robert “How to Be an Immoralist” (2007) in Tevenar, G. Nietzsche and Ethics 58, 60 [HBI]. 
7 Guay HBI 57. 
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He references BGE 198 in support of this claim where it is clear that Nietzsche has exactly these 
three issues in mind when it comes to traditional forms of morality.  Guay goes on to argue that 
Nietzsche is himself best understood as a more or less straightforward virtue ethicist.   
While Guay’s view has its merits, I think it misses the revolutionary aspect of 
Nietzsche’s revaluation of values.  Accordingly, I am much more in agreement with Philippa 
Foot’s aesthetic form of evaluation8.  Foot argues: 
 
These considerations should, I think, incline us to view that Nietzsche is an 
immoralist rather than a special kind of moralist.  And one is led in the same 
direction by the fact that he was prepared to throw out rules of justice in the 
interests of producing a stronger and more splendid type of man.  I suggested that 
this implied a quasi-aesthetic rather than a moral set of values.  Morality is 
necessarily connected with such things as justice and the common good, and it is 
a conceptual matter that this is so (Foot NRV 219). 
 
What exactly this “quasi-aesthetic” element is will be revisited in later chapters but for our 
present purposes I think Foot does a better job of situating Nietzsche as a morality critic than 
Guay or Leiter does.  Nietzsche is not exactly an equal opportunity morality critic.  But his 
revaluation of all values does make him a sort of ‘immoralist’.  However, as Foot points out, this 
does not make Nietzsche a nihilist when it comes to values.  As will be discussed in much more 
detail later, there were clearly values that Nietzsche himself endorses.  Nietzsche is simply 
interested in changing the ways in which we value. 
 So, to return to the question, why do we value in these ways?  The answer according to 
Nietzsche is that we are simply forced to value and create values (TI 5), and given psychological 
forces and needs humans will always value disparate things and value in disparate ways.  
Invariably some will be healthy and others will be destructive.  As previously discussed, I 
maintain that Nietzsche is a conventionalist when it comes to forms of valuing and argues that 
valuing is fundamentally an act of affirmation that in effect creates the value of the value.  
                                            
8 Foot (1994) “Nietzsche’s Immoralism” in R. Schacht (1994) Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals 11 [NI]. 
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However, as it will be discussed in later chapters, I think that Nietzsche’s primary ‘naturalistic’ 
values (i.e. the will to power and health) are not products of convention but actually represent 
‘ur-values’.  For our present purposes though, with regard to moral values Nietzsche is clearly a 
conventionalist.   
In GS 335 Nietzsche argues that there are three steps involved in moral action: first, one 
judges “this is right”, second, “therefore it must be done”, and third, they perform the action.  He 
then observes: 
 
You are speaking of three actions instead of one.  When you judge “this is right,” 
that is an action, too.  Might it not be possible that one could judge in a moral and 
in an immoral way?  Why do you consider this, precisely this, right? (GS 335). 
 
Accordingly, the real value and meaning of so called “absolute values” is in fact a product of an 
adherent’s affirmation of them as such.  The problem is that, if Nietzsche is right, then the 
notions of ‘moral facts’ and ‘absolute moral values’ can be affirmed just like any other value and 
thereby obtain significant meaning.  In fact such values obtain a special kind of meaning because 
they are seen as standing above all other sets of conventionalist values in that they are not 
conventionalist but absolute – as in the case of B morality.  The prejudice involved here is the 
idea that conventionalist values are fundamentally inferior to absolute values.  This is the highly 
successful (historically speaking) way in which such a morality markets itself.  It does not 
compete with other sets of A moralities based merely on content of their values; rather, it 
cultivates its appeal by claiming its values have a radically different and superior form than any 
other possible sets of A moralities.  In this way it’s actually able to sell very backwards and even 
destructive content to followers.  But the irony is that the proposition, the prejudice, that it (B 
morality) is higher and superior (to any form of A morality) is itself an affirmed and created 
value.  Consider that the only way one could judge that the conventionalist’s claim that “man is 
the measure” is qualitatively inferior to B morality’s thesis that it is morality itself (i.e. its 
absolute values) is if man is in fact the measure.  In other words, the very notion of B morality’s 
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absolute values is in fact a created value.  In Nietzsche’s words this movement is “the 
transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end itself” (EH, 
“Destiny” 3). 
 This, I argue, is the deeper meaning behind his declaration that “there are no moral facts, 
only a moral interpretation of facts” (BGE 108).  The very act of ‘moral’ valuation for Nietzsche 
is a process of interpretation.   The problem, however, is when moralizers assume that there are 
moral properties to the facts/phenomena themselves.  This is why Nietzsche claims that morality 
misrepresents phenomena (WP 259).  The idea seems to be that everyone would agree with the 
proposition “murder is wrong” and yet people will have radically different opinions about what 
constitutes murder.  This is not to say that Nietzsche is a moral relativist or subjectivist; but 
rather, the point is that the real moral significance of a proposition like “murder is wrong” is not 
contained in the proposition itself but in the affirmation of what one takes to constitute the 
meaning (or referent) of a given moral proposition.  The real valuing then only begins when one 
is asked to articulate what exactly constitutes the concept ‘murder’.  One may begin with very 
general descriptions of case types but will very quickly discover that though everyone agrees that 
murder is wrong there are fundamental disagreements about what constitutes murder.  For 
instance, is capital punishment murder? or abortion? or euthanasia? what about self-defense or 
the case of a just war, etc.?  Invariably when further questioned individuals will be forced to 
appeal to more and more concepts.   
 Nietzsche’s point is that it is really only at this stage that valuing occurs.  And yet it’s a 
process that is never really finished.  How can one satisfactorily define, even for themselves let 
alone others, the concept of murder in terms of other refined concepts in a way that properly 
captures and anticipates every possible instance of an unjust killing a priori?  This is because if 
there are no moral facts in themselves to appeal to and every case is to some extent unique then 
our moral concepts and abstractions will never really be adequate.  Are we then left with a kind 
of subjective intuitionism where at best one can say “I can’t define murder but I know it when I 
see it”?  But then Nietzsche does not simply state “there are no moral facts” and leave it at that.  
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For, not only does he observe that this in no way excludes moral valuing and interpreting, he 
seems to endorse and advocate some ways of valuing.  As Nietzsche argues in Beyond Good and 
Evil: 
 
It is immediately obvious that designations of moral value were everywhere first 
applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions...  The noble 
type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values... he knows himself to be 
that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates values” (BGE 260).  
 
Perhaps the model then is something like a judge who actively sets precedents based on previous 
cases and thereby creates new values through a process of valuing, judging, and affirming.  After 
all there are no laws or legal precedents in nature apart from human interactions, but this in no 
way entails that there are no legal values – they are simply values that by their very nature have 
to be created.  When Nietzsche discusses the creation of values in the case of master morality I 
take it to be very much analogous to this model.  Clearly from the perspective of B morality the 
response to this would be that moral values are fundamentally different from legal values but that 
is precisely the point.  The problem is that B morality takes moral values to be fundamentally not 
created or developed out of conventions like legal precedents when in fact they are – just as man 
is the measure when it comes to legal precedents so too is man the measure when it comes to 
moral precedents.  The idea is roughly this: if one likened belief in God to belief in Santa Claus 
(as Nietzsche likely would), the believer would no doubt object that belief in God is 
fundamentally not like belief in Santa Claus.  But this is the very point – if one came to view 
belief in God as the same as belief in Santa Claus they would not suddenly believe in Santa 
Claus but cease to believe in God.  Similarly if one came to view moral values as analogous to 
legal values they would not suddenly take legal values to be absolute in nature but would cease 
to believe in the absolute values of B morality.  We will revisit the tension between A and B 
moralities in the concluding section of this chapter, but for now let us take inventory of the other 
senses of morality employed by Nietzsche. 
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ii. “Higher Morality” and the Will to Power 
Before we address any further senses of morality it is important to observe what is becoming 
increasingly apparent in my analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of morality – Nietzsche’s 
employment of the term “morality” appears to be messy.  Recall the contrast in content and tone 
between D 103 and BGE 202.  This however does not entail that Nietzsche’s critique is messy, 
but is, rather, a consequence of the nature of morality itself.  The history of morality is long and 
winding.  In the simplest terms, it is a messy amalgamation of traditions and prejudices, as well 
as complex psychological issues like guilt, punishment, and their prehistories9.  Clark argues that 
when one analyzes Nietzsche’s treatment of things like guilt and punishment it becomes clear 
that “Nietzsche suggests that concepts influenced by history are like ropes held together by the 
intertwining of strands, rather than by a single strand running through the whole thing” (Clark 
NICM 22).  So many features of any morality involve arbitrary prejudices and idiosyncrasies.  
That being said, different moral systems like slave morality may have defining features (i.e. they 
are reactionary and utilize the value schema good and evil) but the evolutionary process from the 
morality of custom to slave morality is long, complicated, and inefficient.  The values of early 
moral values will continue to reverberate and influence the value of later values.  Although that 
long history involves many individuals who have tried to revise and modify moral values, 
morality itself can never go back to the drawing board and start from scratch.   
A couple of analogies may be helpful in clarifying these points.  First, in his book The 
Greatest Show on Earth10, the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins makes similar claims 
about the evolution of any species.  The changes and mutations it undergoes are always 
influenced by the prehistory of that species’ ancestry.  Moreover, evolution can never go back to 
the drawing board and start from scratch.  The organism has to remain functional and viable 
throughout every stage of an evolutionary process; if it fails to do this it simply dies off.  This, 
                                            
9 The term ‘prehistory’ is related to Nietzsche’s discussion of the ‘bad conscience’ and will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 2 in connection with an analysis of what Nietzsche calls ‘the will to power’. 
10 Dawkins, Richard (2009) The Greatest Show on Earth (New York: Free Press). 
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according to Dawkins, is why evolution is so messy.  He observes that, while any complex 
organism looks efficient and organized on the outside, if one dissects it, it is immediately 
apparent that the insides are a complete mess and are wildly inefficient.  If humans had been 
designed, he argues, our circulatory system should look much more like a car’s manifold intake 
and exhaust systems – neat, orderly, and efficient.  The reason for this is that evolution (like 
morality) always works with what it has and can never go back to the drawing board.  To further 
illustrate this point Dawkins considers whether engineers could transform an old prop plane into 
a jet plane.  The catch however would be that as the engineers replace parts, the plane would 
have to remain functional and able to fly at every step in the process.  While this would surely be 
possible, the final jet produced would be wildly inefficient and messy.  So it is with the evolution 
of morality.  The inefficiencies of this engineering experiment are analogous to the prejudices 
involved in the evolution of morality. 
 Because of this messy evolutionary process, morality has no clear or fixed essence.  If 
anything, morality is a confused amalgamation of values, prejudices, and conventions.  
Accordingly, morality is analogous to a university like Kansas.  It can be described in various 
ways (i.e. the campus, the departments, the faculty, the students, or its various organizations etc) 
but there is no one way to describe what the University of Kansas is.  Moreover, it too (like 
morality) has an ever-changing history; so any description of the University of Kansas also has 
to take into account its duration through time.  And yet KU lacks an enduring and unchanging 
essence.  To further complicate the issue, not only does KU have many features unique to it, it 
also shares many features in common with other universities and schools.  So how exactly can 
one define the University of Kansas?  This of course is just another version of the classic 
problem identity that goes back to the ship of Theseus – but just as it applies to a university, so 
too does it apply to morality according to Nietzsche.  In a word, whatever morality is, it’s messy. 
With this issue in mind, let us now consider the different senses of “morality” employed 
by Nietzsche.  He refers to a “morality of intention” in contrast to a “morality of custom/mores” 
(die Sittlich der Sitte).  The main difference is that intentions matter in the context of morality of 
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intention but do not in the case of morality of custom.  For instance, as Nietzsche observes some 
customs are simply for the sake of custom: “as for example those among the Kamshadales 
forbidding the scraping of snow from the shoes with a knife, the impaling of a coal on a knife, 
the placing of an iron in the fire—and he who contravenes them meets death!” (D 16).  In this 
barbaric form of custom one’s intentions do not matter – all that matters is whether or not they 
violated the customs.  This extreme form of custom belongs to what Nietzsche describes as the 
“pre-moral” period.  So “morality” in the sense of morality of intention refers to the period that 
followed – namely, the moral period – and does not then include the morality of custom.  Instead 
the idea of morality in this sense essentially involves the value of intention.  They both however 
demand self-sacrifice for the sake of the needs of the community.  Nietzsche’s concern here is 
the way in which A moralities utilize the idea of moral facts to manipulate people into serving 
the interests of the herd.  It is in this sense that Nietzsche speaks of “herd morality” and this is in 
fact a precursor for the development of B moralities like Christianity.  Nietzsche describes this 
phenomenon as follows: 
 
The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently 
embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a 
certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently 
calculable...  With the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man 
was actually made calculable (GM II 2) 
 
Wherever we encounter a morality, we also encounter valuations and an order of 
rank of human impulses and actions.  These valuations and orders of rank are 
always expressions of the needs of a community and herd... Morality is the herd 
instinct in the individual (GS 116). 
 
 By herd morality Nietzsche thus means a process of domestication through which 
behavior is made uniform and predictable.  People are taught to be like cattle and desire only 
pleasure and security, and as a result become part of a herd with respect to society rather than a 
collection of individuals.  In this sense, Nietzsche argues: 
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Morality makes stupid. – Custom represents the experiences of men of earlier 
times as to what they supposed useful and harmful – but the sense for custom 
(morality) applies, not to these experiences as such, but to the age, the sanctity, 
the indiscussability of the custom.  And so this feeling is a hindrance to the 
acquisition of new experiences and the correction of customs: that is to say, 
morality as a hindrance to the creation of new and better customs: it makes stupid 
(D 19). 
 
In the following passage from Dawn it is clear that Nietzsche here identifies the term “custom” 
with morality as he articulates the basic mechanisms of this herd morality: 
 
The chief proposition: morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than 
obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the 
traditional way of behaving and evaluating.  In things in which no tradition 
commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the 
smallest circle of morality…  What is tradition?  A higher authority which one 
obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it commands... 
(D 9).  
 
Thus in this sense the individual and the demands of morality are in direct conflict with one 
another.  Ironically, though such social contract moralities are pitched and sold in terms of self-
interest they in fact are not in one’s interests (at least not the Noble’s) but rather are rooted in the 
interests of the community as a whole.  In Nietzsche’s words, “The free human being is immoral 
because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon tradition” (D 9). 
 
To be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice 
obedience towards a law or tradition established from old... it is above all directed 
at the preservation of a community (HAH 96). 
 
 
According to Nietzsche guilt, self-sacrifice, and cruelty all intersect when it comes to all three of 
the senses of morality thus far discussed.  Sacrifice for the sake of community eventually mutates 
into self-sacrifice for the sake of self-sacrifice.  Self-sacrifice in fact becomes a virtue and the 
very mark of the “most moral man”.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
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Cruelty is one of the oldest festive joys of mankind.  Consequently it is imagined 
that the gods too are refreshed and in festive mood when they are offered the 
spectacle of cruelty – and thus there creeps into the world the idea that voluntary 
suffering, self-chosen torture, is meaningful and valuable.  Gradually, custom 
created within the community a practice corresponding to this idea: all excessive 
well-being henceforth aroused a degree of mistrust, all hard suffering inspired a 
degree of confidence...  Thus the concept of the ‘most moral man’ of the 
community came to include the virtue of the most frequent suffering, of privation, 
of the hard life, of cruel chastisement – not, to repeat it again and again, as a 
means of discipline, of self-control, of satisfying the desire for individual 
happiness – but as a virtue which will put the community in good order with the 
evil gods and which steams up to the altar like a perpetual propitiatory sacrifice 
on the altar (D 18). 
 
So this process of self-sacrifice carries its own momentum and ultimately culminates in valuing 
sacrifice and suffering above all else.  It is in this way that the herd mentality sets the stage for 
ascetic ideals of slave morality11.  The herd mentality eventually transforms A morality into B 
morality, and B morality in turn becomes the ascetic ideal.  In the ascetic, self-sacrifice becomes 
outright self-punishment.  Why?  Because self-punishment produces more suffering and guilt, 
which in turn perpetuates this vicious cycle – this cycle is what Nietzsche terms “suicidal 
nihilism” (a concept that will be discussed in the following section).   
This is the basis of Nietzsche’s rejection of morality in general.  Consider the following 
passage from Beyond Good and Evil: 
 
Morality in the sense in which it has been understood hitherto, that is to say the 
morality of intention, has been a prejudice, a precipitancy, perhaps something 
provisional and precursory, perhaps something of the order of astrology and 
alchemy, but in any event something must be overcome.  The overcoming of 
morality, in a certain sense even the self-overcoming of morality: let this be the 
name for that secret protracted labour which has been reserved for the subtlest, 
most honest and also most malicious conscience as living touchstones of the soul 
(BGE 32). 
 
Although Nietzsche here specifically refers to morality of intention, I would argue that he is 
really referring not only to the morality of intention but also the many different forms of A 
                                            
11 What Nietzsche calls the “ascetic ideal” will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 along with what Nietzsche calls 
the ‘bad conscience’. 
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morality that Nietzsche rejects, and of course B morality.  Accordingly, by the “self-overcoming 
of morality” I submit that Nietzsche means seeing the distinction between A morality and B 
morality, and overcoming not only the ideology of B morality but also the prejudices that are 
common to A moralities.  It is in this context that Nietzsche states: “Morality is in Europe today 
herd-animal morality – that is to say, as we understand the thing, only one kind of human 
morality beside which, before which, after which many other, above all higher, moralities are 
possible or ought to be possible”. (BGE 202).  So in both BGE 32 and BGE 202 Nietzsche is 
referencing a new sense of morality.  In this sense of morality he is contrasting A and B morality 
with the possibility of higher sets of values that are worthy of value.  The difference is that in 
BGE 202 he uses the term “higher morality” in contrast to the dogmatic forms of morality that 
have become synonymous with the very term “morality” (B morality) whereas in BGE 32 he 
uses the term “extra morality” in contrast to not only B morality but also prejudiced forms of A 
morality.  In other words, though Nietzsche’s terminology is confusing, the “higher morality” he 
envisions would belong to the ‘extra moral period’.  What exactly this “higher morality” is and 
whether it is a morality at all will be discussed in the subsequent chapters – in particular Chapter 
5.   
 So in addition to A and B morality, “higher morality” represents a third kind of morality. 
Nietzsche frequently discusses healthy, noble, and natural forms of morality in contrast to “anti-
natural” and prejudiced moralities12.  In this sense Nietzsche suddenly shifts from negative 
critical claims about morality and instead offers positive thoughts.  In his article “Nietzsche and 
the Morality Critics” Leiter states, “Since Nietzsche uses the word ‘morality’ (Moral) in both 
positive and negative senses, I will introduce a ‘technical’ term to mark ‘morality’ as the object 
of his critique: what I will call henceforth ‘morality in the pejorative sense’ (MPS)” (Leiter NMC 
263).  At this point we can borrow Leiter’s technical term and now conclude that both A and B 
                                            
12 This refers to all of the senses of morality previously discussed.  This includes straightforward forms of morality 
(A morality), dogmatic forms of moral realism (B morality), the morality of intention, and the morality of 
mores/custom.  In addition to this kind of morality, I will discuss one last kind of morality that refers to non-
Christian forms of B morality (i.e. Kant). 
 19
moralities are MPSs.  Nietzsche’s notion of a higher kind of morality and an “extra-moral” 
morality (BGE 202), however, would not be an MPS.  The reason this proposed “higher 
morality” is not an MPS, according to Nietzsche, is that it is natural and healthy (BGE 202). 
The important question initially is what does Nietzsche mean by ‘natural’?  If by the term 
“natural” he means values that we naturally or commonly have, then he would no doubt be guilty 
of the naturalistic fallacy in deeming them superior to anti-natural moralities.  But this does not 
seem to be the case.  In fact he maintains that it is the anti-natural values that seem to be 
common and come naturally while the noble and healthy seem to be rare exceptions to these 
values.  Nietzsche states: 
 
Every naturalism in morality – that is, every healthy morality – is dominated by 
an instinct of life...  Anti-natural morality – that is, almost every morality which 
has so far been taught, revered, and preached – turns, conversely, against the 
instincts of life (TI 4). 
 
So by “anti-natural” Nietzsche means values that retard our nature, and by “natural” he means 
values that are in accord with our nature and minimally do not retard it; optimally such natural, 
noble, and healthy values aim to develop our nature and expand drives – which is to say, such 
natural values express what Nietzsche calls the “will to power”13.  The anti-natural values of the 
ascetic aim to invert and sublimate both the Dionysian as well as Apollonian aspects of the will 
to power, whereas the natural values of Nietzsche’s noble morality aim to express them both.  
So, where “anti-natural” values pollute the will to power, “natural” values purify it.  In 
Nietzsche’s words, “Verily, a polluted stream is man.  One must be a sea to be able to receive a 
polluted stream without becoming unclean.  Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea” (Z 
Prologue 3).  Nietzsche argues: 
 
                                            
13 The “will to power” is the specific subject of the next chapter and will be discussed in detail.  It will also be 
further discussed in this chapter but for our present purposes we need only note that it is what Nietzsche considered 
the mark of the living and health – a relentless drive to become ever greater.  As it will be later discussed, it is 
composed of two basic forces: a Dionysian aspect (chaos) and an Apollonian aspect (order). 
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Life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit 
values.  From this it follows that even that anti-natural morality which conceives 
of God as the counter-concept and condemnation of life is only a value judgment 
of life – but of what life? of what kind of life?  I have already given the answer: of 
declining, weakened, weary, condemned life.  Morality, as it has so far been 
understood – as it has in the end been formulated once more by Schopenhauer, as 
“negation of the will to life” – is the very instinct of decadence, which makes an 
imperative of itself.  It says: “Perish!” (TI 5). 
 
 So by anti-natural morality Nietzsche means all MPSs, which includes most forms of A 
morality, morality of intention, and morality of ressentiment (initially an A morality as discussed 
in the first section of this chapter), which becomes increasingly hostile to higher, noble, and 
aristocratic moralities, and eventually succeeds in becoming “morality itself!” (BGE 202) (B 
morality).  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
In my Genealogy of Morals I offered the first psychological analysis of the 
counter-concepts of a noble morality and a morality of ressentiment – the latter 
born of the No to the former: but this is the Judeo-Christian morality pure and 
simple (A 24). 
 
Two types of morality must not be confused: the morality with which the healthy 
instinct defends itself against incipient decadence – and another morality with 
which this very decadence defines and justifies itself and leads downwards (WP 
268). 
 
Therefore by “higher morality”, “noble morality”, “healthy morality”, “master morality” and 
“natural morality” (non MPSs) Nietzsche means a system of values that aim to, not retard, but 
develop our natures and expand our drives and is “extra-moral” in the sense of being beyond the 
schema of good and evil that belongs to B morality (GM I 17) as well as beyond the schema of 
moralities of intention and as custom.  It is in this rarefied air that Nietzsche situates his higher 
values above morality itself.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
We should be able also to stand above morality – and not only to stand with the 
anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling any moment, but 
also to float above it and play (GS 107). 
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Clearly the standard of what is natural according to Nietzsche has to do with strength and 
weakness; accordingly he identifies the will to power as the most natural force – most notably in 
BGE 19 and 36 where Nietzsche argues that everything in nature is on some level an expression 
of the will to power.   
 So the problem with traditional forms of morality is that they tend to pollute and corrupt 
the expression of the will to power in the case of humans.  In passages like BGE 36 Nietzsche 
makes it clear that the will to power is everywhere in nature and the most natural and primordial 
force.  In nature it is simply growth and the ceaseless expansion of drives.  However, as 
previously discussed, humans are unique in that they must organize and negotiate competing 
drives.  In his words, “The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition” (TI “Anti-
nature” 3).  As a result, with respect to the will to power, given the complexities of human 
psychology there can be both strong as well as weak wills (BGE 21), and wills that desire to be 
self-commanding as well as wills that desire to be commanded from without (BGE 19) – which is 
to say, wills can flourish to varying degrees.  According to Nietzsche humans can have either 
strong self-commanding wills or weak heteronomous wills.  This can occur in the very extreme 
form of the ascetic or the moderate form of the plebeian herd but in either case it is the product 
of traditional forms of morality.  So what Nietzsche means by “natural” in the case of values and 
the will to power is not simply what is common or pervasive.  In his words, “Every naturalism in 
morality – that is, every healthy morality – is dominated by an instinct of life... Anti-natural 
morality... turns, conversely, against the instincts of life.  It is condemnation of these instincts...” 
(TI “Anti-nature” 5).  Here again it is clear that Nietzsche describes ‘unnatural’ moral values as 
those which are reactionary and hostile to what is instinctual – which is to say, they are values 
that are a “negation of the will to life” (TI “Anti-nature” 5).  Though Nietzsche is a bit confusing 
with his use of terms I maintain he identifies ‘natural’ values with a process of artfully 
structuring, managing, and expanding drives.  ‘Unnatural’ values are those that are reactionary 
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and hostile to the will to power – which will be the focus of the next chapter.14  Finally it should 
be observed that, according to Nietzsche, there are non-Christian forms of B morality – most 
notably Kant.  I think it is important to distinguish these non-Christian forms of B morality 
because so much of Nietzsche’s critique of morality is focused on the Christian form of B 
morality.  We should not however forget that there are other religious and secular forms of B 
morality.  Kant and this form of morality will be analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
 
iii. The Slave Revolt in Morality 
In light of my previous discussion of “higher morality” let us return to our analysis of MPSs and 
the prejudices of morality.  As I have just argued in the previous section, B morality involves 
prejudices and misinterpretations.  In Nietzsche’s words, “Morality is merely an interpretation of 
certain phenomena – more precisely, a misinterpretation” (WP 259).  This misinterpretation 
involves not only the content and form of values, but also the motivations linked to traditional 
moral values.  This is made clear in the following passage from Dawn: 
 
There are two kinds of deniers of morality. – ‘To deny morality’ – this can mean, 
first: to deny that the moral motives which men claim have inspired their actions 
really have done so – it is thus the assertion that morality consists of words and is 
among the coarser or more subtle deceptions (especially self-deceptions) which 
men practice, and is perhaps so especially in precisely the case of those most 
famed for virtue.  Then it can mean: to deny that moral judgments are based on 
truths.  Here it is admitted that they really are motives of action, but that in this 
way it is errors which, as the basis of all moral judgment, impel men to their 
moral actions.  This is my point of view...  I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that 
is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who 
believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them...  It goes without 
saying that I do not deny – unless I am a fool – that many actions called immoral 
ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and 
encouraged – but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided for 
                                            
14 The topic of ‘natural’ values will be revisited in detail and further discussed in both chapter 2 as well as chapter 5.  
The main point for our present purposes is that Nietzsche considers ‘unnatural’ things to be marked by reaction and 
hostility.  As we will discuss, the line of demarcation between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ will be drawn in terms of 
heath and sickness rather than frequency and rarity. 
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other reasons than hitherto.  We have to learn to think differently – in order at 
last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently (D 103). 
 
This passage however raises the question: what does he mean by “for other reasons than 
hitherto”?  Does this mean other kinds of moral reasons or reasons other than moral ones?  The 
answer however seems to depend on what sense of morality we are working with.  I think BGE 
202 makes it clear that he certainly means reasons other than B morality; but asking us to “feel 
differently” seems to suggest a paradigm shift in our ways of valuing even with respect to A 
morality.   
 To use Nietzsche’s own analogy, of course we know that the premises of alchemy are 
false, but only because they were replaced by modern chemistry.  So, to deny alchemy does not 
commit one to denying that there is a real truth or fact of the matter behind the chemical structure 
of various elements; it simply denies that alchemy is the way to obtain such knowledge.  Thus, 
alchemy may have been asking the right questions but it was not answering them in the right 
way.  In the same way, Christian morality (B morality) and various forms of A moralities may 
have asked some of the right questions about morality but it did not supply the right answers.  
Thus, just as modern chemistry replaced alchemy perhaps Nietzsche envisions something 
superior replacing these forms of morality.  This view is again supported by BGE 202. 
 
Only one kind of human morality beside which, before which, after which many 
other, above all higher, moralities are possible or ought to be possible.  But 
against such a ‘possibility’, against such an ‘ought’, this morality defends itself 
with all its might: it says, obstinately and stubbornly, ‘I am morality itself, and 
nothing is morality besides me!’...  the democratic movement inherits the 
Christian (BGE 202). 
 
Based on the text it is therefore reasonable to conclude that when Nietzsche says that he rejects 
morality as he does alchemy what he is really advocating and recommending is a rejection of B 
morality (BGE 32) which, as discussed, still leaves open the possibility for a system of A 
morality values worthy of value.  Consider the following passage: 
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Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much 
preparation?...  Whoever begins at this point, like my readers, to reflect and 
pursue his train of thought will not soon come to the end of it – reason enough for 
me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly clear what my 
aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my 
last book Beyond Good and Evil. – At least this does not mean “Beyond Good and 
Bad” (GM I 17). 
 
Nietzsche is as much rejecting previous forms of morality as he is advocating a paradigm shift in 
our very understanding of morality – the paradigm shift being the understanding that comes from 
the tension between, and nature of, A and B moralities.    This understanding then is a first step 
towards what he calls the revaluation of all values.  In Nietzsche’s words, “We need a critique of 
moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question” (GM Preface 
6).  “Nobody up to now has examined the value of that most famous of all medicines which we 
call morality; and the first step would be – for once to question it.  Well then, precisely this is our 
task” (GS 345). 
One of the other major problems with the motives involved in B morality is that they are 
anchored in a desire/need to be commanded.  What sets slave morality (B morality) apart is that 
this need is taken to an extreme such that, under its influence, morality becomes synonymous 
with the very idea of needing to be commanded by an external force.  I maintain that one of the 
marks15 of slave morality that separates B morality from A morality is this need to be 
commanded.  The focus here is the way in which B morality takes the manipulation of the herd 
and moral facts by A morality to a more vicious and extreme level, and involves even 
otherworldly sanctions and the idea of absolute moral facts (i.e. the schema of good and evil).  
This applies primarily to Christianity but when the need of other worldly sanctions and 
commands is taken to its zenith it culminates ultimately in the ascetic ideal.  
 Morality in this sense (ascetic ideals) is designed to resolve the anxiety of the normative 
vacuum discussed in GM III. 
                                            
15 The other primary marks of slave morality is the moral categories of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, its hostile and reactionary 
nature, and its tendency to promote sickness.  One other mark of slave morality is its tendency to empower the weak 
herd by undermining the strong nobles. 
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In the case of saints, finally, a pretext for hibernation, their novissima gloriae 
cupido [newest lust for glory], their response in nothingness (“God”), their form 
of madness.  That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, is 
an expression of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui. it needs a goal 
– and it will rather will nothingness than not will (GM III 1). 
 
The ascetic ideal emerges as the only alternative to suicidal nihilism (GM III 28).  In this way 
asceticism does not produce the need to be commanded – it is not the need itself but rather that 
which attempts to satisfy this natural human need.  It was at the same time an attempt to provide 
meaning to suffering in order to avoid suicidal nihilism.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something was lacking, that 
man was surrounded by a fearful void…  But his problem was not suffering itself, 
but that there was no answer to the crying question, “why do I suffer?”… The 
meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over 
mankind so far – and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning! In it, suffering was 
interpreted; the tremendous void seemed to have been filled; the door was closed 
to suicidal nihilism.  This interpretation – there is no doubt of it – brought fresh 
suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-destructive 
suffering: it placed all suffering under the perspective of guilt (GM III 28). 
 
 In this way, morality answers the same need to be commanded.  As we discussed in the 
third sense of morality (morality of mores), it is satisfied by purely arbitrary rules that have little 
to do with the needs of society.  In this extreme context sacrifice and suffering are no longer 
understood as necessary for the sake of the greater good.  Under the specter of suicidal nihilism 
such an account is no longer sufficient for providing meaning to suffering.  Instead, suffering and 
sacrifice become valuable for their own sake.  At this point the meaning of the commands 
themselves become secondary to the act of obedience.  Happiness is then held out perpetually 
like a carrot on a stick – and even reserved for the next world. 
 
The most general formula on which every religion and morality is founded is: 
“Do this and that, refrain from this and that – then you will be happy!  
Otherwise...”  Every morality, every religion, is this imperative.  I call it the great 
original sin of reason, the immortal un-reason [unsterbliche unvernunft].  In my 
mouth, this formula [verwandelt sich jene Formel in ihre Umkehrung] is changed 
into its opposite – first example of my “revaluation of all values” (TI 2). 
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 According to Nietzsche this need to be commanded goes hand in hand with a need to 
believe – both stem from a weak and superficial attempt to resolve the normative vacuum we 
encounter in terms of the meaninglessness of suffering.  In the Gay Science Nietzsche argues: 
 
Believers and their need to believe – How much one needs a faith in order to 
flourish, how much that is “firm” and that one does not wish to be shaken because 
one clings to it, that is a measure of the degree of one’s strength (or, to put the 
point more clearly, of one’s weakness)...  “Instinct of weakness”, which, to be 
sure, does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds 
but – conserves them....  Faith is always coveted most and needed most urgently 
where will is lacking; for will, as the affect of command, is the decisive sign of 
sovereignty and strength (GS 347).   
 
 
So the need to understand why one suffers is satisfied (out of weakness) by interpreting oneself 
as the cause16.  This immediately leads to the need to be commanded.  The solution to suffering 
becomes submission.  The “believer” must become heteronomous.  Nietzsche lays this out as 
follows: 
 
In other words, the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one 
covets someone who commands, who commands severely – a god, prince, class, 
physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.  From this one might 
perhaps gather that the two world religions, Buddhism and Christianity, may have 
owed their origin and above all their sudden spread to a tremendous collapse and 
disease of the will.  And that is what actually happened; both religions 
encountered a situation in which the will had become diseased, giving rise to a 
demand that had become utterly desperate for some “thou shalt...”  Once a human 
being reaches the fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he 
becomes “a believer.” (GS 347). 
 
I take it that when Nietzsche says, “Once a human being reaches the fundamental conviction that 
he must be commanded” he is being a bit ironic and facetious.  By stressing the “must” he seems 
to suggest that the conviction of the “believer” itself (that one must be commanded from 
something outside) is in fact a command one gives to oneself – which at once unravels the very 
                                            
16 This I maintain results in the guilt discussed by Nietzsche throughout the Genealogy of Morals but specifically his 
discussion of guilt in GM III 28. 
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nature of their conviction, and thus simultaneously reveals the cognitive dissonance of their 
belief.  It is self-deception cloaked by faith.  By contrast this also shows the courage and 
greatness of what Nietzsche calls the free spirit, who does not attempt to flee from the fact that 
one essentially does command oneself, but rather embraces it and in so doing becomes 
responsible for oneself in an authentic manner.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
But up to now the moral law has been supposed to stand above our own likes and 
dislikes: one did not want actually to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to 
take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere or have it commanded to one 
from somewhere (D 108). 
 
The point is not that the believer willingly becomes heteronomous by willingly choosing to 
submit to the authority and command of an outside force (which would not be problematic or 
contradictory); rather, the believer is, in essence, commanding himself to be a being of the sort 
that must be, and can in truth only be, commanded from without (which is a problem because it 
involves a blatant contradiction).   
 Nietzsche argues that “in this first type of morality [master] the antithesis ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ means the same thing as ‘noble’ and ‘despicable’ (BGE 260).  However, it is important to 
note that the categories ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are not moral evaluations.  As Clark puts it, “calling 
commoners ‘bad’ is certainly making a value judgment about them, but it is not judging them to 
be ‘morally bad’ or ‘immoral’ (Clark NICM 24)17.  The nobles are ‘good’ simply because they 
are the ones who take ownership of what it means to be human and actively work to define it.  
The ‘good’ is here defined by individuals as representative types.  Anything that falls short of the 
standard they set in terms of their greatness becomes ‘bad’18 by contrast, or, as a “pathos of 
distance” (BGE 257).  The most important consequence of this is that the moral categories of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ referred to individuals.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
                                            
17  In contrast to these evaluations, the categories ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are moral evaluations.  This will be discussed in 
more detail in connection with GM I 13. 
18 Again, by the term ‘bad’ Nietzsche does not imply a moral judgment; rather he means an evaluation of despicable 
and inferior. 
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It is immediately obvious that designations of moral value were everywhere first 
applied to human beings (as in the morality of the nobles), and only later and 
derivatively to actions...  The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner 
of values... he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor to 
things, he creates values (BGE 260).   
 
Nietzsche then goes on to observe that slave morality has a different origin – one born of 
retaliation and ressentiment.  The common plebeians were not satisfied with their second class 
rank and retaliated by creating a new form of morality that served their interests.  Rather than 
being rooted in nobility, virtue, and greatness, their morality was one of utility.  Nietzsche 
describes the plebeian’s morality as the beginning of slave morality and claims it is marked by a 
pronounced disdain for everything the nobles represent – everything from their power to their 
virtues (BGE 260).  As previously discussed, it is important to note that slave morality’s “action 
is fundamentally reaction” (GM I 10). 
 What the plebeians did was really quite ingenious according to Nietzsche.  They changed 
the moral game altogether.  Since they were clearly inferior in any moral system that placed a 
premium on individuals and noble types, they posited moral values rooted not in individuals but 
in actions – the values of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  In a sense the created an axiological domain above 
the nobles and their virtues through which they could judge and condemn the nobles.  The moral 
values of slave morality are exactly opposite those of master morality.  Here again is the 
“transposition of morality into the metaphysical” (EH “Destiny” 3) that culminates in B morality.  
In master morality the ‘good’ plays the primary role and is defined by the nobles – anything that 
falls short is simply deficient or ‘bad’.  In slave morality, however, the ‘evil’ plays a primary role 
and applies to anything powerful or threatening (i.e. the nobles), and ‘the good’ is anything that 
is not noble or powerful – anything that is potentially weak or vulnerable (i.e. the plebeians).  
Unlike master morality’s categories, slave morality’s categories are moral evaluations rather than 
mere value judgments.  Nietzsche describes the genesis of these new moral categories in 
Genealogy of Morals saying: 
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This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who conceives the 
basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then 
creates for himself an idea of “bad”.  This “bad” of noble origin and that “evil” 
out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred – the former an after-production, a side 
issue, a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, the 
beginning, the distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality – how 
different these words “bad” and “evil” are, although they are both apparently the 
opposite of the same concept “good.”  But it is not the same concept “good”: one 
should ask rather precisely who is “evil” in the sense of the morality of 
ressentiment (GM I 11). 
 
Nietzsche’s point is that master and slave morality do not share a common ‘good’ and merely 
have opposite negative correlates; rather they are completely antithetical and opposite moral 
systems – slave morality being designed and created precisely in response to master morality and 
its values.  Thus, where the nobles gave conceptual primacy to the concept ‘good’ by actively 
defining it, the plebeians grant conceptual primacy to ‘evil,’ and define ‘good’ only in contrast to 
it.  To reiterate their moral syllogism: “I am not that [noble], that is evil, therefore I am good”.  
 In the first essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche explains the ‘good’ as conceived by the man 
of ressentiment with an interesting allegory involving lambs and birds of prey.  There he states: 
 
That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no 
ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs.  And if the 
lambs say among themselves: “these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least 
like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb – would he not be good?” there 
is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the 
birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: “we don’t dislike them at all, 
these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender 
lamb” (GM I 13). 
 
Nietzsche’s point is that the slaves need “moral” values (i.e. ones rooted in the moral categories 
of ‘good’ and ‘evil’) of utility and security instead of noble values of greatness.  The lambs, for 
instance, declare that “the birds of prey ought not eat lambs”.  While such a notion sounds silly it 
proved to be quite powerful historically.  Nietzsche argues that so long as noble morality is the 
only game in town the lambs (plebeians) have a complex psychological dilemma.  The problem 
is that it is psychologically hard to admit that one is weak and powerless.  In the case of the 
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lambs, there is a strong psychological need to deny their vulnerability to the bird of prey.  
Acknowledging the fact that retaliation is simply not a possibility for the lamb adds 
psychological insult to injury.  Accordingly they reject the noble categories of strong and weak 
in order to save face, opting instead to invent new “moral” categories that serve a psychological 
need.  To assuage the vexing reality of their weakness, the lambs begin to reinterpret the 
fundamental nature of their conflict with the birds of prey and empower themselves by 
suggesting that they in fact could have retaliated but chose not to.  This requires the positing of 
the doer behind the deed.  The logic is: “the deed was done and I was harmed as a result of it, but 
the doer, on the part of the bird of prey, could have and should have done otherwise; and I 
myself could have, but chose not to, retaliate – how much greater and better am I then compared 
to the birds of prey”.  It is precisely in this way that the doer becomes something artificially 
added to the deed after the fact.  In truth however, “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, 
becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything” (GM I 13).   
 It all begins with the negative self-evaluation on the part of the lambs in terms of the 
noble categories of strong and weak – the lambs are inherently weak and vulnerable, while the 
birds of prey are inherently strong and dominant.  The lamb cannot deny the fact that they were 
harmed and their friends eaten, but they can exploit the power they have over the interpretation 
of this phenomenon – the only power they really have in this situation.  According to Nietzsche, 
the lamb projects their negative self-evaluation, and feelings of ressentiment that result from it, 
onto the birds of prey in order to rid themselves of it.  The lamb deems the bird of prey ‘evil’ and 
itself ‘good’ by contrast.  The logic is: if the bird of prey is evil then “whoever is least like a bird 
of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb – would he not be good?”  In other words, the 
psychological strategy of the lamb is to translate and reinterpret their vulnerability and weakness 
into “I am not weak; for, I could have retaliated but I chose not to and am therefore better – in 
response to a wrong I did the right thing”.  This of course requires that there be more than just 
the deed; there must also be the respective doers behind the deed.  The doer behind the lamb is 
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good and the doer behind the bird of prey is evil and ought to act like the lamb.  In Nietzsche’s 
words: 
 
The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and 
gives birth to values...  Slave morality from the outset says No to what is 
“outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative 
deed...  This need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself – is of 
the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a 
hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order 
to act at all – its action is fundamentally reaction (GM I 10). 
 
Thus, slave morality and its ways of moralizing are all born of retaliation and ressentiment – and 
are, interestingly enough, creative processes.   
 Before concluding this chapter let us take inventory of exactly what constitutes B 
morality and how it is distinct from other kinds of morality.  I submit that it has a number of 
distinguishing features.  First, as just discussed, it is born out of reaction to some external 
stimuli.  Second, it is a robust form of moral realism.  Third, it operates with the absolute moral 
categories ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ which are thought to be ontologically rooted.  Fourth, it’s non-
reflective and refuses to acknowledge its own prejudices and arbitrariness.  And fifth, it declares 
itself as morality and insists on an absolute monopoly when it comes to moral values (i.e. BGE 
202).  Also, unlike A moralities, moral values and facts are not understood as products of 
interpretation; rather, moral values and facts are seen as dictated from without (usually in 
religious contexts).  Dialogue is thus next to impossible when it comes to believers of B 
morality.  Any attempt at dialogue or debate can immediately be disrupted by simply playing the 
proverbial “I’m just the messenger” card19.  
So, as an immoralist, Nietzsche does not deny the existence of B moralities.  Clearly they 
do exist in the sense of motivating and effecting people’s behavior.  What Nietzsche denies is not 
that some people act in accordance with B morality; rather, he denies the premises of B morality 
                                            
19 Consider for instance the infamous Westboro Baptist Church and its vicious B morality.  Spokespersons for the 
“church” routinely try to deflect criticism by insisting that they are just the messengers of God’s morality. 
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(D 103).  In the next two chapters we will look Nietzsche’s views on health and nature as they 
pertain to his critique of morality – specifically B morality.  First we will further articulate what 
Nietzsche means by “morality as anti-nature”; then we will further analyze the moral psychology 
of slave moralities and their origins.  Finally, after lengthy discussion of the Apostle Paul and 
Nietzsche’s Antichrist, we will address the positive aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of morality 
and what would constitute a natural or healthy or higher type of morality, and whether it would 
be a moral system at all.  Whether a value system rooted in health, nature, and strength can be 
considered a ‘morality’ will have to be bracketed for the moment.  In order to properly answer 
this question we will first have to discuss Nietzsche’s revaluation of all values.  This analysis 
will culminate in chapter 5 where we will discuss the value of values. 
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Chapter II: The Will to Power and Morality as ‘Anti-Nature’ 
 
Nietzsche’s employment of the term “natural” is pervasive, diverse, and complicated.  This is 
especially evident in his critique of morality.  Central to his critique is a repeated insistence that 
morality (save his notion of higher moralities) is somehow “anti-nature” (TI “Morality as Anti-
nature”).  In general, this use of ‘morality’ refers to moral systems that attempt to ‘improve’ 
mankind and human nature.  Nietzsche accuses everyone from Plato to Socrates to Paul to Kant 
of trying to create value systems that would modify and improve human nature.  In section 2 of 
Twilight titled “The ‘improvers’ of Mankind” Nietzsche declares that Christianity “ruined man, 
it weakened him – but claimed to have ‘improved’ him”.  Whatever the intentions, it is this 
element of corruption that causes Nietzsche to declare that these types of morality are ‘anti-
nature’.  But the problem with such a claim is that it involves a vicious circularity.  So in order to 
understand what “anti-nature” means in this context we will first need to understand what exactly 
Nietzsche means by “natural”.  And yet Nietzsche seems to simply posit the concept ‘natural’ in 
opposition to the concept ‘moral’.  Nietzsche’s ambiguous and at times sloppy uses of terms like 
“nature” and “morality” make this a particularly vexing problem to resolve yet one that is at the 
same time fundamental and crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s critique of morality.  In fact, 
unless these ambiguities are resolved, his critique can’t even get off the ground.  For instance, an 
obvious question with no obvious answer is: how can morality be ‘anti-nature’ if we so naturally 
engage in it?  I maintain that the best way to resolve these important issues satisfactorily is by 
understanding and contrasting his notions of “natural” and “moral” in the context of the will to 
power.  This will provide a framework in which his statement “morality is anti-nature” can be 
rendered clear and intelligible.  So the proposed strategy is threefold; first, consult the important 
texts and passages on this issue and various interpretations of it by Clark, Reginster, and 
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Richardson20, second, develop a clear understanding of the will to power, and third utilize this 
understanding of the will to power to explain Nietzsche’s use of the term “natural”. 
 
 
i.  The Will to Power and the Concept of ‘Natural’ 
Resolving this problem will begin and end with a discussion of the term “natural”.  Part of what 
makes Nietzsche’s use of the term “natural” so vexing is that it has so many varied meanings and 
uses.  It’s paradoxical in the sense that on the one hand it seems like such an obvious, 
fundamental, and translucent concept that scarcely requires, or lends itself to, any elaborate 
definition; while at the same time it proves to be incredibly difficult to really nail down.  As a 
result a term like “natural” immediately invokes strong intuitions with regard to its content.  And 
yet, at the same time, such intuitions can be radically disparate from person to person and context 
to context.  For instance, in the most basic sense, when Nietzsche uses the term, does “natural” 
mean what is common or what is frequent?  Or does he mean what is original and common 
absent outside influence?  Is whatever tends to rule “natural” by definition, or could what is 
“natural” actually be the exception to the rules?  To put it another way, is the natural definition 
of “natural” what Nietzsche means, or does Nietzsche mean that what is “natural” in one sense 
might be unnatural in another?  I think Nietzsche’s use of the term is clearly the more 
complicated latter notion that is conditional and depends on the context in which the term 
“natural” is being employed.   
 So to return to the earlier question, some of the ambiguity can already be cleared up – 
what is common is not necessarily natural according to Nietzsche.  Morality might indeed be 
common but that doesn’t make it natural – despite being common it can in fact be anti-nature21.    
                                            
20 Clark, Maudemarie (2001) “Nietzsche’s Doctrines of the Will to Power” in B. Leiter and J. Richardson (2001) 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NDWP].                               
Reginster, Bernard (2007) “The Will to Power and the Ethics of Creativity” in B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu (2007), 
Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [WPEC]. 
Richardson, John (1996) Nietzsche’s System (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NS]. 
21 This of course applies to all the types of morality discussed in the previous chapter save ‘higher’ and ‘natural‘ 
moralities -- a topic which will be revisited in chapter 5. 
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The model I’m going to proceed to develop is rooted in the fact that Nietzsche uses the term 
‘natural’ to refer to what is healthy, flourishing, and strong even in contexts where such things 
are rare and uncommon – since the will to power is fundamentally a force that involves growth, 
progress, and development, I will argue that the will to power applies to all life in its most 
natural (even if rare) form.  Since the will to power is the clear link between understanding 
Nietzsche’s critique of morality and his conception of natural, we will now shift the focus of the 
discussion specifically to properly understanding it. 
 In recent literature three disparate models of the will to power have emerged: Clark’s 
straightforward psychological interpretation, Reginster’s model that stresses the significance of 
overcoming resistance, and Richardson’s model that revolves around the mastery and expansion 
of drives22.  Clark’s primary concern is to find a way to interpret the will to power that is 
consistent with Nietzsche’s rejection of metaphysics.  She maintains that Kaufmann’s 
interpretation is more or less right but stresses that it really only applies to the human world and 
not the cosmos.  In other words, she argues that it really only involves human psychology and 
doesn’t extend beyond that into some sort of metaphysical claim about nature itself.  She 
questions the metaphysical interpretation of the will to power seemingly put forward by 
Nietzsche in BGE 32 and argues that it’s really just a thought experiment and not an actual force 
in nature.  Likewise in BGE 22 she maintains that Nietzsche is simply offering it as a possible 
way of interpreting things but not a literal doctrine.  She goes on to argue that Nietzsche is 
simply projecting what he valued on to nature – and, unlike other philosophers, being honest 
about it (Clark NDWP 145-146).  So if it’s a doctrine at all, it’s a psychological one rather than a 
metaphysical one.  She points out that Nietzsche himself distinguishes between a ‘life will’ and a 
‘will to power’ so he couldn’t have thought that the will to power was necessarily in all things – 
                                            
22 Clark, Maudemarie (2001) “Nietzsche’s Doctrines of the Will to Power” in B. Leiter and J. Richardson (2001) 
Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NDWP]. 
Reginster, Bernard (2006).  The Affirmation of Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) [AL].   
Richardson, John (1996).  Nietzsche’s System (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NS]. 
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it has to be developed.  She considers it to be a second-order drive that all first-order drives be 
expanded (Clark NDWP 141-142). 
 Reginster also takes it to be a psychological doctrine but argues that it is best understood 
not so much as a second order drive but as a desire to overcome resistance.  In reference to WP 
704 Reginster says, “the will to power is the will to ‘striving against something that resists.’  
Since striving against is an effort to overcome, we might say that the will to power is the will to 
overcome resistance” (Reginster AL 126).  I think however that this creates a few problems.  
First, if it is not about expanding drives but overcoming resistance then it would seem to compel 
us to do tasks that we are less talented at and are more difficult for us than others.  Can you fault 
Mozart for composing music because it came too easily for him?  Was his music then a poor 
expression of power?  If he was much less gifted as an athlete should he have focused on 
overcoming that resistance instead of composing music?  Just doing whatever is most difficult 
for us is an odd notion of power yet it seems follow from Reginster’s interpretation of the will to 
power.  Second, should we willingly handicap ourselves so that there’s even more resistance to 
overcome?  Should Michael Phelps be expected to swim wearing all his gold medals because 
they would provide more resistance?  This seems like a rather silly and misguided way to view 
power.  Could this really be what Nietzsche has in mind?  The problem with Reginster’s view is 
that he views resistance as an end rather than a means.  “In my view, then, the will to power is 
the will to the overcoming of resistance” (Reginster AL 131-132).  His intuition is partially right 
however.  I think there is a definite connection between the will to power and resistance, but 
Reginster gets it wrong.  He asserts that resistance is a means to the act of overcoming; however, 
for Nietzsche, the act of overcoming is itself a means, not an end.  In other words, overcoming 
resistance is a means to strength and power but not the end.  Just as in weight lifting, resistance is 
not an end but a means – namely, a means to strength23.  I think Reginster is right in thinking that 
Nietzsche did not advocate the path of least resistance attitude towards life but that doesn’t entail 
                                            
23 In Nietzsche’s words, “Out of life’s school of war: what does not destroy me, makes me stronger” (TI Maxims and 
Arrows 8). 
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that by the will to power he advocated a resistance for the sake of resistance view of life and 
power.  The problem with Reginster’s interpretation of the will to power is that he understands 
resistance as an end when it was only a means in terms of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power.    
 The other prominent concern with Reginster’s interpretation is that it draws too much on 
the unpublished material from The Will to Power.  Reginster references numerous notes 
throughout his discussion (WP 702-704, 423, 675, 699, 697, 125, 689, 1067, 707, 751, 481, 656).  
The concern is that Nietzsche never published any of this material so there is no way to know 
what he really intended to do with it or the context in which he is thinking about the various 
ideas.  When it comes to major issues/concepts of Nietzsche’s thought like the eternal return, the 
overman, nihilism, and the will to power, there are unpublished notes that directly contradict his 
treatment of these concepts in his published works.  Accordingly, one has to be very careful in 
referencing The Will to Power.  I’m not suggesting that the The Will to Power can’t be used or 
referenced at all; but, whatever the issue or concept is, it should always be a secondary source 
used to further support an interpretation that is primarily rooted in Nietzsche’s published works.  
When it comes to the published works, Reginster appeals primarily to GS 56, BGE 6, GM I 13, 
and especially Z II 12. 
 Reginster relies so heavily on Z II 12 that he even quotes it to introduce the entire 
chapter.  He ultimately concludes:  
 
In willing power he [the agent] must also desire resistance to their [ends] 
realization.  And so the agent who wills power must want both certain determinate 
ends and resistance to their realization: “That I must be struggle and a becoming 
and an end and an opposition to ends – ah, whoever guesses what is my will 
should also guess on what crooked paths it must proceed.  Whatever I create and 
however much I love it, soon I must oppose it and my love; thus my will wills it” 
(Z II 12 [first emphasis mine]). 
 
Reginster argues that by “crooked paths” Nietzsche means that not only does one continually 
will new ends but also one wills that the achievement of each new end involves resistance.  
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Moreover he suggests that the reason one must eventually oppose whatever they create is also 
because they have to seek out new resistances.  So Reginster uses this passage to justify the 
proposed significance of resistance he derived from the WP passages.  The problem is that there 
is a simpler way to interpret this passage that squares much better with the rest of what Nietzsche 
says about the will to power in other published works.  By “crooked paths” I would suggest that 
Nietzsche means the various ways in which the will to power can express itself in the case of 
humans – the range of possible expressions from strong to weak, and healthy to sick.  It also 
refers to the rich internal opposition and struggle of every individual with respect to their 
competing drives and wills.  In Nietzsche’s words, “You should love peace as a means to new 
wars” (Z I 10).  “The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition...  One has 
renounced the great life when one renounces war” (A 3).   So in order to continue to grow and 
progress one has to experiment with new economies of wills.  This explains Nietzsche’s praise of 
‘brief habits’. 
 
Brief habits. – I love brief habits and consider them an inestimable means for 
getting to know many things and states, down to the bottom of their sweetness and 
bitternesses.  My nature is designed entirely for brief habits, even in the needs of 
my physical health and altogether as far as I can see at all – from the lowest to the 
highest (GS 295). 
 
Accordingly, when it comes to experiments in life, Nietzsche emphatically declares “let’s try it!” 
in GS 51.  So it is not the need of new resistances that causes the “crooked paths” but the 
struggle to continue to grow, develop, and progress.  In Nietzsche’s words, “Through a hundred 
souls I have already passed on my way, and through a hundred cradles and birth pangs.  Many a 
farewell I have taken” (Z II 2).  Since this process never ends, one will have to oppose old values 
in order to create new ones in the interest of growth rather than in the interest of merely seeking 
out new forms of resistance.  “Whoever must be a creator always annihilates” (Z I 15).  Growth 
and development are essential to the will to power.  “To have and to want more – growth, in one 
word, that is life itself” (WP 349).  Nietzsche makes this very clear in the following passage 
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from The Gay Science.  “The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, 
around growth and expansion, around power – in accordance with the will to power which is the 
will of life” (GS 349).  Similarly Nietzsche states: 
 
Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and 
weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and, 
at the least and mildest, exploitation... if it is living... it will have to be will to 
power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, gain ascendancy – 
not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is will 
to power...  ‘Exploitation’ does not pertain to a corrupt or imperfect or primitive 
society: it pertains to the essence of the living thing as a fundamental organic 
function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the 
will of life (BGE 259). 
 
The important point to take from this quote is the importance of struggle, development, and 
growth in understanding Nietzsche’s will to power.  
 I maintain that Richardson articulates the doctrine of the will to power, as Nietzsche 
envisions it, better than Clark or Reginster.  He rejects the idea that it can’t just be the desire for 
a maximal achievement of some desire’s end.  Like Reginster, he stresses that the will to power 
can never be satisfied.  But this raises the question: does this mean it is like thirst where it can be 
satisfied for a moment but always returns or is it never satisfied in any way?  I would argue it is 
the former – a thirst that can be temporally satisfied24.  So there can be moments of peace and 
rest but this does not entail that one ever becomes completely content.  So like with any thirst, 
though it can be satisfied for brief periods, it eventually returns.  Accordingly, one must always 
have an eye on new goals to quench it.  The aim is continual growth but, as previously discussed, 
this process may at times be messy.  It may often proceed in fits and starts.  In Nietzsche’s 
words, “Whatever I create and however much I love it, soon I must oppose it and my love; thus 
                                            
24 Nietzsche often speaks of momentary peaceful moments or justifying moments of joy – most notably Z IV 10.  
There Nietzsche asks, “Have you ever said Yes to a single joy?  O my friends, then you said Yes too to all woe.  All 
things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, “You please me, 
happiness!  Abide, moment!” then you wanted all back.  All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored -- 
oh, then you loved the world.  Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return!  
For all joy wants -- eternity”.  In Z I 10 he also states that, “You should love peace as a means to new wars” (Z I 
10). 
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my will wills it” (Z II 12), “Whoever guesses what is my will should also guess on what crooked 
paths it must proceed” (Z II 12). 
 I think this fits with Richardson’s interpretation.  In his view the will to power is best 
understood as the mastery of one desire over others – which is to say, the organized and 
purposeful expansion of drives where lower drives are incorporated and redirected by higher 
drives.  Clearly some drives are stronger than others, and their relative strengths, at times, 
depend on circumstances, but theoretically any drive can govern.  In this way there are no 
inherently higher and lower drives.  The higher ones are simply the drives selected to govern.  
This point will be further explored later but it must be pointed out that by “selected” I do not 
mean by some pure subject detached from wills and drives.  Nietzsche clearly excludes this 
Christian and Kantian view of the will (BGE 16-17, 19).  So they are not selected in the sense of 
a pure subject but as a complicated process and struggle – the internal war and opposition he 
describes in section 3 of “Morality as Anti-nature” in TI.  So there is no single subjective will 
that stands behind all drives, but rather an individual’s will is a collection of drives and will with 
no singular conductor.  Again, I will revisit this issue later but I think the best analogy would be 
large flocks of birds and schools of fish that are collectively able to engage in very complicated, 
well organized, and purposeful movements despite the fact that there is no individual leader or 
conductor either among or independent of the group of fish and birds. 
 Consider that in the extreme case of the ascetic, even the completely inverted, sick, and 
artificial drive to retard all drives can actually emerge and be selected to govern.  In fact 
Richardson also distinguishes active versus reactive wills25, which I think is extremely helpful in 
reconciling the will to power with Nietzsche’s discussion of the ascetic ideal.  An active will, 
wills power, whereas a reactive one wills some other end.  Reginster argues that the problem 
with Richardson’s view is that it can’t explain the thirst, and perpetual dissatisfaction, that goes 
along with the will to power the way his view can26.  Thus he argues that Richardson’s account 
                                            
25 Richardson NS 39-41. 
26 Reginster AL 130. 
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can’t explain why the will to power is never satisfied – for Reginster, it’s because it always seeks 
out new resistances.  But on Richardson’s view the will to power is driven by perpetual 
development that will never come to an end – so I don’t see why there’s any less thirst in 
Richardson’s model than Reginster’s.  If anything, there’s more.  In Reginster’s model the will to 
power always seeks out new resistances whereas in Richardson’s model it seeks out new goals.  
Moreover, would Sisyphus not fit Reginster’s model of a dissatisfied confrontation with 
resistance perfectly?  I am quite certain that this is not what Nietzsche has in mind.  The problem 
is that Reginster stresses the significance of resistance and neglects the value of ends and goals.  
I think Richardson’s view is much closer to what Nietzsche means than Clark’s or Reginster’s 
views.  For Nietzsche it is not only resistance that matters but the value and nature of the goals. 
 
 
ii.  The Will to Power and Eudaimonia 
With respect to Clark I think she is wrong to argue that the will to power is purely a 
psychological projection by Nietzsche onto nature and nothing more.  I think he really did mean 
that the will to power is present not only in all forms of life – but in a sense, in all of nature too.  
The way it is expressed may be quite different but I do think we have to take Nietzsche seriously 
in passages like BGE 36 where he claims: “The world seen from within, the world described and 
defined according to its ‘intelligible character’ – it would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else”.  I 
believe it is this distinction that Nietzsche tries to capture when he spoke of a ‘life will’ in 
contrast to the will to power.  Nietzsche himself couldn’t have been clearer on this issue.  In his 
words, “Where I [Zarathustra] found the living, there I found will to power” (Z II 12).  In this 
way the doctrine is analogous to Aristotle’s notion of the three tiers of soul.  According to 
Aristotle anything that is living and a ‘self-mover’ is alive in virtue of having a soul.  Soul 
however has three levels or tiers27.  Plants have a soul of nutrition and accordingly flourishing28 
                                            
27 Nichomachean Ethics Book I ‘An Account of the Human Good’ Sections 12-13. 
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is simply consumption of nutrients and growth.  Animals have the second level of soul.  Like 
plants they too have a soul of nutrition and must consume in order to grow but unlike plants they 
possess a higher level – a ‘sensuous’ soul or soul of locomotion.  Flourishing for an animal is 
thus not mere consumption and growth but activity and interaction with its environment.  
Humans possess both a soul of nutrition and a soul of sensation but they also have the third and 
highest level – namely, a rational soul.  So satisfaction of the first two levels is necessary but not 
sufficient for human happiness; rather, flourishing (or eudaimonia) for humans is a rational 
activity.   
 In a similar way I think the best way to understand Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power is in terms of a tiered structure.  The most basic level is that of organisms, plants, and 
animals.  At this level the will to power is expressed in living things as a continual desire to grow 
and push the limits of environmental conditions.  One of Nietzsche’s favorite metaphors is of 
trees and the way in which they often threaten their own existence by continuing to grow larger 
and larger – plunging their roots ever deeper into the soil so that its branches can reach ever 
higher towards the heavens (Z I “Mountainside”).  However the larger they become the more 
nutrients they require to sustain themselves.  And this is not unique to trees of course.  
Everywhere in nature we find life pushing the envelope.  Even in the harshest environments life 
finds amazing ways to gain a foothold, adapt, and grow.  Everywhere from deserts, to the arctic 
poles, to the depths of the seas, life finds a way to thrive.  For instance the giant Saguaro cactus 
of the southwest can grow over 50 feet tall, emperor penguins of Antarctica and Polar Bears in 
the north pole survive despite the most inhospitable of conditions, and finally coral has recently 
been discovered that survives in the darkest abysses of the oceans by feeding off hydrothermal 
                                                                                                                                             
28 Eudaimonia is the Greek term Aristotle uses frequently in his Nichomachean Ethics.  It is typically translated as 
‘happiness’ but it also involves strong connotations of ‘flourishing’ and ‘growth’.  Where a term like ‘happiness’ is 
typically understood as passive and episodic, eudaimonia implies an ongoing active state.  For instance, so long as 
one is flourishing at an activity even if elements of it are unpleasant they can still be said to be in a state of 
eudaimonia (i.e. an athlete engaged in difficult training).  All of this makes eudaimonia much more like Nietzsche’s 
notion of the will to power than traditional notions of happiness. 
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vents.  And of course, at the opposite extreme, where conditions are optimal like the rain forests 
of South America life teems and thoroughly saturates its environment.   
 Let us return to the tree example however.  Consider the fruit it produces.  It takes a 
considerable amount of energy to create fruit for the purposes of reproducing.  And if successful 
they have merely created a competitor that now threatens their own existence.  Yet all life 
reproduces itself, often at considerable expense and risk for the parent organism.  Just consider 
the amount of energy and care that is required for humans to reproduce.  Before modern 
medicine humans seriously risked their life in order to reproduce.  Nevertheless the essence of 
life according to Nietzsche is the desire to produce something beyond itself.  Of the ascetic who 
hates the body, Nietzsche says “your self itself wants to die and turns away from life.  It is no 
longer capable of what it would do above all else: to create beyond itself.  That is what it would 
do above all else, that is its fervent wish” (Z I 4).  I maintain that this is the understanding of the 
will to power Nietzsche articulates in BGE 36 where he concludes by saying that the “intelligible 
character” of the world is “will to power and nothing beside”.  As he describes it in Zarathustra: 
 
And life itself confided this secret to me: “Behold,” it said, “I am that which must 
always overcome itself.  Indeed, you call it a will to procreate or a drive to an end, 
to something higher, farther, more manifold: but all this is one, and one secret (Z 
II 12). 
 
It is not a mere will to live but a will to grow and produce something beyond oneself and one 
finds this will everywhere in nature29.  Nietzsche formulates the very principle itself in 
opposition to Schopenhauer’s will to live.  In his words:  
 
The “will to exist”: that will does not exist.  For, what does not exist cannot will; 
but what is in existence, how could that still want existence?  Only where there is 
life is there also will: not will to life but – thus I teach you – will to power.  
                                            
29 Nietzsche formulated his notion of the will to power in contrast to Schopenhauer’s notion of a will to live.  
Schopenhauer thought that it was a mere will to continue living that drove us.  Nietzsche however argued that it is 
not a will to continue living that drives us but a will to do, accomplish, and to become ever greater.  This involves 
risk taking and is precisely not the safe path of least resistance through life one would expect of someone only 
concerned with continual survival. 
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“There is much that life esteems more highly than life itself; but out of the 
esteeming itself speaks the will to power” (Z II 12).   
 
Nietzsche also states that “the will to power” is “the unexhausted procreative will of life” (Z II 
12 [my emphasis]).  By this I think he means something external to oneself – for instance, a great 
book, sculpture, painting, athletic achievement, scientific discovery.  However I think this also 
includes more mundane things as well like one’s legacy or offspring.  It’s interesting to note that 
pregnancy and birth is also one of Nietzsche’s favorite metaphors.  For instance, “To be the child 
who is newly born, the creator must also want to be the mother who gives birth and the pangs of 
the birth-giver” (Z II 2).  The “going under” metaphor frequently employed by Nietzsche in 
Zarathustra seems to suggest a cyclical process of growth and decay followed by new life.  In 
fact he introduces the idea in the prologue to Zarathustra by comparing it to the sun going under 
before returning anew.  This mysterious and enigmatic notion of “going under” seems to be the 
mechanism by which new ideas are produced for Zarathustra.   
 I believe inorganic material also expresses will to power in Nietzsche’s estimation – for 
instance solar systems and galaxies grow and expand before decaying and producing new ones – 
but it’s the contrast between human and non-human organisms that’s most important for 
understanding his use of “natural”.  Like with all living things growth and reproduction are 
important for humans but not everything.  The expression of the will to power in fact becomes 
very complex in the case of humans.  Like Richardson I agree that its expression can in fact be 
corrupted and even inverted.  In humans the will to power motivates the expansion and 
organization of drives.  Expressing the will to power for humans thus essentially involves the 
setting and achievement of ends and goals.  As previously discussed I think resistance is 
important but not the sole desire of the will to power when it comes to achieving goals.  But this 
raises the obvious questions of what ends and why?  And what role does resistance really play?  
Purely in terms of physicality there seem to be three possible models of the will to power in the 
case of humans.  In the first model there is lots of resistance but no valuable end.  This would be 
a case like Sisyphus where considerable resistance is overcome but nothing of value is 
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accomplished.  In the second model there is resistance but a trivial end.  This would be a case 
like a pie eating contest.  Again there is considerable resistance that is overcome but for the sake 
of a trivial end with no real value.  Some may find real value in this accomplishment but most 
would deem it trivial.  In the third model there is resistance and an end that is clearly deemed as 
valuable by most, even if elements of it are admittedly arbitrary.  This would be a case like 
Michael Phelps winning eight gold medals in swimming.  Once again there is considerable 
physical resistance but for the sake of an end that most consider worthwhile.  I think it is clear 
that Nietzsche envisaged the third model.  As previously discussed resistance plays a role but 
can’t be understood as the end itself.  Whether the end and resistance are physical in nature or 
intellectual the resistance is only as valuable as the end that is accomplished by overcoming it.  
So the difference is that while natural organisms do overcome resistance in nature, they do not 
set ends (trivial or worthwhile), or engage in self-determined projects, in the way that humans 
do.  To be sure, while animals too set and pursue ends,30 compared to the complex types of ends 
that humans pursue they are utterly trivial.  In the same way, while some animals exhibit a 
modicum of intelligence, compared to the power of the human mind there simply is no 
comparison.  For instance, it’s unlikely that even higher primates have ever even entertained the 
question of how one might go about traveling to the moon and back, let alone accomplished such 
a task.  For humans however, intelligence and rationality allow us to not only engage in broad 
range of complex projects, but also successfully complete them.   
Accordingly what is ‘healthy’ for lower animals will not be ‘healthy’ for humans when it 
comes to the will to power.  To again put it in Aristotelian language, the satisfaction of the soul 
of locomotion and the soul of nutrition is not sufficient for eudaimonia in the case of humans.  
Also, those tiers of soul involve a narrow range of potential projects.  When it comes to the 
highest tier (the rational), however, the horizon is literally infinite.  The problem with the ascetic 
is that they are too preoccupied with trying to deny the first two tiers of soul (nutrition and 
                                            
30 These ends are primarily to catch prey, avoid being eaten, migrate, procreate, etc. 
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locomotion), so that they misuse and neglect their rational soul.  Likewise, the problem with the 
plebeian is that they are fairly content with satisfying the first two tiers of soul and don’t fully 
develop or maximize their rational soul.  While this might be a healthy state of eudaimonia for an 
animal it is not a healthy state for a human – by contrast, the ascetic is positively sick on 
Nietzsche’s view. 
Moreover, while I’m sure Nietzsche would agree that physical accomplishments have 
their place, intellectual and aesthetic accomplishments are of greater worth and importance.  But 
on what basis can Nietzsche privilege intellectual accomplishments over physical?  I maintain 
that it is because it is precisely intelligence that sets us apart from the animals.  Many animals 
can easily outperform us physically, but when it comes to intelligence, compared to even the 
most intelligent animals, we are gods.  Accordingly I think that Nietzsche employs his own 
version of Aristotle’s function argument in order to privilege intellectual accomplishments over 
physical – if it’s our mind that sets us apart from the rest of nature then it is the fruits of our 
minds that is of utmost value and importance.  So it is because human intelligence is so unique 
and powerful that animals’ tasks are rendered trivial in comparison.  Similarly, aesthetic 
accomplishments are also unique to humans and thus deserving of a privileged status.  
 Nevertheless, when it comes to physical accomplishments, it is interesting to speculate 
what Nietzsche might say about a perfect steroid that builds muscle mass with no ill side effects.  
If such a thing existed I think as long as the user utilized his newfound strength in order to 
achieve worthwhile ends not possible before, Nietzsche would say it would be in concert with a 
healthy expression of the will to power – since, as I will argue, the doctrine is primarily about 
growth and development.  Otherwise, it would suggest that curing people of polio was wrong 
because polio creates lots of resistance, in terms of most physical activity, for the patient – which 
is, again, the problem with Reginster’s view.  But again, as long as the cured patient uses his new 
found abilities to accomplish things they couldn’t before, this would be a very healthy expression 
of the will to power.  Consider that from the perspective of the polio patient, the cure is, for all 
intents and purposes, a perfect steroid.  
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 The biggest upshot of contrasting the will to power in humans versus nature is that it 
allows us to make sense of the idea that there can be unhealthy expressions of the will to power 
in humans.  In Nietzsche’s words, “whoever guesses what is my will should also guess on what 
crooked paths it must proceed” (Z II 12).  In nature we find mostly healthy expressions of the 
will to power.  In the case of humans however we find a range of expressions of the will to 
power.  The reason for this, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is that there are progressively 
more complex tiers of the will to power analogous to Aristotle’s three tiers of soul, which 
culminates in the complex form of the human will to power.  However, although in the case of 
humans the unhealthy expressions may be common and in that sense ‘natural’ it doesn’t make 
them good or desirable.  The problem with humans is that it’s become common and ‘natural’ to 
become unhealthy in various ways ranging from the common/average plebeian to the extreme of 
the ascetic ideal.  If we did not have the expression of the will to power in nature to contrast with 
humans’ expression of the will to power there would be no way to make sense of Nietzsche’s 
claims that the expression of the will to power in humans has become unnatural and unhealthy.  
So it is only in virtue of this distinction that Nietzsche’s claim that what is common in the case of 
humans is at the same time unnatural and unhealthy.   
This is why Richardson’s interpretation of the will to power is superior to Clark’s.  His 
‘active’ versus ‘reactive’ distinction allows us to make sense of Nietzsche’s notions of ‘natural’ 
and ‘healthy’31.  Richardson argues: 
 
Nietzsche supposes that some drives ‘fall away from’ their essence as will to 
power, failing to achieve one or another element in the full structure we’ve just 
surveyed…  We must go on to see how will to power can occur in either of two 
basic forms, which I call ‘active’ [aktiv] and ‘reactive’ [reaktiv] (Richardson NS 
39). 
 
                                            
31 This is especially true of section 1.3 of Nietzsche’s System.  There, Richardson discusses not only ‘active’ and 
‘reactive’ wills but also ‘synthetic’ wills, and both ‘positive’ and ‘negative reactive’ drives.  All of these distinctions 
will be discussed in connection with the will to power and health and sickness. 
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According to Richardson, the active will wills power itself and is thus healthy and natural, 
whereas the reactive will is one that has become misdirected and sick – which is to say it wills 
something other than power (consider the ascetic) (Richardson NS 40).  Without this distinction 
his notion of the ‘natural’ would ostensibly lose all meaning – especially as it pertains to 
Nietzsche’s claim that “morality is anti-nature”.  I see this as a significant problem for 
interpretations like Clark’s and Reginster’s as this would render much of Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality incoherent. 
 This however raises an important question – why is it that only humans become sick in 
this way and why is it that the will to power’s expression is only corruptible in the case of 
humans?  To answer this we will need to discuss Richardson’s account in more detail but first I 
think part of the answer to these questions can be found in the section of Twilight entitled “The 
‘Improvers’ of Mankind”.  There, Nietzsche argues that the Dionysian aspect of the will to 
power takes the form of passion in the case of humans while the Apollonian aspect takes the 
form of reason.  I maintain that, just as in the comparison to the Aristotelian model of the soul 
where the human’s rational soul is composed of the highest and most complex tier of soul, the 
Dionysian and Apollonian aspects of the will to power take on a higher and more complex 
manifestation than anywhere else in nature.  This, I maintain, renders them much more 
susceptible to corruption than more basic and lower expressions.  So, to streamline the point, you 
don’t find reason and human passion anywhere in nature except in humans; and accordingly, you 
don’t find their corruption anywhere else in nature.  And in Twilight, Nietzsche proceeds to 
argue that many have endeavored to ‘improve’ human nature by toying around under the hood 
and attempting to redirect reason and passion.  In the simplest terms, the Dionysian desire for 
power gets hijacked in the service of an alleged ‘higher’ type of ‘power’ that attempts to gain an 
advantage through sacrifice, self-denial, and asceticism.  Likewise the Apollonian desire for 
reason and knowledge gets hijacked in the service of an alleged ‘higher’ type of knowledge and 
reason – namely faith.  Consider that because animals lack rationality they are utterly incapable 
of self-control when it comes to delayed gratification.  We of course are capable of such things, 
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but the dangerous downside is that we can become victims of these abilities if they become 
perverted.  The logic behind the ascetic is a form of self-tyranny that goes something like this – 
“delayed gratification is better than immediate gratification, therefore denied gratification must 
be better than both.”   
In so far as this tyranny fights against what is strong and natural it is a kind of sickness – 
especially in the case of B moralities32.  To put it another way, such tyranny opposes the essence 
of life according to Nietzsche, which is the will to power, which is, in essence, growth.  So when 
Nietzsche talks of instincts in this context he means instincts of life in general rather than 
uniquely human instincts – which, as previously discussed in connection with Aristotle, can be 
both healthy as well as unhealthy.  The instincts of life however are always healthy.  So although 
in certain circumstances the healthy expression of the will to power might not be common (i.e. 
when slave morality is dominant) it is still healthy, and natural.   
 Under the influence of slave morality, the individual becomes weak while the herd itself 
becomes collectively strong.  As a result, prudential norms are often at odds with moral norms.  
Thus the natural desire to express the will to power and become a self-actualized agent has the 
potential to be corrupted and instead become a desire to be commanded from without (which will 
be discussed in detail in connection with Richardson).  Accordingly, I do agree with Hurka that 
Nietzsche is a kind of perfectionist33.  As Hurka explains, Nietzsche does not hold a strong 
teleological perfectionism because this tendency for corruption is at odds with a Hegelian 
optimistic view – which maintains that the dialectical process will always ensure success.  
However, it is simply not the case that people always pursue the maximization of power.  
Instead, as Hurka persuasively argues, we always exercise power through the pursuit of goals; 
however, the goals we select may not maximize power.  Again, this is certainly evident in the 
case of the ascetic.  Everyone may start out like a child at play34 (Z I “Metamorphoses”), but 
                                            
32 This subject was first discussed in section one of chapter 1. 
33 Hurka “Nietzsche: Perfectionist” (2007) in Leiter and Sinhababu (2007) Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) [NP]. 
34 Nietzsche’s allegory is likely also a reference to Heraclitus’ claim that, “History is a child building a sandcastle by 
the sea, and that child is the whole majesty of man’s power in the world.” 
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once exposed to the artificial desire of the ascetic ideal some become hooked on it like a drug35.  
Just consider the way that artificial desires (like nicotine, alcohol, or heroin) are often more 
powerful than natural desires (like the desire for food and water).  Likewise the will to power in 
humans often becomes polluted and in this way unhealthy.  Despite the fact that the heroin 
junkie chases ephemeral pleasure, while the ascetic seeks to avoid and repress both pleasure and 
the desire for it, what they have in common is that their respective pleasure seeking vs. pleasure 
avoidance desires are equally artificial and unnatural.  The junkie pursues unnatural sources of 
pleasure, while the ascetic attempts to shut down the natural sources of pleasure.  As Nietzsche 
puts it in Zarathustra, “Verily, a polluted stream is man.  One must be a sea to be able to receive 
a polluted stream without becoming unclean” (Z Prologue 3).  In this way the overman is like the 
‘natural’, clean, and healthy sea that is able to resist the corrupting influences of ressentiment 
and the bad conscience.  However, it may be the case that there are types that simply can’t do 
better than the ascetic ideal once exposed to it.  Another intriguing question, which will be the 
topic of Chapter 4 is, did a figure like the Apostle Paul possess an active or reactive will? 
 Returning to Richardson, as previously discussed he frames this distinction in terms of 
active and reactive wills.  According to Richardson, “The distinction rests on the notion of will to 
power: the active drive wills power itself, whereas the reactive has somehow turned aside from 
its essential end”36.  So reactive wills may be more common in the case of humans but that 
doesn’t make them ‘natural’ or healthy.  “Life is will to power” (BGE 259) even if its expression 
can be corrupted in the case of humans.  And again, human instincts might not always be in 
concert with the natural instincts of nature.  Nevertheless, Nietzsche argues, “Life itself is to my 
mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the 
will to power is lacking there is decline” (A 6).  Though Nietzsche is a bit confusing with his use 
                                            
35 Nietzsche does offer an account of the allure of the ascetic ideal but for our present purposes we will not explore it 
here.  It will however be discussed in Chapter 3. 
36 Richardson NS 39. 
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of terms I maintain that he identifies ‘natural’ values with a process of purposively37 structuring, 
managing, and expanding drives.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Greater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of developed organs and 
functions with the disappearance of the intermediate members – if that is 
perfection, then there is a will to power in the organic process by virtue of which 
dominant, shaping, commanding forces continually extend these bounds of their 
power and continually simplify within these bounds: the imperative grows (WP 
644).   
 
 
And again this passage from Beyond Good and Evil makes the same point: 
 
 
Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and 
weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and, 
at the least and mildest, exploitation (BGE 259). 
 
‘Unnatural’ values, by contrast, are those that are reactionary and hostile to the healthy 
expression of the will to power.  So values are best understood as the ends of wills; and healthy 
values are those that promote growth and progress.  Accordingly I agree with Hurka that the 
strong teleological view of the will to power with respect to humans must be rejected because it 
simply is not the case that all or even most people possess this attitude nor do all people work to 
expand power and their will.  This is acutely evident in the case of the ascetic ideal.  Although it 
should be pointed out that Nietzsche thinks there could actually be good and even healthy forms 
of the asceticism in the case of the philosopher.  Nietzsche states: 
 
The philosopher sees in it [asceticism] an optimum condition for the highest and 
boldest spirituality and smiles – he does not deny “existence,” he rather affirms 
his existence, and this perhaps to the point at which he is not far from harboring 
the impious wish: Let the world perish, but let there be philosophy, the 
philosopher, me! (GM III 7). 
 
                                            
37 In this context ‘purposively’ refers to a teleological or ordered process rather than an overtly conscious process.  
It is one thing to engage with structured values; but another thing to be aware of the process at a meta/self-aware 
level. 
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In other words there are certain forms of asceticism, or self-sacrifice, that are for the sake of 
some great task or end – like devoting oneself exclusively to philosophical inquiry.  This is very 
different from the suicidal nihilism that motivates the ascetic ideal to shut down and retard all 
drives just for the sake of doing so.  Focusing entirely on one end and one goal at the cost of 
others can thus still be a healthy expression of the will to power. 
 In addition to active and reactive wills, Richardson goes on to discuss what he calls 
“synthetic” wills.  He argues that simple wills to power actually combine themselves and form 
complex “synthetic” wills38.  Especially in the case of humans, the will is not a singular or 
simple thing but rather a complex economy of competing wills and drives (BGE 36).  So 
Richardson’s interpretation of this corruption, quite rightly, emphasizes the complexity of human 
drives and desires.   In Richardson’s words, “Human beings are distinguished simply by bearing 
more such drives, and drives that are opposed to one another.  Not only is there no detached 
theoretical subject standing above this struggle among our drives, there is also no preexisting 
“overwill”39.  Accordingly, Richardson argues that the will to power essentially involves 
competing wills – individual wills try to co-op other wills.  Thus the will to power can never be 
satisfied, not because it seeks out a new resistance every time one is overcome as Reginster 
would argue, but because living things just are collections of competing wills.  Due to the 
uniquely complex form of the will to power in humans, we must organize and negotiate 
competing drives in setting ends and goals.  In Nietzsche’s words, “The price of fruitfulness is to 
be rich in internal opposition” (TI “Anti-nature” 5).  Accordingly, Richardson argues that there is 
no real ‘doer’ behind the deed; rather a person is just a successive series of balancing points and 
equilibriums that is continually undergoing changes.  A human then is just the ongoing chemistry 
of these competing simple wills to power40.  Accordingly, these patterns of activity can play 
themselves out in all sorts of ways.  Some will be more full of harmony among wills than others.  
                                            
38 Richardson NS 44-45. 
39 Richardson NS 46. 
40 Richardson NS 45. 
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And this, I argue, is what determines the relative health or sickness of any given ‘individual’.  As 
the following passages make clear Nietzsche rejects any notions of a ‘pure’ or ‘simple’ will 
wholesale:  “Observe the strangest thing of all about the will – about this so complex thing for 
which people have only one word: inasmuch as in the given circumstances we at the same time 
will command and obey…” (BGE 19).  “In real life it is a question only of strong and weak 
wills” (BGE 21).  According to Nietzsche’s view a human will is thus best understood as a 
complex economy of competing wills – more like a corporation than a dictatorship.  Thus 
Nietzsche rejects all classic models of the will that treat it as a single entity that is free and also 
transparent to itself.   
So, given the complexities of human psychology, there can be both strong as well as 
weak wills (BGE 21), and wills that desire to be self-commanding as well as wills that desire to 
be commanded from without (BGE 19) – which is to say, wills can flourish to varying degrees.  I 
maintain that only the former cases exist in nature whereas in humans the latter cases are 
possible.  In nature, an animal simply acts on what its strongest drive is.  But people are best 
understood as a large constitutive of disparate drives and wills.  The wills however don’t 
themselves have wills – they are just drives.  On this point I once again offer my flock of birds 
and school of fish analogy.  This however may suggest that human volition is distinct from 
animal volition only in that humans are prone to akrasia.  Admittedly there may be a kernel of 
truth to this view, but it is too simple and insufficient to properly capture the complex nuances of 
Nietzsche’s model of human volition and agency.  However, rather than engaging in a detailed 
discussion of models of akrasia, for our present purposes it is sufficient to observe that for 
Nietzsche there are both strong and weak wills. 
 The weak will can occur in the very extreme form of the ascetic or the moderate form of 
the plebeian herd but in either case it is the product of traditional forms of morality.  He clearly 
contrasts morality with what he calls the “natural” expression of the will to power.  But what 
Nietzsche means by ‘natural’ in the case of values and the will to power is not simply what is 
common or pervasive.  In his words, to reiterate a point from the previous chapter, “Every 
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naturalism in morality – that is, every healthy morality – is dominated by an instinct of life... 
Anti-natural morality... turns, conversely, against the instincts of life.  It is condemnation of 
these instincts...” (TI “Anti-nature” 5).  So again it is clear that Nietzsche describes ‘unnatural’ 
moral values as those which are reactionary and hostile to what is instinctual, which is to say, 
they are values that are tyrannical and a “negation of the will to life” (TI “Anti-nature” 5).  So 
the point is, it’s not the case that there is a simple continuum of the will to power’s expression 
ranging from the strong free spirit that expands, organizes, and satisfies drives, and the ascetic 
ideal who works to shut down and retard all drives – with various degrees of weak wills41 in 
between.   
Returning, however, to the active/reactive distinction, Richardson observes that it 
parallels Nietzsche’s master/slave morality distinction, but he is careful to point out that active 
versus reactive does not mean caused from within versus without the way one might assume.  
It’s not as simple as a free will versus a controlled will.  As previously discussed Nietzsche in 
fact rejects the traditional notions of free will and the notion of mechanical causation in the will.  
According to Richardson there is a second axis to the expression of the will to power, which 
belongs to the reactive forms of its expression – both of which are actually rooted in weakness.  
First, there is the positive reactive will that internalizes and takes over the other’s values by 
adopting them – represented by the herd instinct and slave morality.  And second, there is the 
negative reactive will that internalizes and takes over others’ values by rebelling against them – 
represented by the man of resentment and the malcontents.  In Richardson’s words: 
 
A drive ‘obeys’ foreign forces even in reacting against them; it obeys by taking 
over their values, whether positively or negatively.  When a drive takes its task as 
the struggle against what some other is, it still sets its sights by reference to that 
other and is still diverted from its own development (Richardson NS 41). 
 
                                            
41 These weak wills obey other’s values while not internalizing them.  In other words they become completely 
heteronomous. 
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Richardson argues that the model of obeying in the case of the weak and reactive wills is not 
causally mechanical but rather the internalization of another will’s values42.  He maintains that a 
reactive will has this tendency to internalize and adopt the others’ values43.  So in the positive 
way one simply adopts the other’s values and obeys them; Richardson identifies this as the herd 
individual.  In the negative way the will rebels against the other’s values but begins to define 
itself and its values in direct contrast to the other’s values.  Richardson identifies this as the man 
of resentment and argues that the act of rebellion diverts one from their own interests such that 
the other still has control over them in an indirect way44.  They don’t choose and affirm their 
values for their own sakes but because they are the antithesis of other’s values.  For instance 
there is the case of the extreme malcontent where the individual tries to violate every possible 
taboo.  Such a case is the exact opposite of the ascetic who seeks to retard all drives.  But 
ironically such an individual, despite all their rebelling, is actually still defined by the norms and 
taboos of society – just in a negative way.  Accordingly their expansion and satisfaction of drives 
is less like a healthy natural growth, and more like the chaotic expansion and growth of cancer.  
So Nietzsche’s ideal of the liberated free spirit who seeks power and the expansion of drives is 
not simply the antithesis of the ascetic ideal.  Control is involved in both but the former involves 
development, growth, and productivity, and the latter does not.  Thus, self control and order are 
in fact essential ingredients in the healthy expression of the will to power in humans.  So while 
self-control and style are completely absent in the will to power’s expression in nature, they are 
fundamentally involved in its expression in humans.  Both the ascetic as well as the man of 
resentment, in different ways, poses a negative reactionary will in Richardson’s analysis.  Unlike 
the cancerous or suppressed will, or animal’s will to power, the healthy forms of the will to 
power in humans are active and “pregnant with a future” (GM II 16).  Once again, to draw on 
Richardson’s analysis, an active will wills power, whereas a reactive one wills some other end. 
                                            
42 Richardson NS 40-41. 
43 This issue will be specifically discussed in chapter 3 in connection with the will to be commanded. 
44 Richardson NS 42. 
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 The weak will however is slightly different from either of these cases.  The weak will 
internalizes and follows the values of the other but does not adopt them or consider them 
superior to their own the way the herd individual does.  Given the opportunity the weak-willed 
individual will reassert their values in a way that the herd individual will not.  This is more or 
less Richardson’s view and I think his analysis is correct and allows us to make sense of the 
different types of wills Nietzsche identifies.  Of the active will, Richardson says, “the active will 
keeps allegiance to itself and to the values favoring its own activities...  The active will 
commands others ‘internally’, by interpreting them and their values from the viewpoint of its 
own, thus granting them only a subordinate role in a world still revolving about itself”45.  Simply 
put, the active will never allows its values to be deflected by, or subordinate to, another’s.   
 One concern I have with regard to Richardson’s treatment of the active will is that it 
seems dogmatic with respect to its values.  If the goal is always development and growth, then 
there has to be an element of plasticity to one’s values.  One has to be willing and able to change 
and replace old values with new ones.  This plasticity can be a conscious change (as in the case 
of a religious conversion like St Augustine) or a subconscious reconfiguration of drives (as in the 
case of someone who is brainwashed or joins a cult).  In the simplest terms this plasticity (for 
good or for bad) means that no one is locked into any set of values in an absolute way.  With 
regard to conscious change, initially, this might require looking to others and examining their 
values, and even imitating them along the lines of the Aristotelian virtue model.  All of this 
seems excluded by Richardson’s model, however, given his insistence that the active will must 
always favor its values46.  The very problem with slave morality is that it often values its values 
just for the sake of valuing.  By contrast, master morality is supposed to be about valuing the 
right values that promote health and growth.  Accordingly, any kind of dogmatic faith in one’s 
values could seriously undermine this process.  The active will must be able to consider and 
assess the values of others and be open to the possibility of adopting them.  In no way does this 
                                            
45 Richardson NS 42. 
46 Richardson NS 42. 
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entail that they become subordinate to the other or their values.  The active will is always free to 
adopt or reject the other’s values.  Richardson’s model however seems to exclude this.  In his 
book Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, Richardson describes the active will as being ‘self selecting’ 
with regard to its values47.  In his words, “Superhuman value = the goal of a responsive behavior, 
self selected to serve oneself”48; but this process should not be understood as dogmatic in nature.  
One must be allowed to self-select others’ values for their own.    
 This issue aside, Richardson concludes, “Nietzsche thinks that conscious wills tend to be 
reactive, whereas simpler, non-human wills are more easily and usually active”49.  This comment 
squares very nicely with our previous discussion of the will to power in nature versus the will to 
power in humans.  Now we can make sense of the notion that the natural and healthy expression 
of the will to power is the active expression, as seen in nature, even if the reactive expression is 
the norm for human beings.  The fundamental difference is that an active will wills power, and a 
reactive will wills some other end (i.e. the ascetic does not will power but the sublimation of all 
drives).  This is why Nietzsche is always ironic in his discussion of the “improvers” of mankind.  
They react to the healthy expression of the will to power in humans and oppose it.  So 
“improvers” versus improvers refers to those who make humans sick versus those who promote 
their health (TI “Improvers”).  The ascetic ideal is the extreme of this and rather than promoting 
the growth and expansion of drives, it simply pits all drives against each other.  Nietzsche 
describes the subsequent feeling caused by the reactive corruption of the will to power as the 
“bad conscience” and clearly thinks that it was unique to humans.  In his words: 
 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is 
what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what 
was later called his “soul”. 
 
                                            
47 Richardson (2004) Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 95 [NND]. 
48 Richardson NND 96. 
49 Richardson NND 43. 
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Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all 
this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the “bad 
conscience” (GM II 16). 
 
The corruption of the instinctual expression of the will to power in humans causes one to pit 
drives against each other in a sick attempt to retard and shut down the drives that are at odds with 
the interests of society and the herd – resulting in the “bad conscience”.  The psychological 
strategy is to get the majority of wills that serve self-growth to acquiesce to the minority of wills 
that serve self-sacrifice – this is the essence of the slave revolt.   
 Note that within Christian morality much of what is considered natural and healthy 
according to Nietzsche becomes considered evil and sinful as the moral categories ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ are replaced with ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  However none of this should come as a surprise.  
There is no organism more complex than humans – which means there are many more ways in 
which its will to power can go wrong and become unnatural and sick.  So all the attempts to 
‘improve’ or ‘tame’ or ‘modify’ human nature will be at odds with the healthy instincts and 
accordingly they will always lead to a corruption of the will to power.  Once again this is clearly 
a phenomenon unique to humans according to Nietzsche: 
 
The man who, from lack of external enemies and resistances and forcibly 
confined to the oppressive narrowness and punctiliousness of custom, impatiently 
lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated himself; this animal 
that rubbed itself raw against the bars of its cage as one tried to “tame” it...  Let us 
add at once that, on the other hand, the existence on earth of an animal soul turned 
against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, 
unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of 
the earth was essentially altered (GM II 16).  
 
So it is only in contrast to the active will to power found in nature that one can make sense of 
Nietzsche’s claim that the will to power as expressed in humans is often sick and unnatural.  The 
“improvers” caused man to turn against the “old instincts” of nature such that the “animal soul 
turned against itself”.   
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 In the final analysis, the will to power may be the essence of life but it is far from 
immune to corruption.  Here I mean ‘natural’ in the sense employed by Nietzsche in The Birth of 
Tragedy.  There Nietzsche likens the process of creation and destruction expressed by the will to 
power to Heraclitus’ notion of a child playing in the sand.  He says of this force that it is like “a 
playing child who sets down stones here, there, and the next place, and who builds up piles of 
sand only to knock them down again” (BT 24).  So there is a kind of innocence to the child’s 
play.  They naturally delight equally in creation as destruction and in this way beautifully express 
the will to power in its most basic form.  So “natural” (or active will) in this sense means a state 
prior to any corruptive influences.  To repeat Richardson’s words, “an active will keeps 
allegiance to itself and to the values favoring its own activities” (Richardson NS 42).  Consider 
how utterly foreign and bizarre the notion of the ascetic ideal would be to a young child.  
Nietzsche also uses the child metaphor in Zarathustra when he talks about the three 
metamorphoses.  He says, “the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the lion, 
finally, a child” (Z I 1).  The ideal here seems to be to return to this natural innocence and 
overcome corrupting influences.  In fact, this is one of the ways in which Nietzsche diagnoses 
the ascetic ideal – it’s an inverted and corrupted expression of the will to power.   
Here we can distinguish between the “improvers” of mankind (e.g. the Apostle Paul50) 
from the improvers of the conditions that serve the interests of the potential higher types (e.g. 
Nietzsche).  So it is not the case that Nietzsche is guilty of the very thing he criticizes – i.e. 
attempts to modify human nature.  He is attempting to correct the corruption caused by reactive 
slave moralities to create conditions that were damaging to the potential healthy higher types.  
Here Nietzsche is himself being reactive but he is not being hypocritical.  The difference is he is 
trying to steer humanity back to the original focal point.  As BGE 260 makes clear, Nietzsche 
understood the fundamental difference between the values he espouses and the values he 
despises in terms of the fact that the former were original and active while the latter were 
                                            
50 The  Apostle Paul will be the main subject of chapter 4.  It will draw heavily from Nietzsche’s discussion of Paul 
in his book The Antichrist. 
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derivative, negative, and reactive – which is to say, the former are healthy while the latter are 
sick. 
It should be noted that Nietzsche also offers an account of this sort of corruption that 
specifically attributes it to social forces.  For instance, in the Genealogy he states: “I regard the 
bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress which 
occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and peace” (GM I 
16).  However, I would argue that these forces produce only the most basic forms of a bad 
conscience.  The attempt to “improve” mankind is almost exclusively a religious endeavor.  With 
various religions, the proverbial ‘walls’ become even tighter and more confining.  I think this 
distinction is clear in the section “The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind” in Twilight.  There, Nietzsche 
offers a series of examples of this attempted improvement.  He discusses religious endeavors to 
“breed” and “tame” a better human.  There he focuses on India’s “Law of Manu” and contrasts it 
with Christianity’s attempted improvements and it is evident he considers the latter the much 
pernicious case.   So while social forces can produce early forms of a bad conscience, it is 
religious forces that exploit the bad conscience and literally try to modify human nature through 
moral value systems.  What these moral systems are in fact doing, to borrow Richardson’s 
terminology, is disrupting the balance of what are otherwise naturally balanced ‘activity patterns’ 
and equilibriums of synthetic wills. 
 Finally, there is one more significant way in which the will to power is unique in the case 
of humans.  Nietzsche argues that goal setting, growth, and overcoming involve an element of 
style51.  Such activities, according to Nietzsche, are often a process of turning what is ugly into 
something beautiful (GS 299).  In his words: 
 
One thing is needful – to “give style” to one’s character…  It is practiced by those 
who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into 
                                            
51 This element of style sets humans apart from other animals.  Though many animals exhibit teleological behavior 
(nest building, hunting, migrating etc.) the element of style goes beyond all such activities.  For Nietzsche, it is more 
than just satisfying drives, it is the process of organizing drives – and this is clearly something unique to humans. 
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an artistic plan until everyone of them appears as art and reason and even 
weaknesses delight the eye (GS 290).   
 
“Style” here seems to mean a configuration of will that establishes the order and rank of drives 
and values.  Nietzsche goes on to describe this “style” precisely as a self-given restraint and 
concludes: “It will be strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such 
constraint and perfection under a law of their own” (GS 290).  A person is nothing but an 
economy of wills and style renders some wills subordinate to others.  So while there is no 
aesthetic style to the will to power’s expression in nature (except for what we project onto it), 
aesthetic style and taste are an essential part of its expression in humans.  In this manner strength 
as well as weakness, good taste as well as bad, and beauty as well as ugliness, can all be 
expressed.  So the cases of the man of resentment and the malcontent discussed earlier are best 
understood as cases that lack of self-control and style, and express themselves in ugliness.  In 
Nietzsche’s words, “It is the weak without power over themselves that hate the constraint of 
style...  Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will 
be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly sight.  For the sight of what is ugly makes 
one bad and gloomy” (GS 290).  As Kaufmann correctly observes in a footnote to this passage, 
Nietzsche identifies self-control and style with power, and a lack of self-control and style with 
weakness.  So the range of strong and weak wills discussed earlier can be understood in terms of 
style and the degree to which one is self-commanding.  In Nietzsche’s words, “It will be the 
strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and of perfection 
under a law of their own” (GS 290).  Nietzsche maintains that strong wills are active wills that 
flourish and grow and this requires that they are “rich in internal opposition” (TI “Anti-nature” 
5).  Nietzsche also declares, “The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition...  One 
has renounced the great life when one renounces war” (A 3).  I submit that passages like these 
refer to a kind of dialectical struggle within oneself that is driven by one’s style.  Weak wills are 
chaotic ones that are lacking in internal opposition – instead of being internally driven they react 
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to external stimuli.  This form of opposition however does not facilitate growth – rather only 
perpetual conflict for the sake of conflict. 
 So the extreme malcontent is actually a weak-willed individual fundamentally frustrated 
with themselves, and precisely not the liberated free spirit they desperately profess themselves to 
be.  They are not free at all but actually a kind of slave.  While they might interpret their “wild, 
arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, and surprising” nature as free and beautiful, it is actually weak 
and ugly according to Nietzsche (GS 290).  Such individuals may in fact be satisfying certain 
base drives but it is done so in such an unbridled, chaotic, and destructive manner that it is not 
actually an expression of strength but of weakness – which is to say, a lack of self-control is not 
liberation and doesn’t constitute a style at all.   
Accordingly, this weakness causes agents to always be out to prove something rather than 
be something.  The goals they set and the drives they pursue are not chosen for their own sakes 
but are chosen purely as an act of rebellion – here again the extreme malcontent ironically 
becomes defined by the norms they rebel against.  So, as previously discussed, there is an irony 
to the malcontent; by rebelling against all the norms of society in an attempt to defy them, they 
are still defined by those norms in a negative way.  Take the very extreme case of G.G. Allin for 
instance52.  He had drives of course; and desired first and foremost to satisfy certain ones.  But, 
far from a bad style, he simply lacked any style at all.  By all accounts he lived more like an 
animal than a human.  So he could hardly be said to have flourished.  Rather than internal 
opposition that spurred growth, he was consumed with external opposition that retarded it.  And 
again, the irony is that, for all his talk of being a liberated free spirit, he was defined negatively 
by all the norms of society that he systematically and comprehensively tried to violate.  
However, it’s easy to see how Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power could be misunderstood 
when it comes to the malcontent.  One could assume that such a malcontent is the opposite of the 
                                            
52 G.G. Allin was a notorious early 90’s “musician” who broke nearly every social taboo and norm imaginable and 
eventually died of a drug overdose after a truncated life of unbridled indulgence and excess.  He is the subject of a 
1994 documentary called Hated by director Todd Phillips who, at the time, was an NYU film student. 
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ascetic ideal and must then be expressing the will to power in a healthy way.  In this way it’s 
easy to make a caricature of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power and use that as a basis for a 
straw man argument against it.  However, as this chapter has hopefully made clear, these types of 
objections are superficial and ill-formed. 
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Chapter III: Slave Morality and Self-Punishment: the Need to be Commanded 
 
 
This chapter will analyze the rich and complex psychological mechanisms at work in slave 
moralities, and the need to be commanded that drives them.  We will focus specifically on the 
sickness produced by slave moralities and other anti-natural moralities mentioned in the previous 
chapter.  Slave moralities (or B morality discussed in Chapter 1), according to Nietzsche, are the 
products of what he calls “slave revolts”, in which a reactive and oppressed group establishes 
new values that corrupt the natural and healthy drives in an attempt to empower themselves.  B 
moralities utilize the value schema of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and assert that their values are absolute 
and therefore superior to all other sets of values or moralities.  Although, as I will later argue, 
there are different types of slave morality, the primary one Nietzsche discuses in the Genealogy 
is the priestly revolt that gave rise to Christianity in which the plebeian herd reacted53 to the 
noble elite types and produced a new moral system and table of values – culminating in what 
Nietzsche calls the “ascetic ideal”.  I maintain that slave moralities such as this essentially 
involve a complicated desire to be commanded from without. 
 
 
i. The Desire to be Commanded 
While it seems completely counter-intuitive, I maintain that the ascetic ideal is in fact a closeted 
form of autonomy – wanting to want to be commanded.  This makes it different from common 
notions of heteronomy.  In everyday terms, under certain conditions, people are willing to submit 
to the will of another in exchange for some higher good.  For instance, an employee submits to 
the will of his or her boss, a soldier follows the orders of his or her commanders, and patients 
adhere to the recommendations of their doctor.  So how is the psychology of slave moralities 
different from these rather straightforward forms of heteronomy?  First, I maintain that slave 
                                            
53 In this context there is a double meaning to ‘reactive’.  First, it refers to the ‘external stimuli’ (i.e. the nobles) 
described in GM I 10.  Second, it also refers to the fact that the herd as a group develop reactive wills. 
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morality is not just another form of heteronomy at all, but a unique and complicated 
psychological state that actually consists of a perverted form of autonomy.  Second, it’s distinct 
from forms of heteronomy in two key ways.  First, in slave moralities the agent does not simply 
choose to acquiesce or submit to another’s will; rather they desire to actually supplant their own 
will with the other’s.  Second, the agent is motivated to do this not for the sake of some higher 
ends deemed more important than one’s immediate interests; instead, they actually submit to a 
mentality that allows them to serve interests that are actually contrary to their natural drives such 
that their various drives become redirected.  In other words, their wills are no longer active 
(willing power itself) but rather become reactive (desiring some other end – in this case, the 
desire to be commanded and have their natural drives sublimated).  In this way it is sick 
according to Nietzsche – the agent perceives the submission of their will as a strength, and the 
enslavement of their will as a liberation.  It is self-perpetuating, and gets the healthy and strong 
parts of the will to serve the sick and weak parts.  So it is a sickness that produces disharmony.  
Thus while this tendency is common in humans it is not natural.   Specifically it creates 
conflicting and irreconcilable psychological forces that render the agent, in Gemes’ terms, a non-
integrated subject54.  Although Gemes acknowledges passages like “our body is but a social 
structure composed of many souls” (BGE 26) he argues that unity is the ultimate goal: 
 
Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is in fact a call to engage 
in a purposive self creation under a unifying will...  The de-centered self 
celebrated by the postmodernists is for Nietzsche the self-conception of the 
nihilistic Last Man.  The construction of a unified self is the goal of Nietzsche's 
Overman (Gemes PUAN 339). 
 
As Gemes correctly observes, it’s clearly the distinct Cartesian or Kantian subject, doer behind 
the deed, that Nietzsche rejects.  In contrast an agent is constituted by an economy of wills.  
Accordingly, non-integrated versus unified self is not to be understood as a weak confused will 
versus an autonomous will; but rather, it is a chaotic arrangement of wills versus an expansive 
                                            
54 Gemes (2001) "Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
LXII/2: 337-360 [PUAN]. 
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and organized economy of wills.  Recall the discussion in the previous chapter of the will to 
power, and G.G. Allin and the case of the extreme malcontent.  Again, it is not enough for 
Nietzsche that wills are satisfied.  As discussed in the previous chapter, there must also be an 
element of style that gives one character and organizes drives (GS 290). 
This helps us to better understand Nietzsche's claim that morality is anti-nature.  The 
natural forces meant to process and digest ressentiment55 are corrupted such that they actually 
produce more ressentiment in the agent.   In Nietzsche's words: “The ascetic ideal springs from 
the protective instinct of a degenerating life” (GM III 13).  As we will see, in slave moralities, 
the desire to punish others becomes a desire to punish oneself.  In Nietzsche’s words, “all 
religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties” (GM II 3).  Here it’s important to note that, 
while there are different forms of slave moralities (to be discussed later), the slave morality that 
gave birth to Christianity is a unique one (for reasons to be discussed) and the specific subject of 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy and the following analysis. 
 But this raises an immediate question: if the desire to be commanded is sick and 
unnatural why is it so common?  What motivates it?  And why would one want to redirect their 
drives at all?  I maintain that its appeal stems from, for lack of a better way to put it, 
psychological economics.  Submission to commands is a highly effective mechanism to deal 
with stress, anxiety, and responsibility.  When one finds oneself in ordinary and common 
circumstances there is a well tested and proven play book to follow and clear rules to abide by.  
As such, so long as one follows the rules, in the off chance that one still fails in achieving their 
ends they can blame the rules and not themselves for the failure.  By contrast, there is nothing 
more stressful than finding oneself in exceptional circumstances where there is no playbook, or 
ready to hand rules to follow.  In such a situation one has neither clear rules to follow nor an 
automatic scapegoat should they fail – which is to say, one becomes fully responsible.  In this 
context the rules are absent precisely where they are needed the most.  In his article “What is 
                                            
55 The topic of ressentiment was tentatively discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Moral Maturity?” Hubert Dreyfus56 argues that a novice in any complex situation is in desperate 
need of rules in order to perform.  The problem is that a novice is literally crippled by a surplus 
of options and possibilities.  It is this sort of novice status that I would argue creates the legalistic 
vacuum that the plebeians fear and the nobles embrace57.   
 However, it is in just such circumstances that the higher types thrive and flourish, while 
the average and plebeian suffer and fail.  Now, if one grants Nietzsche's elitist claim that the 
plebeian types are common while the noble and higher types are rare, then it becomes obvious 
why this need to be commanded is so common and persuasive even if it is unnatural.  The need 
to be commanded is a product of the common plebeians trying to deal with this legalistic 
vacuum.  The strategy is this: if we can invent rules where rules are absent then we can better 
deal with the stress and anxiety that such circumstances produce by dispersing blame over a 
wider circumference.  This, if nothing else, produces at least a semblance of control from the 
perspective of the agent.  Or better still, this will to be commanded promises to prevent one from 
ever even finding themselves in such stressful circumstances so long as they follow the rules.  
Accordingly this desire to be commanded systematically produces rules that aim to keep 
everything common and average – which is to say, predictable:  
 
The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently 
embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a 
certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently 
calculable...  With the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man 
was actually made calculable (GM II 2). 
 
However effective or non-effective these mechanisms prove to be in practice takes a back seat to 
the promise of power these strategies offer to the common and plebeian types.  As such these 
psychological strategies are inherently appealing to the average plebeian types but are distasteful 
                                            
56 Dreyfus, Hubert (1992) “What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical 
Expertise” in J Ogilvy Revisioning Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press). 
57 As discussed in Chapter 2, there may be social forces that initially create the bad conscience (GM II 16) but I 
maintain that the attempt to improve mankind that really exploit the bad conscience are almost exclusively the 
product of religions introducing ever-stricter rules to govern human behavior and interactions. 
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to the higher noble types.  However, since the plebeians are much more common so too is this 
psychological tendency.  Once again, though this tendency is common it is, nevertheless, not 
natural. 
 Turning specifically to the ascetic and the desire to be commanded, the rules alleviate 
suffering and make life more manageable by establishing a context of meaning wherein the 
alleged causes of suffering are identified and addressed.  The enemy and cause of guilt is once 
again singled out and focused on.  It is those pesky instincts once again.  They are to blame – 
they are the ‘flesh’ and the cause of all sin.  The dichotomy of the priest’s ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
categories is correlated with the categories ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’.  War was declared on the instincts 
and passions in order to liberate the ‘spirit’. 
 
Formerly, in view of the element of stupidity in passion, war was declared on 
passion itself, its destruction was plotted; all the old moral monsters are agreed on 
this: il faut tuer les passions [the passions must be killed]... but an attack on the 
roots of passion means an attack on the roots of life: the practice of the church is 
hostile to life (TI “Anti-nature” 1). 
 
 In the final analysis it is this war against the instincts and passions that causes the bad 
conscience that serves as the fuel for the ressentiment machine of the ascetic’s slave morality 
(HAH 141).  It’s a sickness in which the will to power turns on itself and life.  These 
psychological forces have a profound effect on the expression of the will to power.  In the 
service of this psychological value structure, the natural desire to expand drives becomes the 
unhealthy and unnatural desire to be commanded.  Once again, even though this desire is 
common, that doesn't make it natural.  Again, if one grants Nietzsche's claim that the plebeian 
types are common while the noble and higher types are rare, then it is not surprising why this 
desire is so common and persuasive even if it is unnatural.  All of this is rooted in a kind of 
psychological sickness and weakness according to Nietzsche.  Here again, it’s important to stress 
that it is a holistic system that stands or falls together and has God as its cornerstone, and 
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paradoxically it is predicated on the idea that man cannot know what is in his real best interest.  
This leads to the closeted autonomy that wants to be commanded.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Christianity presupposes that man does not know, cannot know, what is good for 
him, what evil: he believes in God, who alone knows it.  Christian morality is a 
command; its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism, all right to 
criticism; it has truth only if God is truth – it stands or falls with faith in God (TI 
“Untimely Man” 5). 
 
A powerful need to be commanded accompanies the need to believe.  This is because, in the 
agent’s sick psychological state they require a special mechanism to digest and process the bad 
conscience and the unique guilt produced by sin.  Recall that the bad conscience itself is a 
product of the redirecting of ressentiment, guilt, and the instincts.  Rather than being released 
outwardly, they are redirected inward at oneself – which in turn creates the guilt of sin.  In 
Nietzsche’s words: 
 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is 
what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what 
was later called his “soul”...  Those fearful bulwarks with which the political 
organization protected itself against the old instincts of freedom – punishments 
belong among these bulwarks – brought about that all those instincts of wild, free, 
prowling man turned backward against man himself.  Hostility, cruelty, joy in 
persecuting, in change, in destruction – all this turned against the possessors of 
such instincts: that is the origin of the “bad conscience” (GM II 16). 
 
This, I maintain, is where the need to be commanded comes from.  It's in place even at the level 
of the morality of mores  (discussed in Chapter 1) in terms of dealing with ressentiment, but 
culminates in the ascetic ideal that accompanies slave moralities – for this reason he states that 
the origins of the bad conscience are rooted in the morality of mores.  I maintain that Nietzsche 
sees this desire to be commanded as a necessary, though not sufficient, characteristic of morality 
that is present at the level of a morality of mores and culminates in the ascetic ideal of slave 
morality.   
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 Specifically I would argue this tendency is the result of the aforementioned phenomena 
of psychological economics.  In addition to the belief that slave morality’s values are superior to 
any other set of values, its values are rendered more appealing by several other factors58.  First, 
consider just how incredibly attractive a prepackaged ideology or metaphysical worldview that 
promises the ability to resolve ressentiment would be to the marginalized plebeians who suffer 
acutely from the effects of ressentiment.  If there are suddenly rules to follow and a playbook to 
draw from the anguish of uncertainty and despair is immediately ameliorated – just as in the case 
of the O.C.D. case.  In both cases however it is a desperate mechanism employed to provide, if 
nothing else, a semblance of control – it is not a cure but part band-aid, part placebo, part toxin.  
It promises to alleviate the guilt and suffering acutely felt by the believer and is at the same time 
a kind of punishment the believer feels they deserve.  As the earlier passage argues, the believer 
is made to believe that they cannot know what is good for them.  The psychological system in 
fact does more to perpetuate the very guilt that plagues the believer than alleviate it, but this fact 
again remains obfuscated – and it must since if any part of the system is exposed it threatens the 
whole.  Once the system is up and running however it achieves an equilibrium between sin 
production and digestion (by obeying the moral commands) and the psychological process 
perpetuates itself indefinitely.  In the psyche of the believer a never-ending battle between the 
fictitious enemies of flesh and spirit ensues.  Their inability to command and regulate their 
instincts, passions, and wills causes them to seek out other mechanisms to regulate them.  
According to Nietzsche the believer is not only in a profoundly sick state but also a weak one; 
thus, the believer clings desperately to the value system because it at least affords them the 
illusion of stability.  Nietzsche addresses this complex psychology in GS 347. 
 
Believers and their need to believe. – How much one needs a faith in order 
flourish, how much that is “firm” and that one does not wish to be shaken because 
one clings to it, that is a measure of the degree of one’s strength (or, to put the 
point more clearly, of one’s weakness)...  That instinct of weakness... does not 
                                            
58 This topic was discussed in detail in Chapter 1 (especially section 2).  The two primary references were BGE 202, 
and GM I 13 (where the birds of prey and lambs allegory was discussed). 
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create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds but – 
conserves them (GS 347).    
 
What this passage highlights is that, like a placebo, the power of the “cure” is rooted in the belief 
of its power.  It’s a kind of faith in the very notion of faith.  For this reason, once the agent buys 
into the psychology, they cling to it.  Ironically the weakness that motivates the belief is 
inversely proportioned to the degree of strength with which they cling to it.  This is why 
Nietzsche states that: 
 
Faith is always coveted most and needed most urgently where will is lacking: for 
will, as the affect of command, is the decisive sign of sovereignty and strength.  In 
other words, the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets 
someone who commands.  From this one might perhaps gather that the two world 
religions, Buddhism and Christianity, may have owed their origin and above all 
their sudden spread to a tremendous collapse and disease of the will...  Once a 
human being reaches the fundamental conviction that he must be commanded, he 
becomes “a believer” (GS 347) 
 
The agent thus becomes one who now needs to be commanded.  Like a drug addiction, the rules 
and commands become a distraction and escape from the deeper pathologies that in fact initially 
caused, and subsequently feed, the artificial need itself.  For Nietzsche, nothing could be more 
antithetical to the self-determined free agent – nothing could be more sick in comparison. 
 
Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-
determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all 
faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on 
insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses.  Such a spirit 
would be the free spirit par excellence” (GS 347). 
 
 So it is the believer’s desire to be commanded that keeps the believer locked into the 
psychological mechanisms of slave morality.  The redirection of drives and the desire to be 
commanded are intimately intertwined.  As the redirection of drives continues, the desire to be 
commanded becomes ever stronger.  This is because the attempt to resolve suffering by 
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redirecting drives actually creates more suffering and frustration – accordingly the agent in turn 
desires more commands.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
In many respects the ascetic too seeks to make life easier for himself: and he does 
so as a rule by complete subordination to the will of another…  This 
subordination is a powerful means of becoming master of oneself…  One has 
renounced one’s own will once and for all, and this is easier than renouncing it 
only now and again…  The saint thus makes his life easier through his complete 
surrender of his personality (HAH 139). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 section two, this act of submission creates a sort of perpetual motion 
machine of suffering, guilt, and frustration that culminates ultimately in the ascetic ideal.   
Interestingly this seems to be the cause of Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s normative theory.  
Nietzsche argues that Kant’s deontological ethics also appeals to this desire to be commanded.  
In his words: 
 
To demand that duty must always be something of a burden – as Kant does – 
means to demand that it should never become habit and custom: in this demand 
there is concealed a remnant of ascetic cruelty (D 339). 
 
As with slave moralities in general, Nietzsche argues that Kant’s morality involves a kind of 
sickness and weakness.  The categorical imperative seems designed precisely to work against the 
exceptional types.  For Nietzsche, however, part of what sets the nobles apart is that they 
deserve, and know when, to make exceptions of themselves.  For this reason Nietzsche says that 
the categorical imperative “smells of cruelty” (GM II 6).  Once again the will to punish others is 
redirected inward as a desire to punish oneself.   
 
‘Thou shalt obey someone and for a long time’ – otherwise thou shalt perish and 
lose all respect for thyself’ – this seems to me to be nature’s imperative, which is, 
to be sure, neither ‘categorical’ as old Kant demanded it should be (hence 
‘otherwise’ --), nor addressed to the individual (what do individuals matter to 
nature!), but to peoples, races, ages, classes, and above all to the entire animal 
‘man,’ to mankind (BGE 188). 
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Thus, Nietzsche argues that the psychology behind the categorical imperative leaves one 
perpetually in debt to the moral law and mankind in general; and thus perpetually deserving of 
punishment.  One must always consider their wills, desires, and actions with respect to the whole 
of humanity – and adjust them to the whole.  Not only does Nietzsche see this as recklessly 
presumptuous, but also naively arrogant.  In his words: 
 
It is selfish to experience one’s own judgment as a universal law; and this 
selfishness is blind, petty, and frugal because it betrays that you have not yet 
discovered yourself nor created for yourself an ideal of your own, your very own 
– for that could never be somebody else’s and much less that of all, all!  Anyone 
who still judges “in this case everybody would have to act like this” has not yet 
taken five steps toward self-knowledge... (GS 335). 
 
Now compare this passage to the previously discussed GS 347.  Nietzsche could just as easily be 
commenting on Kant in this passage.  By contrast to the Kantian who has not taken any steps 
towards self-knowledge, Nietzsche’s free spirit has taken all those steps and, as a result, is self-
determined and free.  Unlike Nietzsche’s free spirit the Kantian, like the believer in the ascetic 
ideal, operates in an illusory world of manufactured metaphysical value system.  According to 
Nietzsche the categorical imperative is just an updated version of the age-old “thou shalt” of 
slave morality – Kant did not so much transcend the old moral categories as reinvent them. 
 
In the end, Kant tried, with “German” innocence, to give this corruption 
[conviction as criterion of truth], this lack of intellectual conscience, scientific 
status with his notion of “practical reason”: he invented a special kind of reason 
for cases in which one need not bother about reason – that is, when morality, 
when the sublime command “thou shalt,” raises its voice (A 12). 
 
Kant, Nietzsche argues, simply posited new concepts and categories designed to preserve old 
value systems.    He claimed to have discovered a new moral faculty, but Nietzsche considers the 
categorical imperative a vacuous moral place-holder invented by Kant for the old moral 
categories of good and evil (BGE 11).  Specifically his charge is that Kant’s strategy is to 
presuppose a metaphysical structure that makes certain questions, not only meaningful, but only 
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answerable in predetermined ways – all of which is thought to validate that structure after the 
fact.  Which is to say, whether in epistemology or normative theory, with his invention of new 
faculties, according to Nietzsche Kant is guilty of pulling a necessary rabbit out of an 
unnecessary hat (HAH 25).   
 
 
ii.  Metaphysical Motion Sickness 
In order to understand this closeted autonomy and the desire to be commanded that underlies 
slave morality we will need to unpack the psychological layers that constitute it.  As Nietzsche 
explores in the Genealogy, slave moralities establish a new set of moral categories, and invent 
and posit a comprehensive metaphysical world-view to sustain them.  This metaphysical value 
matrix distinguishes itself from all other value systems, and thereby gains its authority, by 
insisting it is not created, but rather, is given in nature (i.e. a kind of realism decreed by God).   
 
Only one kind of human morality beside which, before which, after which many 
other, above all higher, moralities are possible or ought to be possible.  But 
against such a ‘possibility’, against such an ‘ought’, this morality defends itself 
with all its might: it says, obstinately and stubbornly, ‘I am morality itself, and 
nothing is morality besides me!’... the democratic movement inherits the 
Christian (BGE 202). 
 
So Christian morality involves a robust moral realism that insists it has a pure monopoly on 
morality and values to such a degree that anything non-Christian is at once perceived as immoral.  
While it is true that most moralities, to varying degrees, perceive any other morality’s values as 
false, Christianity, according to Nietzsche, takes it even further by insisting that its values are the 
essence of morality itself.  In truth however its values are all rooted in utility and the needs of the 
herd over the individual, and are projected onto nature.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
At first, men imagined themselves into nature: they saw everywhere themselves 
and their kind, especially their evil and capricious qualities, as it were hidden 
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among the clouds, storms, beasts of prey, trees and plants: it was then they 
invented ‘evil nature’ (D 17). 
 
All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world 
estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore 
devaluated the world – all these values are, psychologically considered, the results 
of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human 
constructs of domination – and they have been falsely projected into the essence 
of things (WP 12). 
 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to 
its nature – nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time, as 
a present – and it was we who gave and bestowed it.  Only we have created the 
world that concerns man! (GS 302). 
 
It is important to note that this metaphysical moral structure is a holistic system that revalues 
everything and is justified and sustained by the keystone concept of God.  “Christianity is a 
system, a whole view of things thought out together.  By breaking one main concept out of it, the 
faith in God, one breaks the whole” (TI “Untimely Man” 5).  So the fact that this system is 
merely a projection has to be concealed at all costs.  It is a kind of faith that has to be concealed.  
One has to have faith in the metaphysical structure that sustains the values.  The loss of any one 
part, especially God, threatens the whole.  In Nietzsche's words: 
 
That which constrains these men [ascetics], however, this unconditional will to 
truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative – 
don’t be deceived about that – it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute 
value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone (it stands or falls 
with this ideal) (GM III 24). 
 
This however creates a certain tension in the agent.  The instincts repeatedly resist the system 
and its authority.  The will to power fights to expand, while the moral values of this system work 
to reign it in.  The agent finds himself torn between the two. 
 This, I maintain, leads to a kind of metaphysical motion sickness.  Consider that motion 
sickness is caused by the tension between the illusion of stasis and the sense of motion.  If 
everything in one’s immediate environment is collectively moving in tandem (i.e. the cabin of a 
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ship in rough seas) it can trick some of the senses into thinking that they are at rest while other 
senses insist that one is not.  It is this tension that results in motion sickness.  In the same way, 
slave moralities attempt to invert all values collectively as a whole.  The instincts however resist 
the illusion of this system of values.  Like in motion sickness, this tension creates a kind of 
anxiety and sickness in the agent.  As initially discussed in Chapter 2 section two, this negative 
feeling results in the ‘bad conscience’ and the agent immediately seeks out a cause.  The obvious 
cause to blame is the instincts and, accordingly, they are blamed for the sake of preserving the 
metaphysical system of values – the system that also provides meaning to the suffering.  This 
creates a “war against the old instincts” according to Nietzsche: 
 
Man’s suffering of man, of himself – the result of a forcible sundering from his 
animal past, as it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of 
existence, a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, 
joy, and terribleness had rested hitherto (GM II 16). 
 
But this war against the old instincts in turn creates feelings of guilt and more suffering which 
leads to more disdain for the instincts.  Nietzsche further describes the psychology of this tension 
in the Genealogy. 
 
Man, the bravest of animals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not 
repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is 
shown a meaning for it, a purpose of suffering.  The meaninglessness of suffering, 
not suffering itself, was the curse that lay over mankind so far – and the ascetic 
ideal offered man meaning!  This interpretation – there is no doubt of it – brought 
fresh suffering with it, deeper, more inward, more poisonous, more life-
destructive suffering: it placed all suffering under the perspective of guilt (GM III 
28). 
 
So the system that creates the suffering and guilt also provides meaning for it, and the system 
perpetuates itself.  The priest’s value system is not the cure but in fact the cause. 
 
He [ascetic priest] brings salves and balm with him, no doubt; but before he can 
act as a physician he first has to wound; when he then stills the pain of the wound 
he at the same time infects the wound – for that is what he knows to do best of all, 
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this sorcerer and animal-tamer, in whose presence everything healthy necessarily 
grows sick, and everything sick tame...  The priest alters the direction of 
ressentiment (GM III 15). 
 
The tension between the belief system and the instincts creates a kind of metaphysical motion 
sickness and results in what Nietzsche calls the “bad conscience” which also demands a cause 
and a meaning.  The artificial nature of the real psychological cause however remains buried, and 
the blame is instead placed on the instincts.  This, Nietzsche argues, redirects the ressentiment of 
the bad conscience from the priest and his metaphysical value structure and towards oneself.  In 
his words: 
 
“Someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill” – this kind of reasoning is 
common to all the sick, and is indeed held the more firmly the more the real cause 
of their feeling ill, the physiological cause, remains hidden...  They scour the 
entrails of their past and present for obscure and questionable occurrences that 
offer them the opportunity to revel in tormenting suspicions and to intoxicate 
themselves with the poison of their own malice: they tear open their oldest 
wounds, they bleed from long-healed scars, they make evildoers out of their 
friends, wives, children, and whoever else stands closest to them.  “I suffer: 
someone must be to blame for it” – thus thinks every sickly sheep.  But his 
shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: “Quite so, my sheep someone must be to 
blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for it – you 
alone are to blame for yourself!” – This is brazen and false enough: but one thing 
at least is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered. (GM III 15). 
 
This whole psychological system is designed to feed off itself and perpetually gather momentum.  
The axis of it involves turning suffering into guilt, turning guilt into ‘sin’, which in turn causes 
more suffering as one is told they are the cause of it.  The agent is exploited by the priest’s 
system’s ability to turn a natural psychological force (suffering) into a sick and unhealthy force 
(sin) and thereby invert its meaning by redirecting it at oneself. 
 
The chief trick the ascetic priest permitted himself for making the human soul 
resound with heart-rendering, ecstatic music of all kinds was, as everyone knows, 
the exploitation of the sense of guilt...  It was only in the hands of the priest, that 
artist in guilt feelings, that it achieved form – oh, what a form! “sin” – for this is 
the priestly name for the animal’s “bad conscience”... he must seek it in himself, 
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in some guilt, in a piece of the past, he must understand his suffering as a 
punishment (GM III 20). 
 
In this way, the natural desire to retaliate, intimidate, and harm others is inverted such that it 
becomes a desire to punish oneself – the retaliation against others becomes retaliation against 
oneself and their own drives. 
 
 
iii.  Ressentiment and O.C.D.  
In the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that this psychological mechanism has its roots in the creditor 
debtor relationship.  As Janaway observes in his essay “Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Self-
punishment in Nietzsche’s Genealogy”59: 
 
One of the main sources of explanitory power for the whole essay is the repeated 
play on Schuld, Schulden, Schuldner (guilt, debt, debtor), at its most salient in 
Nietzsche's thought that ‘that central moral concept “guilt” had its origins in the 
very material concept “debt” ’ (Janaway GBS 145). 
 
As in the case of revenge, Nietzsche argues that punishing another or making them suffer can be 
viewed as compensation for a debt.  Accordingly, the creditor is allowed to inflict pain on the 
debtor as payment for the debt (GM II 4, 6).  Thus if one can be made to feel perpetually guilty 
or in debt, they can easily be convinced that they are deserving of continual punishment.  At the 
hands of the priest the agent is made to believe that they suffer because they are forever guilty 
and in debt before God (GM II 12).  This ubiquitous sense of pervasive guilt in turn leads to the 
agent punishing themselves as payment on this guilt/debt60.  The desire to punish others becomes 
a desire to punish oneself.  As Janaway correctly argues, self-punishment is not only a product of 
the debtor-creditor relationship but also involves the satisfaction of the will to dominate by 
internalizing it61.  He then observes that: 
                                            
59 In Leiter and Sinhababu's (2007) Nietzsche and Morality 145 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [GBS]. 
60 The German terms are Schuld/Schulden. 
61 Janaway GBS 147. 
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We are being cruel to ourselves because, given our instincts as living beings, we 
are driven to be cruel to something, but we interpret the self-cruelty as deserved 
and rightful, as punishment of ourselves by ourselves.  We give ourselves 
permission to despise and maltreat ourselves (Janaway GBS 148). 
 
Thus self-punishment comes to be seen as something virtuous.  According to Nietzsche this 
occurs when unresolved guilt is transformed into sin (GM III 20).   
 In her essay “Nietzsche's Immoralism and the Concept of Guilt”62 Clark describes this 
process as the moralization of debt. 
 
Debt is moralized into guilt, Nietzsche claims, when it is pushed back into the bad 
conscience (GM II: 21).  I take this to mean that the moralization of debt into guilt 
occurs through the taking over of the idea of debt by the bad conscience, the 
project of internalizing aggression.  Debt becomes guilt insofar as people start 
using the idea of being indebted to inflict suffering on themselves (Clark NICM, 
29). 
 
While I agree with Clark’s and Janaway’s analysis of this psychology for the most part, I don't 
think they emphasize the role that the concept of sin plays in it.  As Nietzsche makes clear in GM 
III 20, it’s not just suffering and guilt that motivates this process, it’s that moralized debt 
becomes sin.  This is important to note because it causes agents to perceive themselves in an 
existential state of perpetual debtedness.  Accordingly it is no longer specific sufferings or 
specific debts that the agent is concerned to resolve; it is their very being and condition itself.  
Thus they remain perpetually in debt and guilty before God (GM II 12, 21), and perpetually 
locked into these psychological mechanisms.    Clark does make precisely this point63 but she 
fails to observe that it is not mere guilt and debt that produces such an existential state64, but 
specifically the introduction of sin – a completely new type of guilt – into the equation.  The 
critical distinction between mere guilt and sin is that individual types of guilt can be specifically 
                                            
62 In Schacht (1994) Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (London: 
University of California) Press) [NICM]. 
63 See Clark NICM 30. 
64 In Clark’s words, “We owe God a debt not just for what we do, but who we are” (Clark NICM 30). 
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addressed and resolved (at least in theory by repaying debts or accepting punishments).  Sin 
however refers to one’s very state of being.  It’s a sort of holistic debt, which cannot be resolved 
through any sort of repayment or punishment – it is perpetual existential guilt.  Accordingly, 
what began out of a need to make sense of their suffering turns the agent into the victim of 
powerful psychological forces and the redirection of drives (GM III 15).  Nietzsche of course 
describes such an agent as sick (GM III 21), the victim of a “sick soul” (GM III 20). 
 Here, however, a very important question arises: was this psychological manipulation a 
strategic creation of the priests to control the masses, or is it instead the product of psychological 
forces under certain social/cultural circumstances?  In his essay “Ressentiment, Value, and Self 
Vindication,”65 Wallace argues against the former (strategic) interpretation and in favor of the 
latter – what he calls the “expressive interpretation”.  Wallace describes it as follows: 
 
Ressentiment becomes creative and gives birth to values when the tensions that 
attend it lead the powerless to adopt and internalize a wholly new evaluative 
framework...  The slaves adopt the scheme of values organized around good and 
evil, because doing so enables them to make sense of their experience of the 
world, which is mediated by the sentiments of hatred and ressentiment.  If the 
masters are evil, then hatred of them becomes a response that is merited by its 
object, and the latent tensions in the world-view of the slaves are thereby 
resolved...  The expressive interpretation attributes a plausible causal role to the 
unconscious forces of hatred and ressentiment (Wallace RVSV 119). 
 
I think Wallace is exactly right that many of the psychological forces behind the slave revolt are 
unconscious.  However he goes on to make a major qualification to his expressive interpretation.  
Wallace goes on to argue: 
 
This emotional dynamic would not succeed if the powerless masses viewed the 
new table of values in strategic terms, as something to be advocated solely as a 
way of striking a blow against the master class.  The aristocratic priests, I now 
want to suggest, grasp the susceptibility of the masses to this dynamic, and exploit 
it expressly for the purpose of undermining the power and position of the warrior 
class.  That is, without really accepting the new table of values themselves, they 
cynically advocate on its behalf, in the expectation that the values will catch on 
                                            
65 In B. Leiter and N. Sinhababu (2007) Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [RVSV]. 
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over time among the masses who join with them in resenting the power of the 
political aristocracy.  There is, in other words, a strategic dimension to the slave 
revolt, but strategic rationality does not capture the primary psychological dynamic 
in which that revolt consists (Wallace RVSV 123). 
 
For a variety of reasons I think Wallace gets this completely wrong.  I do not think the slave 
revolt was the product of a priestly conspiracy; instead, I maintain that the priests themselves 
suffered from the same value system.  As I will argue in a later chapter, I do think some forms of 
slave moralities can be strategic in nature, but the slave revolt of the priestly aristocracy did not 
have this strategic component.  This I maintain is what allowed it to spread so fast.  It was a 
unique and special slave morality, which is why Nietzsche devotes so much analysis to it.  I 
maintain that, rather than having a strategic element to it, this slave revolt was more like a virus 
that, under “perfect storm” social/cultural conditions, spread like an epidemic.  I further maintain 
that there is strong textual evidence to support this claim.  BGE 260 strongly suggests that 
Nietzsche sees this slave revolt as a ground up process.  In response to powerful oppressive 
forces, Nietzsche asks, “Suppose the abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of 
themselves and weary should moralize: what would their moral evaluations have in common?” 
(BGE 260).  This herd movement I maintain arose spontaneously in response to the oppression 
of the nobles.    
 Moreover I think the following passage makes one of the most fascinating aspects of this 
psychological system clear – the priest did not design it so as to control others, they in fact 
suffered from it as well, to an even greater degree. 
 
Dominion over the suffering is his [ascetic priest] kingdom, that is where his 
instinct directs him, here he possesses his distinctive art, his mastery, his kind of 
happiness.  He must be sick himself, he must be profoundly related to the sick – 
how else would they understand each other?...  with his will to power intact, so as 
to be both trusted and feared by the sick...  He has to defend his herd – against 
whom?  Against the healthy, of course, and also against envy of the healthy; he 
must be the natural opponent and despiser of all rude, stormy, unbridled, hard, 
violent beast-of-prey health and might (GM III 15). 
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To Wallace’s credit I will concede that Nietzsche does not refer specifically to the slave revolt at 
all in essay III of the Genealogy.  Accordingly, it could be the case that essay III is about a later 
period in which the priests eventually became victims of the earlier slave revolt.  But if there 
really is a time lapse in the essays, why didn’t Nietzsche point this out?  While I can't rule this 
out as a possibility, I see no compelling evidence that suggests this was the case.  The sole 
motivation for this reading would thus be to cook the books against the chronologically 
consistent reading of the Genealogy.   
This of course raises an obvious question, why does Nietzsche repeatedly describe the 
slave revolt as ‘revenge’ if it wasn't a conscious conspiracy?  I maintain that Nietzsche's rhetoric 
of intentionality does not capture the real nature of the slave revolt.  The slave revolt was 
‘revenge’ in a highly qualified sense.  Namely, it was originally the ‘revenge’ of the collective 
herd rather than an individual – it was psychological not conspiratorial revenge.  Which is to say, 
it was extreme socio-political conditions that caused the slave revolt and not a priestly 
conspiracy.  From the beginning I maintain that the priestly class were victims, not designers, of 
the psychology of slave moralities.  Nietzsche's description of this event as ‘revenge’ was merely 
intended to highlight the reactionary, not conspiratorial, nature of slave moralities.  Accordingly, 
I maintain that the herd wasn’t spoon-fed appealing values by the priests; rather, the herd gave 
birth to new values as a result of their acute ressentiment.  In time this resulted in the production 
of ascetic priests who were themselves victims of the same psychological forces and did much to 
perpetuate them – most notably Paul.   They simply elevated the strategy by believing that 
further self-punishment and denial can resolve not only their guilt but also their followers’.  This 
wins the priests’ trust and power over the herd.  They are necessary to validate the perceived 
truth of the metaphysical value system, and further obfuscate the real psychological mechanisms 
at work.  The priests in turn require the herd to validate the meaning of their sacrifices and 
punishments – the punishment in fact serves as a kind of anesthesia and the whole system 
perpetuates itself and gains momentum.  
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For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly, an 
agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering – in 
short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his 
affects, actually or in effigy: part of the suffering to win relief, anesthesia – the 
narcotic he cannot help desiring to deaden pain of any kind.  This alone, I 
surmise, constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, 
and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects (GM III 15). 
 
So what began as a collective “revenge” eventually became conspiratorial and strategic at the 
hands of priests like the Apostle Paul. 
 What the priest (most notably Paul) offers are rules for dealing with sin and guilt.  The 
rules of sacrifice and self-punishment they establish are also shared with the followers.   
 
The most general formula on which every religion and morality is founded is: 
“Do this and that, refrain from this and that – then you will be happy!  
Otherwise...”  Every morality, every religion, is this imperative; I call it the great 
original sin of reason, the immortal unreason (TI “Four Errors” 2). 
 
The rules serve as a perpetual carrot on a stick continually promising the ability to curb 
ressentiment, the bad conscience, and guilty feelings of sin.  The problem with accounts like 
Wallace’s is that he focuses too much on the psychological mechanisms involved in the revolt 
and fails to highlight and put sufficient emphasis on the reciprocal aspect of the relationship 
between the priests and the herd.  Instead, I maintain that it was not a priestly conspiracy but this 
reciprocal relationship between the priests and their rules, and the believers and their suffering, 
that gave birth to the ascetic ideal – there was no strategic conspiracy.  As it evolved from 
custom and tradition to the ascetic ideal the same reciprocal relationship was operating.  
Consider the following passage from Dawn. 
 
What is tradition?  A higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands 
what is useful to us, but because it commands...  Originally, therefore, everything 
was custom, and whoever wanted to elevate himself above it had to become 
lawgiver and medicine man and a kind of demi-god: that is to say, he had to make 
customs – a dreadful, mortally dangerous thing!  Who is the most moral man?  
First, he who obeys the law most frequently: who, like the Brahmin, bears a 
consciousness of the law with him everywhere and into every minute division of 
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time, so that he is continually inventive in creating opportunities for obeying the 
law.  Then, he who obeys it even in the most difficult cases.  The most moral man 
is he who sacrifices the most to custom...  Let us not deceive ourselves as to the 
motivation of that morality which demands difficulty of obedience to custom as 
the mark of morality! (D 9). 
 
So the need to be commanded is satisfied by the genesis of more and more rules and customs.  
But without the believers and the customs there could be no law givers and vice versa.  It’s a 
complex psychological game where once again it is evident that it is not so important what the 
rules are – just that there are rules and those who obey.  And once again it is evident that once 
such a system gets rolling it produces its own momentum.   
 When Nietzsche says in the above passage that custom is not useful to us, I believe he 
means that it is not the content of the commands that is useful but the command itself.  In fact 
much of essay III in Nietzsche’s Genealogy suggests that such moral commands are helpful in 
resolving the anguish that accompanies a perceived normative vacuum.  As Nietzsche argues, 
“Any meaning is better than none at all...  In it [ascetic ideal], suffering was interpreted; the 
tremendous void seemed to have been filled; the door was closed to any kind of suicidal 
nihilism” (GM III 28).  In this way, the ascetic ideal is a sort of extreme from of obsessive 
compulsive disorder and slave morality is itself a social/collective form of O.C.D. (TI “Four 
Errors” 2, D 108, GS 347, GM II 2, D 9, GS 335).  The crucial difference however is that while 
O.C.D. involves a cognitive dissonance, in the sense that the person knows their rules are 
entirely arbitrary and yet still feels they must obey them, the ascetic really believes the rules are 
essential and not arbitrary.  The reason for this is that the person who suffers from O.C.D. is 
forced to create and impose their own arbitrary rules, whereas the ascetic ideal is situated in a 
large institutional structure (i.e. religious) that imposes the rules for them.   
 In either case however it is motivated by the anxiety of a perceived normative vacuum.  
As Sartre would later argue, the idea that without God everything is permitted is exactly the 
starting point – especially for Nietzsche’s free spirit.  “‘Nothing is true, everything is permitted.’ 
– Very well, that was freedom of spirit; in that way the faith in truth itself was abrogated” (GM 
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III 24).  The burden and responsibility for our values ultimately rests on us.  As he describes in 
Dawn: 
 
Morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to custom, of 
whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way of 
behaving and evaluating.  In things in which no tradition commands there is no 
morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of 
morality.  The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined 
to depend upon himself and not upon a tradition (D 9). 
 
It is easy to go by the book, as it were, with blind allegiance to tradition.  If one follows the rules 
of tradition, and does what they are “supposed to” then, at the very least, there is no legalistic 
vacuum and the blame for sub-optimal results can be dispersed over a broader metaphysical 
surface area and thereby reduce the negative pressure on the individual.  While Nietzsche is not 
examining morality as tradition in the Genealogy, he clearly was in Dawn.  Regardless, the point 
is that, as previously mentioned, the plebeian fears a legalistic vacuum while the free spirit 
embraces it – it brings out the weaknesses in the plebeian and the strengths in the noble free 
spirit.  Moreover, tradition is a powerful force that can serve to justify a host of bad values where 
the plebeian herd is concerned.  Consider for instance the role that tradition played in our 
country’s history in justifying slavery and later opposing civil rights.  It took strong free spirits 
capable of depending on themselves to stand up to the forces of tradition.  
 So moral systems satisfy this need to be commanded and their origins are always rooted 
in tradition, but how much or how little does the content of the rules matter?  In this regard is it 
really analogous to O.C.D. where the content of the rules is often known to be entirely arbitrary?  
The answer is yes and no.  Although the subject matter of the rules is never arbitrary much of the 
content often is.  In this regard it is in fact like O.C.D.  For the O.C.D. case the rules are designed 
to effect specific and very significant things – i.e. to ensure health and wellbeing of oneself and 
their loved ones.  However, the content of the rules is arbitrary66 and the causal relationship to 
                                            
66 In most cases of O.C.D. not only is the content of the rules arbitrary but they typically involve arbitrary numbers 
of repetitions. 
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the desired effects is irrational.  Accordingly, if one asked the believer what the causal 
connection is they would likely get a very thin explanation.   
 There is however a range when it comes to O.C.D.  Rules like checking the stove five 
times before you leave to ensure the house doesn't burn down is more rational and less arbitrary 
than locking and unlocking the door five times to ensure you don't get into a car accident.  These 
types of rules are the product of an obsession with specific concerns/fears to an irrational degree.  
As such one is motivated by legitimate concerns but deals with them in an inappropriate, and 
even destructive, way.  This is similar to the nature of moral commands and the need to be 
commanded.  Like O.C.D. the subject matter is not irrational or arbitrary though the content may 
be.  Consider early man and his bizarre rituals concerning things like droughts and famines.  
These subject matters were hardly arbitrary.  However, the content of the rules and their causal 
relationships were entirely arbitrary – i.e. sacrificing animals or virgins to bring about rain.  In 
such cases, like the analogous O.C.D. cases, one would likely get a very thin story from the 
believer if they were pressed to explain the causal relationship of the rule and the effect – 
somehow that action is pleasing to a god who rewards their sacrifice.   
 These types of commands however can only be successful where there is a tremendous 
vacuum in knowledge that obfuscates their arbitrary nature.  Unlike with O.C.D., if the believer 
ever comes to perceive their rules as arbitrary they will lose all their psychological power.  So 
there is an incentive to produce rules whose content is perceived to be relevant as well.  Consider 
the way in which all moral systems, especially religious ones, address human sexuality head on 
and apply often very strict rules to regulate human behavior.  The subject matter is hardly 
arbitrary, since human sexuality is a very important part of human nature.  However the content 
is largely arbitrary from any other perspective but the believer’s.  For instance, if one asked a 
Catholic about the rules and why they follow them, one could expect a very rich explanation.  
However, if one asked an Orthodox Jew or a Muslim the same question, one could expect very 
different rules and disparate explanations.  From a neutral perspective the subject matter of the 
rules (human sexuality) hardly seems arbitrary or irrational, but the rules and explanations 
 87
would.  Like the checking the stove five times to ensure the house doesn't burn down, there is a 
legitimate concern that is being dealt with in an irrational way or to an irrational degree.  
However, unlike with O.C.D. one needs a community and lawgiver other than themselves to 
ensure that these arbitrary elements remain obfuscated. 
 The trouble is that, if there truly are no absolute moral facts rooted in nature itself, then if 
we are not doing the actual valuing and interpreting for ourselves, someone, or some institution, 
is in fact doing it for us under the guise of so-called absolute values.  The following passage 
perfectly describes this psychological force: 
 
Up to now the moral law has been supposed to stand above our own likes and 
dislikes: one did not want actually to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to 
take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere or have it commanded to one 
from somewhere (D 108). 
 
By ‘moral law’ Nietzsche refers to the morality of good and evil that belongs to slave morality 
and this highlights the major problem with slave moralities.  They cause the herd, and thus the 
potential higher types, to believe too much in the value of certain values.  As first discussed in 
Chapter 1, Leiter describes this as “morality in the pejorative sense” and says of it, “it is not, 
then, that there is too much pity and altruism in the world, but rather too much belief in the value 
of pity, altruism, and, and the other values of MPS”67.  I think Leiter’s analysis is correct and 
Christianity is for Nietzsche the ultimate MPS.  It creates a ferocious need for, and invention of, 
‘moral facts’ to set the rules.  Once again, as stated in Chapter 2, I maintain that Nietzsche sees 
this desire to be commanded as a necessary, though not sufficient, characteristic of morality that 
is present at the level of a morality of mores and culminates in the ascetic ideal of slave morality, 
which Nietzsche identifies with Christianity.   
 Accordingly, to pursue a brief tangent, I reaffirm the claim in Chapter 1 that Nietzsche is 
not just a critic of Christian morality and any morality that shares elements of it, but all 
traditional forms of morality (especially those rooted in the schema of good and evil).  That 
                                            
67 Leiter NMC 263. 
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being said, Christianity is clearly the focus of much of Nietzsche’s critique when it comes to 
slave morality.  He even employs the phrase “slave revolt” specifically in reference to the 
Christianization of Rome and Europe.  But Christianity aside, it is more than just an objection to 
certain values, he objects to the value schema of traditional forms of morality and the ways in 
which they value.  The marks of a ‘traditional’ form of morality according to Nietzsche are: an 
appeal to moral facts thought to exist independently of our attitudes and dispositions, involves a 
desire on the part of the agent to be commanded from without, a tendency to place the needs of 
the community over those of the individual, and an emphasis on egalitarianism.  The basis of his 
criticism is that such moral systems may make life easier for the weak herd, but they are life-
inhibiting for the superior kinds of individuals – which is to say they undermine Nietzsche’s 
elitism.  In Leiter’s words: 
 
The normative component of an MPS is harmful because, in reality, it will have 
the effect of leading potentially excellent persons to value what is in fact not 
conducive to their flourishing and devalue what is in fact essential to it (Leiter, 
NMC 274). 
 
Like Leiter, I agree that a culture that embraces such values makes the extraordinary life difficult 
to achieve for the potential greats.  Nietzsche objects on the grounds that such moral systems do 
not value strength and beauty, but humility and contentment. 
 In conclusion, however, all of this raises an obvious question, how does the healthy, and 
non-weak agent deal with suffering and even ressentiment?  First, the strong agent does not 
always seek out a specific cause for every suffering and thus is less susceptible to the 
manipulation of false causes.  Likewise they do not fight with their instincts and natural wills 
since they are not operating in an illusory metaphysical system.  Instead they process experience 
and suffering directly as it comes rather than internalizing and turning against themselves.  “A 
strong and well constituted man digests his experiences (his deeds and misdeeds included) as he 
digests his meals, even when he has to swallow some tough morsels” (GM III 16).  Accordingly, 
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in what Nietzsche calls the “noble man” suffering does not become acute guilt, and ressentiment 
is resolved without being redirected back at oneself.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Ressentiment itself, if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and 
exhausts itself in an immediate reaction, and therefore does not poison: on the 
other hand, it fails to appear at all on countless occasions on which it inevitably 
appears in the weak and impotent (GM I 11). 
 
So here again the fundamental contrast is between health and sickness; but it also involves the 
tension between freedom and repression.  In the sick individuals the natural drive for power and 
freedom is inverted and repressed. 
 
This instinct for freedom forcibly made latent – we have seen it already – this 
instinct for freedom pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally 
able to discharge and vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad 
conscience is in its beginnings (GM II 17). 
 
So in the sick agents their will becomes reactive and inverted.  Rather than willing power and the 
expansion of drives, they will a different end – namely a “war against the old instincts” (GM II 
16).  The problem is that, according to Nietzsche, “All instincts that do not discharge themselves 
outwardly turn inward” (GM II 16).  As a result the bad conscience takes hold of the sick agent, 
and the frustration, suffering, and sickness perpetuates itself and they succumb to what I have 
called metaphysical motion sickness. 
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Chapter IV: Slave Morality and the Apostle Paul 
 
 
In terms of the psychology of slave moralities, Paul represents a unique and fascinating case 
study.  Paul effectively throws a wrench in Nietzsche’s analysis of slave moralities and one can 
palpably sense that Nietzsche’s vehement criticism of Paul in The Antichrist is tinged with 
frustration68.  The problem for Nietzsche is that Paul was not a meek ascetic monk teetering on 
the brink of suicidal nihilism; rather he was an itinerant and prolific creator of new values who 
also pursued and obtained much power.  He is nothing like the sick agent desiring to be 
commanded discussed in the previous chapter.  In fact Paul himself repeatedly boasted about 
gaining power through his special abilities to tap into ‘the Spirit’ and demonstrate great ‘signs 
and wonders’69.  I find it surprising, unfortunate, and somewhat embarrassing that the topic of 
the Apostle Paul has been so neglected when it comes to Nietzsche’s critique of morality.  This 
chapter will offer a much needed analysis of Paul and the revaluation of values.   
 In the simplest of terms, despite being the grand architect of Christian slave morality, 
Paul exhibited numerous Übermenschean qualities.  Moreover, Paul was not a group, class, or 
herd but an individual – perhaps, in terms of Nietzsche’s own values, even a free spirit of sorts.  
For lack of a better way to put it, he was an elite who utilized and manipulated the herd.  So on 
what grounds then does Nietzsche have the right to vehemently criticize Paul?  Paul, it seems, 
was somehow sick and powerful at the same time.  In the previous chapter I argued that the 
priestly class were themselves sick and foisted their sickness onto the masses in a failed attempt 
to cure it – but what about the grand architect of slave morality?  Was Saul’s conversion to Paul 
the result of sickness or conspiracy?  As discussed in the previous chapter I reject the 
conspiratorial elements of Wallace’s expressive model70.  However, I do maintain that Paul is a 
unique figure and did serve as the strategic architect of slave morality and facilitated its spread 
                                            
68 In particular A 41-45 where Nietzsche describes Paul as a tyrant and villain; and also D 68 where he sharply 
criticizes Paul. 
69 See Romans 1:16, 15:19, 8:38, 1 Thessalonians 1:5, 2 Corinthians 12:12, Galatians 3:5, 1 Corinthians 5:3-5. 
70 Wallace RVSV 123. 
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through his itinerant reformation project.  So there was a conspiratorial element to the slave 
revolt but according to Nietzsche it did not belong to the priestly class as a whole, as Wallace 
argues, but rather to a particular member of the priestly class – namely the Apostle Paul who 
manipulated and molded not only the herd but also the priestly class itself.  Through Paul a new 
type of person became valued and a new way of life was established – ones which Nietzsche 
found no value in.  Interestingly, Nietzsche attacks Socrates for very similar reasons – he too 
tried to promote a new way of life that Nietzsche also rejects.  According to Alexander Nehamas 
in his book The Art of Living71, Nietzsche criticizes Socrates for three primary reasons: first, he 
disregarded the importance of instincts and other drives in favor of rationality; second, he was 
the first great ‘moralizer’72; and third, he dismantled the early Greek’s views of human nature, 
suffering, and tragedy73.  Like Socrates, Paul revalued old values in ways that established a new 
type of individual and new way of life that Nietzsche rejects as sick and unworthy of value. 
 This understanding will allow us to better understand the nature of the slave revolt, the 
context of Nietzsche’s critique, and why he attacks it with such vitriol.  Moreover, an 
examination of Paul will provide insight into the psychology of the ascetic ideal discussed in The 
Genealogy and it will also allow us to understand what Nietzsche is attempting to do in The 
Antichrist.  I maintain that The Antichrist should be read, not as an objective historical analysis, 
but rather as Nietzsche’s attempt to establish a philosophical nemesis.  I do not think Nietzsche is 
trying to rewrite history to accomplish this, but many of the generalizations and claims of The 
Antichrist highly suggest a pre-established motive and bias in Nietzsche.  This may seem a 
provocative claim but consider that Nietzsche came to refer to himself as “Dionysus versus the 
crucified” – and “the crucified” was Paul’s term for Jesus Christ.   
 Let’s begin by addressing Nietzsche’s own words on Paul.  Nietzsche devotes a sizable 
portion of The Antichrist to discussing Paul.  There he states: “At bottom he [Paul] had no use at 
                                            
71 Nehamas, Alexander (1998) The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (London: University 
of California Press) [AL]. 
72 This topic will be revisited later in this chapter. 
73 Nehamas AL 335. 
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all for the life of the redeemer – he needed the death on the cross and a little bit more” (A 42)74.   
Essentially Nietzsche argues that Christ was the invention of Paul and had little to no connection 
to the historical “gentle jew from Nazareth”.  As Nietzsche provocatively put it: “there was only 
one Christian, and he died on the cross” (A 39)75.  Nietzsche was clearly very influenced by 
David Strauss’ 1839 work The Life of Jesus in which he argues that there indeed was an 
historical Jesus but he was in no way divine.  It seems Nietzsche appropriates this thesis but 
stresses that it was almost entirely Paul who was responsible for the invention of Christ.  As 
Geuss argues in “Nietzsche and Genealogy” Paul hijacked the meaning of Jesus and established 
the essence of Christianity (D 68)76.  Of course Nietzsche of all people would be a hypocrite if he 
maintains that all reinterpretation was tantamount to hijacking.  In fact he explicitly argues that 
reinterpretations are unavoidable, and meanings, the value of values, and purposes necessarily 
change over time (GS 54, 57).  In Nietzsche’s words, “the cause and origin of a thing and its 
eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds apart; 
whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, 
taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it” (GM II 12).  
 Geuss maintains that Paul’s interpretation of the meaning of Jesus is wrong in two ways: 
first he was wrong to interpret the meaning of Jesus’ life and message in terms of sin, guilt, and 
redemption.  Jesus’ original message was that there is no such thing as sin (A 33) and that the 
concept of perpetual guilt is ‘abolished’ (A 41).  Second, Paul’s propositional claims are false.  
Geuss argues that for Nietzsche the whole notion of ‘sin’ is the product of the priests’ 
misinterpretation of suffering77.  I think Geuss’ analysis is correct but it raises an immediate 
question: was this creation consciously done and conspiratorial in nature or was Paul himself the 
victim of a kind of sickness?  Unlike the sick priestly class discussed in the previous chapter, I 
                                            
74 See also WP 171, 177. 
75 See also A 24, 27, 35, 39 
76 In Richardson and Leiter’s (2001) Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
330-331 [NG]. 
77 Geuss NG 330-336. 
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maintain that Nietzsche takes Paul’s invention of Christ to be both a conscious act and part of a 
conspiracy.   
 
Paul comprehended that the lie – that “faith” – was needed; later the church in 
turn comprehended Paul.  The “God” whom Paul invented, a god who “ruins the 
wisdom of the world” ... is in truth merely Paul’s own resolute  determination to 
do this: to give the name of “God” to one’s own will, torah, that is thoroughly 
Jewish.  Paul wants to ruin the “wisdom of the world” (A 47). 
 
 This passage (along with A 42) strongly suggest that Paul’s invention of Christ was an 
intentional and even vengeful project.  I think it is crucial however to point out that this in no 
way entails that Paul was lying and merely trying to control the people.  Rather, he could have 
been motivated to challenge the “wisdom of the world” and Christ was his vehicle for doing so.  
Accordingly, perhaps Saul’s conversion to Paul was the result of an enlightened epiphany78 in 
which he sincerely saw the need to challenge the old world values and establish new ones.  
Consider that he did explicitly state that his message was not given to him by man but revealed 
to him79.  So Paul could have conspired to promote these new values not merely to control 
people and gain power but because he genuinely saw a vacuum in traditional theology which he 
filled in with a radical reinterpretation of the life and death of Jesus and the creation of Christ (A 
24, 40-42, 46, 51-52).  It is crucial to point out that Paul did not claim he got his message of 
sacrifice and resurrection80 from the historical Jesus or any of his followers.  Rather his message 
was the result of direct and personal revelation when he was raised to the third level of heaven on 
the road to Damascus81.  In light of this revelation, Paul simply appropriated the crucifixion of 
Jesus, attached the message of his revelation to it, and thereby created the notion of Christ. 
 I maintain that the conspiratorial/strategic component of Wallace’s expressive model82 
discussed in the previous chapter applies not to the priestly class as a whole but to a particular 
                                            
78 Galatians 1:13-17. 
79 Galatians 1:12. 
80 1 Corinthians 15. 
81 2 Corinthians 12, Galatians 1:12. 
82 Wallace RVSV 123. 
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member of that class (i.e. Paul).  Paul designed the psychology of slave morality and introduced 
it to the priestly class and the masses.  He perceived a need to challenge the old world theology 
and created a savior figure (Christ) who would accomplish this and would be attractive to the 
masses.  Paul was simply opportunistic and took advantage the confusion of his day surrounding 
the life and death of Jesus to promulgate his new system of values.  As Nietzsche puts it: the 
disciples were left confused by the death of Jesus and asked “who was this, what was this?” (A 
40).  Paul simply answered these questions for them in a way that could both make sense of his 
untimely death and still preserve his redeemer status.  The notion of a risen savior that serves as 
a metaphysical messiah made perfect and obvious sense.  In Nietzsche’s estimation Paul didn’t 
need to know anything about the historical Jesus except that he was believed to be the messiah; 
as he put it in A 42 “he needed the death on the cross and a little bit more”.  I maintain that in 
Nietzsche’s view Paul and the priestly class represent the “men-of-resentment” and the followers 
the “herd-animal”83.  Paul’s resentment stemmed from his inability to fulfill the law – in 
changing the fundamental nature of the law he also satisfies his lust for power (D 68) over others 
by exploiting a theological vacuum. 
 
 
i. The Historical Context of Paul 
Near the end of first century Palestine there was a great deal of tension between Jews and 
Christians.  In the beginning Paul was part of the Jewish tradition which held that all Gentiles 
must abide by the law before they can be associated with.  Initially then he was very hostile to 
Christians and would have viewed them as a stubborn cult.  After Paul’s vision and conversion 84 
however Paul fought to reconfigure social relations (i.e. Jew/Gentile, slave/free, male/female).  
For instance in Galatians Paul addresses the Antioch incident in which James refused to eat with 
Gentiles85.  Without the law Paul argued that the whole distinction between Jews and Gentiles 
                                            
83 Richardson NS 42. 
84 Galatians 1:13-15. 
85 Galatians 2:11-14. 
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had broken down and Jews should interact with Gentiles apart from any considerations of the old 
jewish laws.  Paul began to directly challenge the social norms of the Jews.  It was a vision and a 
call that converted Paul, not some deeper reflection and insight that produced a new way of 
relating to the law.  In fact he considered himself “blameless” under the law86.  Put simply, he 
was trying to change the world for the sake of the coming world. 
 So what was the source of all the societal tension that eventually gave birth to Paul?  For 
Nietzsche it goes back to the conflict between master and slave morality, or “Rome against 
Judea” (GM I 16).  Nietzsche declares in Beyond Good and Evil: 
 
The Jews – a people 'born for slavery' as Tacitus and the whole ancient world 
says, 'the chosen people' as they themselves say and believe – the Jews achieved 
that miracle of inversion of values thanks to which life on earth has for a couple 
of millennia acquired a new and dangerous fascination – their prophets fused 
‘rich,’ ‘godless,’ ‘evil,’ ‘violent,’ ‘sensual’ into one and were the first to coin the 
word 'world' as a term of infamy (BGE 195). 
 
In The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche is clearly referencing this passage when he continues on 
the same theme, saying: “The Jews, that priestly people, who in opposing their enemies and 
conquerors were ultimately satisfied with nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies' 
values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge...  With the Jews there begins the slave 
revolt in morality” (GM 34).   
 Nietzsche's estimation of Judaism often seems ambiguous and contradictory.  For 
instance, in his book The Antichrist he speaks highly of Judaism in contrast to “Christian 
decadence”.  So what are we to make of passages like this and how do they relate to his overall 
criticism of Christianity in terms of a genealogical analysis of history?  Perhaps the following 
passage from The Antichrist can provide the answer – or at least point us in the right direction. 
“Originally... Israel stood in the right, that is, the natural, relationship to all things.  Its Yahweh 
was the expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself” (A 25).  
                                            
86 Philippians 3:6. 
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However, according to Nietzsche, due to certain threats, “they changed his concept – they 
denatured his concept: at this price they held on to him.  Yahweh the god of ‘justice’ – no longer 
one with Israel, an expression of the self-confidence of the people” (A 25).  I think Nietzsche’s 
use of terms in this passage is significant.  What does it mean to say they denatured  
(entnatürlichte) the concept of YHWH?  In light of the ongoing discussion of Nietzsche’s use of 
the term ‘nature’ I would argue that the best way to understand this passage is that, according to 
Nietzsche, originally the concept of YHWH was in concert with the will to power and 
represented strength and growth (i.e. “self-confidence”) to the Israelites.  “Yahweh was the 
expression of a consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself” (A 25).  Somehow 
this concept was corrupted and the formulation of the concept of YHWH set the stage, and 
provided the metaphysical framework for the slave revolt that is the emergence of Christianity 
according to Nietzsche.  In his book Nietzsche, God, and the Jews87 Weaver Santaniello 
describes this transition as follows: 
 
The severed natural realm, which was formerly intertwined with the conception of 
Yahweh, first had to be consecrated by the priest in order to be rendered holy.  It 
was out of this utterly false soil, Nietzsche writes, that Christianity grew up 
(Santaniello NGJ 122). 
 
While I agree that this is indeed Nietzsche’s view, historical generalizations like this are 
frustratingly common in The Antichrist.  It is doubtful that Jewish people would agree with this 
historical account but that alone doesn’t discredit it when one considers that they have biases of 
their own.  Right or wrong Nietzsche is clearly committed to this view of the origins of 
Christianity (A 33).  This issue aside, Nietzsche goes on and argues that the natural values in 
concert with the will to power were supplanted with new unnatural parasitic values – this was the 
start of the new “moral world order”.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
                                            
87 Santaniello, Weaver (1994) Nietzsche, God, and the Jews (New York: State University of New York Press) 
[NGJ]. 
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Every natural custom, every natural institution (state, judicial order, marriage, 
care of the sick and the poor), every demand inspired by the instinct of life – in 
short, everything that contains its value in itself is made altogether valueless, anti-
valuable by the parasitism of the priest (or the “moral world order”): now it 
requires a sanction after the event – a value-conferring power is needed to negate 
what is natural in it and to create a value by so doing.  The priest devalues, 
desecrates nature: this is the price of his existence (A 26). 
 
 So what happened exactly?  Unfortunately Nietzsche doesn’t get into the historical details 
of this transition but history and the Biblical tradition does support the idea that YHWH went 
through significant changes.  The Antichrist 25 is crucial in sorting out how Nietzsche 
understands this transitional period in history.  There he describes this as the “denaturing of 
natural values” (A 25) and argues it happened in 5 stages.  In his words: 
 
1.  Originally, especially at the time of the kings, Israel also stood in the right, that 
is, the natural, relationship to all things.  Its Yahweh was the expression of a 
consciousness of power, of joy in oneself, of hope for oneself. 
 
2.  This state of affairs long remained the ideal, even after it had been done away 
with in melancholy fashion: anarchy within, the Assyrian without. 
 
3.  But all hopes remained unfulfilled.  The old god was no longer able to do what 
he once could do.  They should have let him go.  What happened?  They changed 
his concept – they denatured his concept. 
 
4.  The concept of God becomes a tool in the hands of priestly agitators...  that 
most mendacious device of interpretation, the alleged “moral world order,” with 
which the natural concepts of cause and effect are turned upside down and for all.  
When, through reward and punishment, one has done away with natural causality, 
an anti-natural causality is required: now everything else that is unnatural follows. 
 
5.  Morality – no longer the expression of the conditions for the life and growth of 
a people, no longer its most basic instinct of life, but become abstract, become the 
antithesis of life – morality as the systematic degradation of the imagination, as 
the “evil eye” for all things (A 25). 
 
Nietzsche then concludes by saying, “The concept of God falsified, the concept of morality 
falsified: the Jewish priesthood did not stop there” (A 26).  What are we to make of these 
passages?  What historical period is he describing?  And what were the threats mentioned by 
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Nietzsche and what exactly changed in Judaism?  In the passage Nietzsche alludes to the 
Assyrians and certain enemies being threats to Israel, which seems to be a subtle reference to 2 
Kings.  And indeed, 2 Kings can help answer many of these questions.  In 2 Kings 19 Hezeki’ah 
is desperately concerned about the mounting threat of the Assyrians who had conquered other 
parts of Israel (scattering the original 12 tribes) and now threatened Judah.  Though Nietzsche is 
not explicit on this, he seems to be suggesting that up until this point YHWH had only been the 
unique cultural expression of the Jewish people and nothing more than an expression of ‘joy’, 
‘hope’, and ‘power’ (A 25).  However the threat of the Assyrians began to change this 
conception of YHWH.  God had to become The God of all nations if Judah was to survive the 
Assyrians and not meet the same fate as Israel.  Thus Hezeki’ah appealed to YHWH and 
transformed him from a mere aesthetic expression and representation of justice into a 
metaphysical instrument of power and justice.  In 2 Kings Hezeki’ah declares:  
 
O Lord the God of Israel, who art enthroned above the cherubim, thou art the 
God, thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and 
earth... O Lord our God, save us, I beseech thee, from his hand, that all the 
kingdoms of the earth may know that thou, O Lord, art God alone (2 Kings 19:14-
19).   
 
In referencing this biblical text Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that when Judah prevailed over 
the Assyrians, this declaration became, ipso facto, the Truth.  But this transition was not 
institutionalized and finalized until the reign of Josi’ah, when the priest Hilki’ah discovered a 
mysterious set of laws88.  The laws were more than likely the laws of Deuteronomy and were 
rediscovered in the basement of a temple when Josi’ah ordered it to be cleaned out.  Josi’ah 
feared that the identity of the Jews was losing its stability as other cultural norms and traditions 
began to influence the people of Judah.  Fearing the same fate that befell Israel would soon come 
to Judah, Josi’ah then utilized the newly discovered laws to universalize the Jewish identity and 
the Jewish God – it was no longer a culture and a people, it became a Religion... the religion and 
                                            
88 These events are described in 2 Kings 22. 
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the people.  It was the only way to prevent the complete dispersion of the Jewish identity.  
YHWH then became a universal metaphysical entity (a force) and no longer an aesthetic 
expression, and morality was no longer seen as something self created but as something 
universal and in itself justified by absolute laws – which is to say it became “unnatured”.   
 It is this transformation that Nietzsche has in mind when he declares that “Judaism was 
the slave revolt in morality” and furthermore he characterizes Christianity as simply the 
continuation of this transformation.  In The Antichrist he even characterizes Christianity as “the 
ultimate Jewish consequence” (A 24).  When Paul challenged the legitimacy of this law he 
created a new morality that had jurisdiction beyond the descendants of Abraham; under Paul’s 
design it would extend to all.  Therefore, Christianity grew out of the conflict between Roman 
and Jewish morality – or “noble” and “slave” to use Nietzsche's terminology – and represents the 
historical victory of slave morality over master morality with the “Christianization” of Rome.  
Santaniello argues that there was original Israel and YHWH and then a priestly strand of Judaism 
that gave birth to Christianity89.  He then remarks:  
 
Within Nietzsche’s scheme, Jesus stands in contrast to both poles of the 
Rome/Judea paradigm.  In the Genealogy Jesus appears in a negative role as the 
continuation of negative Judea.  In the Antichrist, Jesus is the ultimate 
denouement of the slave revolt who dissolves the whole system of sin and 
judgment (Santaniello NGJ 119). 
 
I think Santaniello’s analysis is exactly right on this point and helps us better understand the 
difference between Nietzsche’s discussion of slave morality in the Genealogy versus the 
Antichrist.  So the values of the original Israel and YHWH became priestly Judaism and its God 
of judgment, which in turn became Christianity with its crucified god – the “anti-natural 
castration of a god” (A 16). 
 But the question remains: why was Nietzsche himself so vague on the historical details?  
I maintain that he simply didn’t feel the need to do so since it wasn’t intended to be a work of 
                                            
89 Santaniello NGJ 118. 
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rigorous historical analysis.  Rather, he is simply articulating the general context in which the 
slave revolt took place.  He is not interested in the history of the slave revolt but the psychology 
of it.  So nuanced questions about historical details were simply irrelevant to Nietzsche.  
Moreover, the notion that slave morality was the product of corrupted values squares nicely with 
his view that the slave morality itself is a kind of sickness.  And this generalized context allows 
Nietzsche to focus specifically on Paul as the great villain – and, as previously mentioned, 
establish him as Nietzsche’s great adversary.  
 
 
ii. Paul and Master/Slave Morality 
As previously discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, I maintain that Nietzsche’s distinction between 
master and slave morality can be best understood in terms of this contrast of healthy and sick.  
The nobles simply assert themselves as actively defining what the good is for humans.  This is 
why Nietzsche argues that their master morality applied first only to individuals – specifically 
the noble types in contrast to the plebeian types.  The concept 'good' originally, according to 
Nietzsche, was simply a description of this distance.  In Beyond Good and Evil he states: 
 
The noble human being separates from himself those natures in which the 
opposite of such exalted proud states find expression: he despises them.  It should 
be noted at once that in this first type of morality the antithesis ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
means the same thing as 'noble' and 'despicable' (BGE 260). 
 
Thus ‘good’ was initially defined by distinguishing it from ‘bad’ in the non-moral sense of 
‘noble’ versus ‘despicable’ – a definition based on a “pathos of distance” (BGE 257). 
 It is therefore the high-stationed, powerful, and noble themselves who determine what the 
concept ‘good’ means.  According to Nietzsche they are the first to take ownership of the term 
and adopt the role of value creation.  “The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner 
of values... he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates 
values” (BGE 260).   Originally the nobles define ‘good’ independently of the common or 
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plebeian – they simply are good themselves.  However, when they encounter the common or 
plebeian and recognize a marked difference they label them ‘bad’ in the sense of contemptible.  
In other words, ‘bad’ is defined in relation to ‘good’ not ‘good’ in relation to ‘bad’ – the concept 
‘good’ therefore has etymological primacy according to Nietzsche.  Again, however, it is 
important to emphasize the non-moral sense of this distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’90.  
Originally, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are distinguished in a non-moral sense in terms of quality.  In other 
words, Nietzsche's point is that ‘good’ for the nobles means excellence in one or more of 
uniquely human activities, be it physical, intellectual, artistic in nature.  The nobles are ‘good’ 
simply because they are the ones that take ownership of human nature and actively define it.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, anything that does not fulfill that actively defined essence subsequently 
becomes ‘bad’ by comparison in terms of a “pathos of distance” (BGE 257). 
 The story does not end there however.  As one would rightly expect, the plebeian class is 
not content with the pejorative label ‘bad’, and they become frustrated with their lack of power 
and ability to resist persecution.  The plebeians also seek to express their will to power but are 
faced not only with physical and violent oppression at the hands of the masters, but also the 
psychological oppression of master’s moral categories that labels them inferior, weak, and 
powerless.  This leaves them frustrated and discontent resulting in what Nietzsche refers to as 
ressentiment.  They want to challenge the authority of the nobles but lack the resources to do so.  
As a result: “the slave [plebeian] is suspicious of the virtues of the powerful: he is skeptical and 
mistrustful, keenly mistrustful, of everything ‘good’ that is honored among them” (BGE 260). 
 I think Paul witnessed this tension (between the Jews, Gentiles, and newly emerging 
Christians) reach a fever pitch in first century Palestine.  Thus the plebeian class seeks to find a 
way to exert power over the noble class and challenge their authority, but they lack just such 
power.  Therefore, according to Nietzsche, they would have been very susceptible to the 
introduction of new moral concepts that empowered them (i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘evil’) in place of 
                                            
90 This point was originally discussed in section three of Chapter 1. 
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those that rendered them powerless (i.e. ‘good’ versus ‘bad’).  So Paul opportunistically posited 
a radically different system of morality, insisting that his values were not created but revealed.  
His values were a higher type of ‘absolute’ values that were metaphysical in nature.  These 
values also perfectly mapped on to and satisfied the need to be commanded discussed in chapter 
3 since such values are presumed, by their very nature, to be the furthest thing from arbitrary.  
They were too attractive to be ignored by the plebeians because they also promised to resolve 
suffering.  Accordingly the lynchpin to the whole doctrine was its realism. 
 This extreme form of moral realism armed the plebeians with the necessary tools to 
‘retaliate’ – or more precisely empower themselves by devaluing the noble’s status.  According 
to Nietzsche, this reorganization is the origin of morality in the sense of slave morality – which is 
first and foremost a response, a reaction, a retaliation.  Once again it is important to highlight the 
reactive nature of the slave revolt.  In Nietzsche's words, “Its action is fundamentally reaction” 
(GM I 10).  Just as the plebeians began to define themselves in antithesis to the nobles (they are 
evil therefore we are good), so too did they define their values simply in antithesis to the nobles’ 
values.  The implicit logic is: the oppressive values of the nobles are conditional and created, 
therefore ours’ are absolute and real.  However, as discussed in Chapter 1 section three (in 
connection with the lambs and birds of prey allegory from GM I 13), although this strategy may 
sound conscious and conspiratorial, it’s actually the product of complex psychological 
mechanisms that have to remain suppressed in order to be successful.  Paul as the great architect 
saw a need and endeavored to satisfy it.  As a member of the priestly class he manipulated it so 
as to manipulate the herd in turn.  The slave revolt was, to be sure, a reactive movement.  But it 
was more about the plebeians and priestly class empowering themselves than retaliating against 
the nobles for the sake of retaliation.  Paul, as an individual member of the priestly class, simply 
supplied the means to do so. 
 Nietzsche observes that, with their power, the noble class exerts a degree of fear over the 
plebeians – and it is precisely this fear that gives rise to the plebeian’s re-valuation of the ‘good’ 
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in contrast to the imposition of ‘evil’.  It is this ‘degeneration of life’ that eventually gives birth 
to the ascetic ideal (GM III 13).  In Nietzsche's words: 
 
According to slave morality the ‘evil’ inspire fear; according to master morality it 
is precisely the ‘good’ who inspire fear and want to inspire it... The antithesis 
reaches its height when, consistently with slave morality, a breath of disdain 
finally also comes to be attached to the ‘good’ of this morality’ (BGE 260). 
 
Therefore, the plebeians, due to their powerless state, define themselves, and likewise the ‘good,’ 
in contrast to the nobles by labeling the nobles ‘evil’ and, subsequently, themselves ‘good’ (GM 
I 10, 13).  As Clark puts it in her article “Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality,” 
“Good versus evil, however, is clearly supposed to be a moral distinction.  Like good versus bad, 
it distinguishes superior from inferior people”91. 
 According to Nietzsche, slave morality introduces the term ‘evil’ for all things powerful, 
and redefines ‘good’, this time in a moral sense as the antithesis of ‘evil’ (i.e. meek).  Thus, 
where the nobles defined ‘good’ in a creative and positive sense, the plebeians now define it in a 
negative sense – that is, in contrast to ‘evil’.  
 
This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who conceives the 
basic concept ‘good’ in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then 
creates for himself an idea of ‘bad’!  This 'bad of noble origin and that ‘evil’ out 
of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred – the former an after-production, a side issue, 
a contrasting shade, the latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the 
distinctive deed in the conception of a slave morality – how different these words 
‘bad’ and ‘evil’ are, although they are both apparently the opposite of the same 
concept ‘good.’  But it is not the same concept ‘good’: one should ask rather 
precisely who is ‘evil’ in the sense of the morality of ressentiment (GM I 11). 
 
Thus, where the nobles gave etymological primacy to the concept ‘good’ by actively defining it, 
the plebeians grant etymological primacy to ‘evil’, and define ‘good’ only in contrast to it.  It is 
therefore defined in negation – articulated by the declarative syllogism: “I am not that [noble], 
that is evil, therefore I am good”.  ‘The good’ becomes anything weak or humble (i.e. the 
                                            
91 Clark NICM 25. 
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plebeians) while ‘the evil’ refers to anything powerful or threatening (i.e. the nobles) (GM I 7).  
In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
“The enemy” as the man of ressentiment conceives him – and here precisely is his 
deed, his creation: he has conceived “the evil enemy,” “the Evil One,” and this in 
fact is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and 
pendant, a “good one” – himself!  (GM I 10). 
 
It is crucial to note that this process of appropriation and reorganization is itself a creative 
process.  To reiterate a point I’ve made previously, an underlying and somewhat undeclared 
theme of Nietzsche’s entire analysis of morality is that morality is always a creative endeavor.  
Therefore, just as the morality of the nobles was a creative process of actively defining what it 
was to be a human, so too is the retaliatory slave morality of the plebeians a creative process.  
Slave morality’s “ ‘No’ is its creative deed” (GM I 10).   
 So what exactly constitutes this process of appropriation and reorganization?  I maintain 
that it is still an expression of the will to power – the satisfaction and expansion of drives.  It 
however can be done in a positive way or negative reactionary way.  According to Nietzsche, 
slave morality is fundamentally reactionary and projects a realm above the noble class – above 
the ‘good’ – in order to challenge and critique it.  For, if the noble class simply is the definition 
of good, the plebeians have no recourse but to establish something higher than the noble class in 
order to challenge that definition.  They must reclaim the ‘good’ from the nobles by somehow 
projecting the ‘good’ over and above the nobles.  Accordingly, they establish the universal, 
absolute, realm of the “moral world order” (A 25) in order to accomplish this.  Slave moralities’ 
values become viable precisely in so far as they are presumed to exist in themselves and are 
thought not to be created.  Therefore, any morality that acknowledges itself as ‘self-created’ 
becomes, ipso facto, ‘immoral’ by contrast Paul’s slave morality was the product of divine 
revelation92.  And this now provides the grounds for the plebeians to be critical of the nobles on 
                                            
92 2 Corinthians 12, Galatians 1:12.  This is the same distinction made in chapter 1 between A and B moralities – B 
moralities are marked by robust dogmatic moral realism. 
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the grounds that their morality is manufactured (i.e. its values do not exist in themselves), and 
simultaneously elevate their own morality above it by maintaining that theirs is absolute and real.  
As the architect Paul then invests this universal moral realm with values that serve the interest of 
the plebeian herd.  “Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility” (BGE 260).  Slave 
morality proceeds by redefining the concept 'good' by conceiving it in a negative sense.   
 So the reason Nietzsche approves of the noble’s values and disapproves of slave morality 
is that the latter is a retaliation against the former.  While some of these values may in fact 
benefit the weak and certainly the needs of the herd, the cost is that their insistence that all are 
equal in every significant way undermines the noble types.  Accordingly it is not the case that 
Nietzsche thinks the noble’s values were somehow more real or true compared to slave morality 
and therefore more worthy of belief.  Since he denies the very existence of any moral properties 
independent of our attitudes and opinions, a value just is a value in so far as it’s affirmed 
according to Nietzsche.  As discussed in the previous chapter, it all comes back to the will to 
power for Nietzsche.  So the difference is, where the noble’s values are in concert with the will 
to power and promote growth and strength, slave morality is hostile to the will to power and 
promotes values that undermine individual strength and growth while at the same time 
promoting the strength and influence of the herd.  In his article “Vengeful Thinking and Moral 
Epistemology”93 Sinhababu points this out and argues that “Nietzsche approves of the noble 
morality not because it is true or because the nobles are epistemically justified in accepting it, but 
because it promotes the active, proud, strong-willed lifestyle that the nobles enjoy”94.  In support 
of this Sinhababu refers to BGE 4 where Nietzsche says, “The falseness of a judgment is to us 
not necessarily an objection to a judgment... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, 
life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding” (BGE 4).   
                                            
93 In Leiter and Sinhababu (2007) Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [VTME]. 
94 Sinhababu VTME 267. 
 106
 Sinhababu also argues that “vengeful fury of oppressed classes in ancient Rome caused 
them to invert the value system of their rulers and embrace slave morality”95.  I think Sinhababu 
rightly identifies ressentiment as the primary cause of this value inversion.  In his words, “the 
slaves’ powerlessness and inability to act causes their ressentiment to build up inside them until 
it begins to reshape their beliefs and values”96.  Sinhababu then goes on to argue that there was 
no priestly conspiracy at all – that it was all a passive and subconscious phenomenon97.  
Essentially Sinhababu argues that one cannot simply change one’s beliefs and values by mere 
conscious force of will.  Ressentiment however can be a powerful value changing force on a 
passive and subconscious level.   
 I think however that Sinhababu has oversimplified the nature of the slave revolt that was 
Christianity according to Nietzsche.  I think Nietzsche believes slave revolts are as inevitable as 
human conflict.  That being said I maintain that Nietzsche thinks the Christian slave revolt was a 
special case given its scale and the near perfect storm of conditions that gave rise to it.  Part of 
what made it unique and special is that it was the product of both a priestly conspiracy as well as 
historical conditions.  I fail to see why the slave revolt must be either passive or conscious as 
Sinhababu argues.  Why can’t it be both?  Nor do I see why the active and conscious 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s analysis makes less sense.  I would argue that it’s just the opposite.  
The biggest reason for this is Nietzsche’s discussion of Paul in The Antichrist.  “Paul 
comprehended that the lie – that ‘faith’ – was needed; later the church in turn comprehended 
Paul.  The ‘God’ whom Paul invented, a god who ‘ruins the wisdom of the world’ is in truth 
merely Paul’s own resolute determination to do this” (A 47).  Whether he is right or wrong it’s 
clear that Nietzsche sees this as an active and conscious development in the case of Paul.  
According, to Nietzsche Paul was unquestionably the grand architect of the slave revolt and the 
new moral schema of good and evil.  However, its spread and success was not itself a 
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conspiracy; rather, it was due to the fact that it tapped into universal features of human 
psychology in a highly manipulative way.  This accounts for not only its spread but its longevity.   
 In his book The Tipping Point Malcolm Gladwell sets out to explain the ways in which 
trends, values, and ideas, can “tip” – which is to say, spread rapidly like an epidemic.  He argues 
that the key to a message’s successful spread throughout a society is a combination of three 
factors in the messenger: a connector (people who are good social networkers who know the 
right people in the right places – i.e. people that serve as hubs of information), a salesman (a 
charismatic person with the ability to capture an audience’s attention), and a maven (a 
knowledgeable expert trusted by many who passes vital information on to others).  In addition to 
these factors the message itself also has to be “sticky” according to Gladwell – namely, an 
attractive idea that is also memorable and significant.  This he argues is what explains the wild 
success of Paul Revere’s midnight ride in getting the word out that the British were coming, and 
the failure of several others who also went out on their own midnight rides that night but did not 
make it into the history books.  Paul Revere had the key ingredients.  Likewise I would argue 
that what caused Paul’s version of Christianity to win out over others and spread like wildfire is 
that he was, like Paul Revere, a well-connected maven who was also a good salesman with a 
very “sticky” message to spread.     
 I think Sinhababu, though in different terminology, correctly identifies what made Paul’s 
message so “sticky”.  He argues that vengeful thinking towards the nobles is a kind of wishful 
thinking.  In his words, “As is the case with all varieties of wishful thinking, vengeful thinking 
disposes the slaves to believe that the states of affairs which they desire will come to pass.  The 
more satisfying a kind of revenge against the nobles would be, the more powerfully vengeful 
thinking will dispose them to believe in it”98.  Paul’s message of unorthodox empowerment of 
the plebeians, coupled with a reclaiming of the notion of ‘good’ that is now rooted in the 
plebeians and the promise of justice for the weak and powerless (even if it is put off to the next 
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world), would be very attractive to the plebeians.  This made it a very sticky message and Paul’s 
itinerant lifestyle along with his connector, salesman, maven qualities almost guaranteed that his 
slave morality would quickly become an epidemic.  What Gladwell’s model points out is that the 
messenger is every bit as important as the message itself in terms of its ability to tip.  So even 
though Paul’s competitors like Peter tried to make their messages even more attractive and sticky 
by catering even more to the desires of the plebeians, theirs did not win out in the end because 
they could not compete with the three key ingredients Paul had, by all accounts, in spades as a 
messenger. 
 I think the other helpful model for understanding how the slave revolt happened is 
Richardson’s reactive account of the corrupted expression of the will to power involved in a 
slave revolt.  In his book Nietzsche’s System Richardson distinguishes between the ‘man-of-
resentment’ form of this corruption and the ‘herd-animal’ form.  “He [Nietzsche] distinguishes 
(we might say) two main species of reactivity: the herd animal and the person of resentment, the 
former obeying by following the latter obeying by reacting against.  Although Nietzsche pays 
much attention to the herd instinct, he takes far more interest in resentment”99.  I maintain that 
the slave revolt that is Christianity according to Nietzsche was in fact a perfect marriage of these 
two forms made possible by specific historical conditions.  Specifically, Paul embodied the ‘man 
of resentment’ while the oppressed masses of the time embodied the ‘herd animal’.  After Paul 
and the emergence of Christianity a new kind of person came to be valued and thus a new 
morality.  Given the historical conditions of the oppressed during this time, Paul’s slave morality 
tipped and became an epidemic.  In other words, in contrast to Sinhababu, I maintain that the 
slave revolt was both an active and conscious phenomenon as well as a passive one. 
 To his credit however Sinhababu does make some salient and significant points about the 
limits of wishful thinking related to the slave revolt.  Though we are more likely to believe 
something if we strongly wish it were true, there’s a critical point at which the undeniable brute 
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facts of reality and experience render some beliefs, no matter how attractive, unbelievable.  For 
instance, the plebeians may strongly desire to be more powerful than the nobles the facts of their 
everyday experience makes it impossible for them to believe this is actually the case.  However, 
beliefs involving morality and the afterlife are much more difficult to falsify.  Accordingly, their 
is much less empirical resistance to their belief.  In Sinhababu’s words, “These beliefs [afterlife 
and morality], if not totally isolated from empirical confirmation and disconfirmation, are at least 
difficult to confirm or disconfirm empirically.  Evidence does not get in the way of vengeful 
thinking on these topics”100.  So it is much easier for the plebeians to wishfully think themselves 
into believing that they are good and the nobles evil, and that all will be rectified in the future or 
at least in the afterlife.  This is the key to wishful thinking – there may be no data that suggests 
certain beliefs are true, but if there is no obvious data that can refute those beliefs and one wishes 
such beliefs to be true, there will be little to no resistance in believing them to be true.  When it 
comes to human psychology nothing is more uncertain, unknown, and at the same time 
significant as what happens after we die.  This makes it the perfect environment for vengeful 
wishful thinking to flourish – the dichotomy of the notions of heaven and hell perfectly 
illustrates this point.   
 This is likely the source of Nietzsche’s animosity for “doctrines of the next world”.  They 
are breeding grounds for falsehoods born out of weakness and intellectual pettiness.  In 
Nietzsche’s words, “It was suffering and incapacity that created all afterworlds... weariness that 
wants to reach the ultimate with one leap, with one fatal leap, a poor ignorant weariness that does 
not want to want any more: this created all gods and afterworlds” (Z I 3 “Afterworldly” 143).  
Nietzsche sees such views as not only inherently intellectually cheap and lazy, and not only do 
they stem from weakness and a kind of nihilism and in opposition to the will to power, but they 
also negate life. They reduce this life and this world to nothing but a means to another.  
Nietzsche sees this as inherently life negating.  This being said, these beliefs serve as powerful 
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cohesive forces in the service of slave moralities.  All of this is perfectly illustrated in the case of 
extreme religious cults – most of which tend to attract weak individuals and are fundamentally 
rooted in wishful beliefs in some notion of the afterlife.  In A 50 Nietzsche remarks that the 
psychology of faith is rooted, not in truth, but in wanting to believe and the pleasure a belief 
brings.  He argues, “the greatest suspicion of a ‘truth’ should arise when feelings of pleasure 
enter the discussion” (A 50).  Nietzsche even goes so far as to suggest that most people really 
aren’t even interested in the truth at all; but rather, desire veils to cover the truth (A 54, 57).  In 
his words, “The service of truth is the hardest service” (A 50). 
 To sum up, master moralities are those which are motivated by strength and health, and 
facilitate strength and growth, whereas slave moralities are those which are motivated by 
weakness and sickness, and facilitate weakness and sickness.  Accordingly, Nietzsche’s reaction 
to slave moralities in no way makes him a hypocrite – nor does it entail that his values are 
reactive in the way he criticizes Paul’s values of being.  Nietzsche makes this abundantly clear in 
the following passage: 
 
Master morality affirms not just as instinctively as Christian morality denies... 
These contrasting forms of the optics of value are both necessary: they are ways 
of seeing which are unaffected by reasons and refutations.  One does not refute 
Christianity, just as one does not refute a defect of the eyes (CW Epilogue). 
 
So Nietzsche affirms master morality because it promotes the values which he considers the most 
important.  And this is the basis of Nietzsche’s critique of Paul.  Due to the psychological 
pressure of the acute ressentiment felt by the oppressed, they are unconsciously rather than 
strategically compelled to view things in this negative way.  This was the essence of Paul’s new 
moral world order.  Paul’s system was consciously strategized but spread due to the fact that it 
satisfied powerful psychological needs for the plebeians and the priests of 1st  century Palestine. 
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iii. Nietzsche and The Apostle Paul 
Now we are finally in a position to address both the fairness as well as the consistency of 
Nietzsche’s critique of Paul – specifically the lengthy discussion of Paul in Dawn 68.  To sum 
up, Nietzsche argues that Paul simply appropriated the notion of Christ in order to vicariously 
and disingenuously promote his values.  As Nietzsche puts it, the ‘Holy Spirit’ was in truth just 
Paul’s spirit (D 68).  “Without this remarkable history, without the storms of confusions of such 
a mind [Paul’s], of such a soul, there would be no Christianity” (D 68).  As we will discuss in 
detail Nietzsche also argues that Paul secretly hated the law because it could not be fulfilled so 
he plotted its destruction through the figure of Christ.  This raises two big issues to resolve: first, 
on what grounds can Nietzsche criticize Paul when he in fact pursued and won considerable 
power?  In Paul’s words, “The signs of a true apostle were performed among you in all patience, 
with signs and wonders and mighty works”101.  Second, on what grounds can Nietzsche fault 
Paul for consciously attempting to modify the values of first century Jews and Christians?  Was 
Paul not, like Nietzsche, just another re-valuator of values?   Here again, these two aspects of 
Paul are in concert with Nietzsche’s own notion of the will to power previously discussed as well 
as Nietzsche’s Übermenschian ideal.  In this light, Nietzsche’s critique of Paul comes off as not 
only hypocritical, but petty, and even ad hominem in nature.  There is no question that Nietzsche 
has nothing but disdain for Paul as an individual but the question is whether he had legitimate 
and non-hypocritical reasons for doing so.  Consider that Nietzsche himself declares that “His 
[Paul’s] need was for power” (A 42)! 
 First let’s consider Nietzsche’s provocative claim that Paul was really motivated by a 
secret desire to destroy the old laws of Judaism.  “The ‘God’ whom Paul invented, a god who 
‘ruins the wisdom of the world’ is in truth merely Paul’s own resolute determination to do this” 
(A 47).  In Dawn 68 Nietzsche argues: 
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And then he [Paul] discovered in himself that he himself – fiery, sensual, 
melancholy, malevolent in hatred as he was – could not fulfill the law, he 
discovered indeed what seemed to him the strangest thing of all: that his 
extravagant lust for power was constantly combating and on the watch for 
transgressors and goad...  However much he tried to relieve this conscience, and 
even more his lust for domination, through the extremist fanaticism in revering 
and defending the law, there were moments when he said to himself: ‘It is all in 
vain!  The torture of the unfulfilled law cannot be overcome’ ” (D 68).  
 
So according to Nietzsche, Paul was so frustrated by his inability to fulfill the law that he 
decided to destroy it and replace it with mere faith.  As an added bonus Paul would gain 
considerable power by filling in the vacuum left by the law with his own message – which goes 
beyond just the Jews and actually wins authority for Paul over the Gentiles as well.  This, I take 
it, was Paul’s ‘lust for power’ – he desired to control the masses.  “In Paul the priest wanted 
power once again – he could use only concepts, doctrines, symbols, with which one tyrannizes 
masses and forms herds” (A 42).  Nietzsche calls this Paul’s ‘perfect revenge’ and argues: 
 
The destiny of the Jews – no, of all mankind – seems to him [Paul] to be tied to 
this notion, to this second of his sudden enlightenment, he possesses the idea of 
ideas, the key of keys, the light of lights: henceforth history revolves around him!  
For from now on he is the teacher of the destruction of the law (D 68). 
 
One can find support for this view in Paul’s own writings.  Paul says things like “The 
righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law102.  “If you are led by the Spirit you 
are not under the law”103.  “Christ is the end of the law”104.  And “If justification were through 
the law, then Christ died to no purpose”105 – which comes across from Nietzsche’s perspective as 
a clear case of reverse engineering.  He is presupposing his view of Christ’s purpose in order to 
validate his view of the law.  As Nietzsche puts it (speaking as Paul): 
 
God could never have resolved on the death of Christ if a fulfillment of the law 
had been in any way possible without this death; now not only has all guilt been 
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taken away, guilt as such has been destroyed; now the law is dead, now the 
carnality in which it dwelt is dead (D 68). 
 
Moreover Paul was clearly engaged in a power struggle with other Apostles for authority and 
power over numerous congregations.  He repeatedly feels the need to re-affirm his authority 
above all others by stating things like, “The signs of a true apostle were performed among you in 
all patience, with signs and wonders and mighty works”106.   
 But here is where things get really confusing.  Nietzsche seems to be criticizing Paul for 
no other reason than that he pursued and won power.  Consider this description of Paul “The law 
was the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it! how he had to drag it along! how 
he sought about for a means of destroying it” (D 68).  Assuming Nietzsche’s interpretation of 
Paul’s motives is accurate, this was no easy task and yet: Paul accomplished it according to 
Nietzsche.  Moreover, wouldn’t the personal nature of this project amount to an act of self-
overcoming in Nietzsche’s view?  But here is perhaps the most confusing fact yet, despite the 
previous statements about the law, Paul also maintained that he was actually blameless under the 
law 107.  This inconsistency in Paul’s message has been one of the biggest and most complicated 
issues in the history of Paul scholarship.  And yet Nietzsche fails to even acknowledge this 
statement, despite the fact that it flew directly in the face of his thesis.  Was Nietzsche somehow 
ignorant of this issue?  And what do we make of all this?   
 It is hard to believe, given what a scholar Nietzsche was, that he is somehow ignorant of 
Paul’s conflicting statements regarding the fulfillment of the law.  I think it is more likely that 
Nietzsche considers the single passage in Philippians a fluke compared to the numerous other 
passages where he argues that Christ was necessary because no man could fulfill the law.  In 
Paul’s words, “God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do”108.  Whatever 
the explanation is, for our purposes, not nearly as much turns on this issue as the question of 
Nietzsche challenging Paul for his pursuit of power.  Once again I maintain that Paul in fact 
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desired power over the masses – not merely the Jews but also the Gentiles.  Paul obsessively 
traveled to his various congregations in order to continually reassert his authority. 
 I maintain that Nietzsche is not criticizing Paul for his pursuit of power at all.  In fact, if 
Nietzsche were pressured to say something positive about Paul, I am confident we would 
concede respect for Paul’s itinerant lifestyle109 and commitment to a difficult and complex 
project.  What Nietzsche objects to is the moral values that Paul was promulgating.  After Paul 
and the emergence of Christianity a new kind of person came to be valued and thus a new 
morality – both of which Nietzsche objects to.  However, I do not think this in any way makes 
Nietzsche a hypocrite.  From Nietzsche’s perspective Paul was not a re-valuator of values like 
himself but a destructive ‘improver of mankind’ (TI “Improvers”) who promoted sick and 
unhealthy values.  I maintain Nietzsche regards revaluation as good only when it is to reverse 
sick and unhealthy values and promote healthy ones (which he of course saw himself doing).  
Moreover Nietzsche thinks that Paul’s attempt at ‘improving’ mankind resulted in the slave 
revolt that brought down Rome and caused the cultural value schema to shift away from elitism 
to the morality of good and evil which benefits the weak and undermines the strong.  So while 
Paul may not himself have been an ascetic, he set the stage for, and established the psychological 
mechanisms of, slave morality. 
 I maintain that from Nietzsche’s perspective Paul did this in two primary ways.  First, his 
conception of selfhood and the will.  He more or less posited a Cartesian/Kantian view of the 
subject, arguing that will is singular and distinct from actions.  In Romans Paul offers his famous 
“I” and “sin” passage: 
 
I do not understand my own actions.  For I do not do what I want, but I do the 
very thing I hate.  Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is good.  So 
then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.  For I know that 
nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh...  If I do what I do not want, it 
is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me (Romans 7:14-20). 
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This kind of moral scapegoating, and the conception of the subject it presupposes, is clearly at 
odds with Nietzsche’s views.  Not only is there no singular will operating behind all deeds (GM I 
13) there is no single will at all – rather a complex economy of wills (BGE 36).  I don’t think this 
view of the pure subject behind the will was original to Paul but I would argue that the coupling 
of it with the flesh/spirit dichotomy and the disassociation of the ‘I’ and actions were his 
invention.  In fact Nietzsche himself blames Socrates for first articulating the singular will/soul 
model of human nature.  As Alexander Nehamas argues in his book The Art of Living 
Socrates was: 
 
The first to establish the notion that the soul (which he identified with rationality) 
is fundamentally different from the rest of us – from everything that according to 
Nietzsche in reality constitutes the human individual.  He was not only the first 
modern but also the first Christian (Nehamas AL 140). 
 
In this regard Socrates and Paul have a lot in common.  Paul’s claim that the old Jewish law no 
longer had authority, and that it had been replaced with the universal judgment of God in Christ, 
mirrors Socrates’ claim that moral judgments are rational and therefore apply universally – 
without regard to individuals, circumstances, or instincts.  Whether it was in the context of 
Socrates, Paul, Christianity, or Kant, it is this universalizing aspect of morality that was clearly 
the common denominator in Nietzsche’s comprehensive critique of morality (TI 2, BGE 188, GS 
335, D339, GM II 6).  However, according to Nietzsche Socrates and Paul were the original 
moralizers.  Where Paul invented the notion of spirit, Socrates selected rationality, but both 
attempted to define the essence of human nature in contrast to other competing instincts and 
drives.  Nietzsche absolutely rejects this disregard for all the other significant human drives and 
instincts.  On this point Nehamas says the following of Socrates; but I submit that it would 
(substituting “spirit” for “rationality”) apply equally to Paul: 
 
By giving it [rationality] absolute preeminence, Socrates convinced us not to think 
we comprise many things, all of them equally part of what we are.  Instead, he 
persuaded us to identify ourselves with this one impulse, to consider it the seat of 
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the self, the mark of the human, and to distrust everything else about us as lower, 
degenerate, as features simply of the body or our fallen nature.  Instead of 
integrating our various capacities, he convinced us to try to subjugate, perhaps 
even to destroy them (Nehamas AL 139). 
 
What Paul and Socrates have in common then according to Nietzsche is that they are both sick 
and viewed, not only human nature, but life itself as a disease in need of a cure. 
 Second, Paul was attempting to “improve” mankind with his dichotomy of flesh and 
spirit.  According to Nietzsche however this results in a non-integrated self that goes to war with 
itself and pits drives against one another, creating chaos and sickness in the subject.  With his 
spirit/flesh distinction, Paul was exploiting the psychological need to be commanded discussed 
in the previous chapter and creating a profoundly sick subject.  The more the agent tries to isolate 
the fictitious ‘spirit’ and subdue the fictitious ‘flesh’ the more sick they become.  This results in 
the perpetually escalating sickness discussed in the previous chapter.  To accomplish this, Paul 
employed the moral schema of good and evil, and the profoundly manipulative narrative of an 
alleged “present evil age”110 and ‘spirit/flesh’ dichotomy111.  In Paul’s words, “walk by the 
Spirit, and do not gratify the desires of the flesh.  For the desires of the flesh are against the 
Spirit, and the desires of the Spirit are against the flesh”112.  Accordingly, the form of 
Christianity that emerged under Paul’s influence is essentially a war against the ‘higher type of 
man’ and his ‘basic instincts’ – which are considered evil (A 5).  
 In an effort to ‘improve’ mankind, Paul launched an all-out war on the flesh.  Paul’s 
worldview was essentially that there were powerful oppressive elemental forces that he had the 
power to overcome through his unique access to “the Spirit”113.  The “thorn in his side” 
described in 2 Corinthians 12:7 and Galatians 4:12-13 represented his “weakness” in the flesh; 
his strength, by contrast, resided in his spiritual possession of Christ.  Put simply, the flesh was 
                                            
110 Galatians 1:4. 
111 Galatians 5:16. 
112 Galatians 5:16. 
113 See Romans 1:16, 15:19, 8:38 1 Thessalonians, 1:5, 2 Corinthians 12:12, Galatians 3:5, 1 Corinthians 5:3-5. 
 117
the battleground of spirit.  In Nietzsche’s eyes, however, Paul’s war on the flesh amounted to a 
war on the passions and the instincts – on the will to power itself.  Nietzsche argues: 
 
People like St. Paul have an evil eye for the passions: all they know of the 
passions is what is dirty, disfiguring, and heartbreaking; hence their idealistic 
tendency aims at the annihilation of the passions, and they find perfect purity in 
the divine (GS 139)114. 
 
Rather than improving or liberating people, Nietzsche think that Paul’s views in fact enslaved the 
individual by chaotically pitting drives against each other in an futile attempt to shut down all 
drives (a.k.a. the ‘flesh’) so as to liberate the fictitious notion of ‘spirit’.  Thus, while it is true 
that Paul sought power and the creation of new values, his values were sick, unhealthy, and at 
odds with the will to power.   
 Paul was trying to control people by manipulating the way they view the nature of 
suffering.  Like other priests and ascetics discussed in The Genealogy (GM I 13).  Paul argued 
that we suffer because we can’t control our drives.  For Paul however, suffering is synonymous 
with the ‘flesh’.  The only solution then is to be found in the ‘spirit’.  However, if Paul’s notion 
of ‘spirit’ is fabricated, and his notion of ‘flesh’ misguided, then he will not be able to deliver on 
his promise to control drives.  But this reality will not deter his believers because, as previously 
discussed, they are attracted to the pleasure that attends a belief and not the truth.  Accordingly, 
Paul can promise everything and yet deliver nothing because the believers want to believe (GS 
347, A 50).  In the end all Paul really achieves is the redirection of drives.  According to 
Nietzsche however the only way to truly control drives is to exercise them. 
 On the subject of destructive “improvers” of mankind, Hurka, in his article “Nietzsche: 
Perfectionist,” offers two interpretations.  First, he argues that if one’s activities stem from 
weakness and/or resentment they are corrupted expressions of the will to power and not worthy 
of value since they are reactive in nature; second, he argues that the activities are not worthy of 
value if their intent was to undermine the best and noble.  Once again the activities are 
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reactionary and therefore corrupted expressions of the will to power.  Hurka is indifferent with 
respect to these two views.  I however am decidedly in favor of the former.  In the Antichrist 
Nietzsche does not seem to be very concerned with Paul’s intentions.  Maybe they were more to 
empower one group rather than undermine another.  Either way Nietzsche’s real concern with 
Paul is that if Abraham was the father of faith, Paul was the father of ressentiment.  As Nietzsche 
argues in the Genealogy, the act of punishment is just an action – what is more interesting is the 
various ways it can be interpreted (GM II 12).  Paul offered a specific interpretation of the 
crucifixion and its meaning that systematically reoriented the focus of all valuing from this world 
to some imagined world to come and, fictitious notion of the ‘Spirit’.  “Our commonwealth  is in 
heaven, and from it we await a savior, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will change our lowly body to 
be like a glorious body, by the power which enables him even to subject all things to himself”115.  
At this point Paul’s morality became entirely misinterpretation.  In other words, not only was 
Paul’s morality false, it was unnatural, undermined the potential of the higher types, and 
promoted sickness.   
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Chapter V: The Revaluation of Values 
 
 
So what does my analysis of Paul, morality as anti-nature, and the will to be commanded tell us 
about the sorts of values that Nietzsche endorses?  Does Nietzsche’s provocative rhetoric make 
him a casuist?  If not, what can we conclude about Nietzsche’s positive views concerning 
morality and values?  Specifically what exactly does Nietzsche mean by higher/noble kinds of 
morality (BGE 32, 202, TI 4)?  The first 4 chapters have established a framework within which 
we can now discuss Nietzsche’s positive views.  Chapter 1 explored Nietzsche’s critique of the 
various forms of morality while Chapter 2 established the anchor for his revaluation of values in 
the form of the will to power and his notion of health.  Chapter 3 explored the sickness of the 
ascetic ideal while Chapter 4 contrasted Paul’s revaluation with Nietzsche’s.  In this chapter we 
will now contrast Nietzsche’s positive ideal of health (rooted in the will to power) with the full 
array of sick types first delineated in Chapter 2.  This will allow us to articulate Nietzsche’s 
positive views in connection with major features of his thought like the will to power and the 
eternal return. 
 Without question, one of the most provocative questions surrounding Nietzsche is, What 
ought to become of morality and related values in the wake of the death of God?  Unfortunately 
we have only the first offering of his great project, the revaluation of all values, in the form of 
his book the Antichrist.  Regardless, the two most significant casualties of this great event in 
terms of morality are that, not only must the notion of moral facts be abandoned, but so too must 
the old moral categories of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much 
preparation?...  Whoever begins at this point, like my readers, to reflect and 
pursue his train of thought will not soon come to the end of it – reason enough for 
me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly clear what my 
aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my 
last book Beyond Good and Evil. – At least this does not mean “Beyond Good and 
Bad” (GM I 17). 
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I maintain that while Nietzsche doesn’t offer his own moral system, he does offer a set of values 
that focus on the individual qua individual and have self-actualization (i.e. the free spirit that 
properly expresses the will to power) as their main goal – naturalistic values of strength and self-
overcoming which Nietzsche sees as the opposite of the will to be commanded116.   
 By self-actualization I mean the higher and noble types winning their autonomy and 
establishing their own values.  “The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of 
values... he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honor to things, he creates 
values” (BGE 260).  Or as Nietzsche puts it in GS 290, strong natures and free spirits seek 
“constraint and perfection under a law of their own”.  But how do these ideas relate to the 
discussion of the previous four chapters?  Specifically what is it that unifies all these concepts?  
As Chapters 2 and 3 made clear, it will somehow have to come down to power and health for 
Nietzsche.  Passages like BGE 260, GS 335, and GS 290 suggest that responsibility is a 
paramount feature of Nietzsche’s naturalistic value schema, and I maintain that this is a product 
of his emphasis on the uniqueness of the free spirit as an autonomous agent and the particulars 
of the historical and life circumstances in which he or she finds herself.  As we will discuss 
towards the end of this chapter, this kind of responsibility requires that one question and engage 
with their own unique pre-history.  Furthermore, I maintain that it is understanding, embracing, 
and acting on these realities that sets the free spirit apart, and represents the highest articulation 
of power possible for humans – a state of self-actualization. 
 So what does it mean to move beyond good and evil but not beyond good and bad?  In 
the simplest of terms I think Nietzsche means that we cannot help but value; the challenge is that 
we find new and non-moral ways of valuing.  As Nietzsche states in Twilight of the Idols, “Life 
itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values” (TI 5). Where 
Dostoevsky thought that the death of God spelled the potential end of morality with his famous 
claim that “without God anything is permissible,”117 Nietzsche sees this event as, not the end of 
                                            
116 The will to be commanded was first discussed in Chapter 3. 
117 Dostoevsky The Brothers Karamozov. 
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meaning to human existence, but in some sense the beginning of a new and profoundly 
promising chapter – hence the title of his book Dawn. 
 
 
i. The Value of Values 
So if life forces us to value, how ought we to value?  What exactly was Nietzsche’s revaluation 
of values?  I maintain that he intends this to be not merely a revaluation of what we value, but 
also how we value.  As Leiter observes in his article “Morality in the Pejorative Sense,”118 
Nietzsche’s criticism of pity is not that pity is inherently a bad value merely because it somehow 
always “makes suffering contagious” (A 7); rather it makes suffering contagious only when we 
place too high a value on it.  The problem is that when people overvalue pity they become too 
complacent and accepting of weakness – both in terms of themselves as well as in others.  
Expectations drop and mediocrity becomes more acceptable.  Such values can, in effect, spread 
like a pathogen causing individuals to wallow in one another’s weaknesses.  More than anything, 
however, Nietzsche wants us to evolve beyond the notion that the value of values lies in 
sanctions and expected rewards.  So Nietzsche is concerned not only with the value of the values 
but also an agent’s motivations.  In his words: 
 
The most general formula on which every religion and morality is founded is: 
“Do this and that, refrain from this and that – then you will be happy!  
Otherwise...”  Every morality, every religion, is this imperative.  I call it the great 
original sin of reason, the immortal un-reason.  In my mouth, this formula is 
changed into its opposite – first example of my “revaluation of all values” (TI 2). 
 
  
By contrast, Nietzsche sees virtue as its own reward and considers sanction-based moral systems 
superficial and underdeveloped. 
 
                                            
118 Leiter (1995) “Morality in the Pejorative Sense: On the Logic of Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality” in British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 3/1:113-145 [MPS] 
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You who are virtuous still want to be paid!  Do you want rewards for virtue?...  
And now you are angry with me because I teach that there is no reward and 
paymaster?...  Alas, that is my sorrow: they have lied reward and punishment into 
the foundation of things, and now into the foundation of your souls, you who are 
virtuous (Z II “Virtuous”). 
 
He adds: “You are too pure for the filth of the words: revenge, punishment, reward, retribution.  
You love your virtue as a mother her child; but when has a mother ever wished to be paid for her 
love?”  And concludes: “grow weary of the old words you have learned from fools and liars.  
Weary of the words: reward, retribution, punishment, and revenge in justice”.  Sounding almost 
Kantian, Nietzsche maintains that virtue must be pursued for its own sake – he even adds, “I do 
not even teach that virtue is its own reward”.  Instead Nietzsche implores one to “be in your deed 
as the mother is in her child”.  These statements seem to imply that it is neither the case that 
virtue gets you a reward nor is virtue even its own reward; as in the case of the genuinely 
nurturing mother, a reward simply isn’t involved.   
 From this we can conclude that when Nietzsche speaks of “higher moralities” he clearly 
has in mind a system of valuing rooted in virtues that focuses on individuals (as opposed to 
actions), and is not founded on either sanctions or duty-based values but values like honesty, 
self-knowledge, and responsibility.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the 
consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in 
his case [the sovereign individual] penetrated to the profoundest depths and 
become instinct, the dominating instinct.  What will he call this dominating 
instinct, supposing he feels the need to give it a name?  The answer is beyond 
doubt: this sovereign man calls it his conscience (GM II 2). 
 
 
Passages like this (along with GS 335) suggest that self-knowledge is a special and significant 
virtue for Nietzsche.  In the same way he is skeptical about most people’s desire for the truth, he 
seems equally skeptical about most people’s desire for self-knowledge.  For the sovereign 
individual, however, self-knowledge is, in almost any case, a good thing.  This however does not 
refer to mere factual knowledge of oneself.  That type of knowledge can in fact cause harm on 
occasion.  As passages like GS 324 suggest, sometimes forgetting is a good thing.  In contrast, 
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what I mean by self-knowledge in this context, is the critical engagement of an agent with his/her 
conscience and prehistory.  I maintain that this engagement is a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for the possibility of a sovereign individual.  Accordingly this type of self-knowledge 
is not only beneficial but necessary in the case of a sovereign individual.   Although Nietzsche is 
not always clear on the nature of this conscience, I take it that he means a kind of mature moral 
character that is able to move beyond childish punishment and reward based moralities.  
Passages like this clearly recall Socrates and his debate with Glaucon on the nature of justice, 
virtue, and character where Socrates argues that, ideally, justice and virtue should have little to 
nothing to do with consequences119.  Nietzsche and Socrates seem to agree that virtue and noble 
values should be understood in terms of individuals and types rather than actions and 
consequences (BGE 260). 
But beyond this, Nietzsche clearly thinks that virtue and value are intimately related to 
aesthetics – recall the previous discussion120 of GS 290 where Nietzsche insists that one must 
give “style to one’s character”.  We concluded that style here refers to the teleological 
organization of drives, but I maintain that this also gestures to an aesthetic element in that 
arrangement.  Nietzsche goes on to argue that style 
 
is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature 
and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and 
reason...  It will be the strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest 
gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own. (GS 290). 
 
So the idea seems to be that the aim of this organization is to make things beautiful.  This is clear 
in a follow-up passage where Nietzsche states: “What one should learn from artists. – How can 
we make things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not?” (GS 299).  I submit 
that this is connected to Nietzsche’s ongoing analysis of the problem of suffering and is the 
biggest challenge.  As we discussed in Chapter 3, the ascetic attempts to deal with, explain, and 
resolve his suffering in unhealthy and sick ways that in fact perpetuate a cycle of suffering.  In 
the Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche articulates a thesis that the early Greeks found healthy and life 
                                            
119 See Plato’s Republic Book 2 (2.359a–2.360d). 
120 This topic was initially discussed in section two of Chapter 2. 
 124
affirming ways of understanding suffering with their creation of Greek tragedy.  There one also 
finds his claim that “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally 
justified” (BT 5).  He argues:  
 
Art alone can re-direct those repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature 
of existence into representations with which man can live; these representations 
are the sublime whereby the terrible is tamed by artistic means, and the comical, 
whereby disgust at absurdity is discharged by artistic means (BT 7).  
 
This notion that the affirmation of life and one’s self is essentially aesthetic in nature is an idea 
that Nietzsche revisits and further develops throughout nearly all his works.  As he puts it in 
Zarathustra, “Creation – that is the great redemption from suffering” (Z I “Blessed Isles”).  
Given that this type of creation essentially involves choice and style (GS 290), it is necessarily 
an aesthetic project.  The essence of the view is that, for the sake of health, one must embrace 
their nature rather than trying to modify or “improve” it.  This however does not entail that we 
should just accept ourselves the way we are.  Rather, as he argues in the Birth of Tragedy, the 
idea is to not allow the Dionysian side of one’s nature to war with the Apollonian side.  In other 
words, one should embrace the universal features of the will to power within them so as to 
overcome the idiosyncrasies of their particular nature as it just so happens to be.  It’s not about 
modifying one’s nature but rather overcoming the “improvements” others have tried to make 
with respect to human nature.  In other words, it’s not about changing one’s nature, but changing 
how one comports oneself to their nature.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the structural nature of the 
Apollonian aspect must harness the passion of the Dionysian aspect.  This imperative, however, 
is not moral in nature but rather prudential – it facilitates health.  Once again this requires an 
aesthetic element of style and balance to achieve – or, as Nietzsche puts it, it requires an “artistic 
means” (BT 7).  As discussed in connection with the nurturing mother, virtues are not about 
external rewards, but rather, states of character.  As I will further discuss in detail at the end of 
this chapter, I maintain that the ultimate aim of this aesthetic process is to create a free spirit that 
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is able to achieve self-actualization – the higher and noble types winning their autonomy and 
establishing their own values.  
 Here it is again important to point out that this in no way makes Nietzsche a hypocrite.  
He is of course critical of the reactionary nature of slave moralities, but he himself is not merely 
reacting to slave morality out of retaliation, but to overcome its sick and anti-nature 
characteristics.  As discussed in Chapter 2 the contrast here is always between health and 
sickness.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Two types of morality must not be confused: the morality with which the healthy 
instinct defends itself against incipient decadence – and another morality with 
which this very decadence defines and justifies itself and leads downwards (WP 
268). 
  
It is only in light of this point that we can make sense of Nietzsche’s critique of Paul.  While it is 
true that Paul worked to establish new values and a new type of man, the values he was 
promulgating were born of retaliation, and promoted sickness and weakness.  As previously 
discussed, while Nietzsche is himself in some ways retaliating against Paul’s values, he is not 
retaliating just for the sake of retaliation; rather, he is attempting to cure and overcome Paul’s 
sick values and replace them with his healthy ones.  Insofar as Paul’s values had style, Nietzsche 
rejects them because, for lack of a better way to put it, they were ugly.  Here it might be helpful 
to distinguish the first-order sickness of the ascetic discussed in Chapter 3, and a second order 
sickness that involves the revaluation of values.  In this way, Paul was not sick like the ascetic; 
rather he was, like Nietzsche, a creator of values who fought for a revaluation of the ways in 
which we value.  But again, his values were retaliatory in nature and promoted sickness.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2 concerning the extreme malcontent, there seem to be multiple axes 
involved rather than a simple continuum when it comes to the will to power – specifically an axis 
of will and an axis of health.  I think the following model allows us to finally situate all the 
significant cases discussed in the previous chapters: 
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   Malcontent (axis of will) 
        | 
        | 
  Paul ----------- Plebeian --------- Nietzsche’s free spirit (axis of health)  
        | 
        |  
   Ascetic 
 
With respect to the axis of will the two extremes are the malcontent who has a cancerous and 
disorganized expansion of drives, and the ascetic who seeks to shut down and suppress drives 
and wills (as discussed in Chapter 2).  Paul, the plebeian, and Nietzsche’s free spirit all fall 
somewhere in between.  With respect to the axis of health the two extremes are Paul and his sick 
slave morality values, and Nietzsche’s free spirit and his healthy life affirming values who also 
possess a balanced and organized hierarchy of wills.  The plebeian, malcontent, and ascetic all 
fall somewhere in between when it comes to health.  The plebeian is at best innocuous and 
uninteresting, but the other three (Paul, the ascetic, and the malcontent) are all dangerous and 
destructive. 
 This however raises another interesting question with regard to Paul.  To what degree 
was he self-actualized and did he possess style?  If nothing else he clearly engaged in the 
singular project of institutionalizing and spreading Christianity.  However, since his moral 
system was a “decadent” one that “leads downwards” he was not engaged in making things 
beautiful but rather ugly – which is to say, he was not resolving suffering but further promoting it 
with his life negating worldview.  It is clearly people like Paul that Nietzsche has in mind when 
he discusses preachers of the next world in sections “On the Afterworldly” and “On the 
Despisers of the Body” in Zarathustra.  So although people like Paul may have been self- 
actualized and pursued power, they are life-negators and “poison-mixers” (Z Prologue 3) 
according to Nietzsche. 
 To return however to the question of style and aesthetics, it should be noted that Sartre 
would later make a very similar claim regarding the connection between aesthetics and ethics in 
his work Existentialism is a Humanism, and I maintain that Nietzsche would affirm many of 
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Sartre’s ideas.  For instance, Nietzsche would no doubt embrace Sartre’s treatment of 
Dostoevsky’s famous claim that without God anything is permitted.  Sartre argues: “Everything 
is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find 
anything to depend on either within or outside himself.  He discovers forthwith that he is without 
excuse”121.  While Nietzsche would no doubt take issue with Sartre’s analysis of free will, I am 
confident he would agree with the general sentiment of Sartre’s point.  If one is not actively 
creating, evaluating, and affirming values for themselves, someone else or some other 
institution/system is doing it for them – as in the case of slave moralities.  In so doing, the values 
of slave moralities spread like computer viruses and render agents sick by subversively 
appropriating their autonomy.  Consider that, if there truly are no moral facts, only a moral 
interpretation of facts (BGE 108), then it is the affirmation of a value that in fact gives it its 
value, authority, or power; which is to say, the value of values does not lie in nature itself but in 
our human interactions, attitudes, and opinions122.  Normally we assume that it is the value of a 
value that gives it its legitimate authority – however, it is frequently the authority of a value that 
gives it its arbitrary value.  After all, of what value is an unenforceable law, however good and 
noble it may be?  And as discussed in Chapter 3, any value (no matter how arbitrary) is better 
than none.  In our all too common non-reflective moods we simply assume that values that 
effectively command are automatically good ones.  As it will be discussed later, we get caught 
up in, and confused by, not only the prehistory of our cultural values, but also the prehistory of 
our individual values.  Slave moralities exploit this fact and once one takes hold, like any virus, it 
is difficult to overcome because it establishes a narrative of meaning that the agent becomes 
schematically locked into.   
 To better understand this aspect of values that slave moralities take advantage of 
reconsider the conch in Golding’s The Lord of the Flies discussed in Chapter 1.  The 
shipwrecked children in the story decide that whoever has the conch has the floor and is free to 
                                            
121 Solomon (2005) Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 211. 
122 See Chapter 1 discussion of legal realism. 
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address the group.  It was intended to represent and ensure equality and free speech.  Initially 
everyone affirms its value and authority – and its power and value is rooted precisely in that fact.  
However, the older children soon begin to openly mock the conch and its value.  As soon as the 
children stop affirming its value it loses all authority.  On the flip side, inferior, sick, or unnatural 
values can actually gain authority, value, and power if they are affirmed by the herd.  It is this 
feature of axiology that makes slave moralities possible. 
 So if there are no absolute values in nature – with the exception of power itself, which is 
simply the mark of the living according to Nietzsche (BGE 36) – we are then fully responsible 
for the values we create and affirm.  This I maintain is the essence of master/noble moralities.  In 
contrast to slave moralities, they are focused, not on universal actions, but individuals as 
representative types, and the creation and affirmation of healthy values.  Thus once one is able to 
emancipate themselves from the herd, in Sartre’s words, “He cannot find anything to depend on 
either within or outside himself.  He discovers forthwith that he is without excuse”123.  Consider 
the example Sartre uses to illustrate this point.  He offers the story of a soldier who must decide 
whether to go to war and fight for his country or stay home and take care of his sick mother.  
According to Sartre he has duties and obligations to do both that are equally strong and yet he 
can only do one of them – the choice to do the one is simultaneously the choice not to do the 
other.  So how is he to decide?  Sartre argues that there are no objective moral principles to 
consult in such a difficult case.  There is no moral equation to crunch that will tell him what he 
ought to do.  Instead he is forced to choose for himself.  Only he can decide – only he can choose 
for himself which duty supersedes the other.  It requires therefore a subjective element of 
aesthetic taste precisely because objective facts and imperatives are absent. 
 Here an interesting point arises.  This sentimentalism couldn’t be more opposed to Kant’s 
deontological ethics and is likely the source of much of Nietzsche’s contempt for it. 
 
                                            
123 Solomon (2005) Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 211. 
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What!  You admire the categorical imperative within you?  This “firmness” of 
your so-called moral judgment?  This “unconditional” feeling that “here everyone 
must judge as I do”?  Rather admire your selfishness at this point.  And the 
blindness, pettiness, and frugality of your selfishness.  For it is selfish to 
experience one’s own judgment as a universal law; and this selfishness is blind, 
petty, and frugal because it betrays that you have not yet discovered yourself nor 
created for yourself an ideal of your own, your very own – for that could never be 
somebody else’s and much less that of all, all!  Anyone who still judges “in this 
case everybody would have to act like this” has not yet taken five steps toward 
self-knowledge... (GS 335). 
  
What this passage makes clear is that Nietzsche is far more interested in when to make an 
exception of yourself – which requires self-knowledge rather than simply going by the book.   
Consider that Kant’s whole categorical imperative is designed precisely to keep an agent from 
ever making an exception of themselves.  In this way it too strips out the unique and aesthetic 
qualities of any situation.  Nietzsche clearly rejects Kantian values with the same zeal as 
Christian values.  In fact, in the context of Christianity and guilt, Nietzsche declares that the 
categorical imperative “smells of cruelty” (GM II 6).  
 For Nietzsche, autonomy is not the free submission to a feigned moral law – which I 
argue Nietzsche would see as a paradoxical case of weakness of will analogous to that of the 
ascetic ideal’s – rather it is the direct commanding of oneself which is more of an aesthetic kind 
of self-actualization than a moral kind of self-domestication.  Once again, the particulars of 
circumstances are not always amiable to general rules or facts regarding what one ought to do.  
As such, the only alternative option is to regard oneself as an individual in unique circumstances.  
In the absence of prefabricated rules and facts, all that remains are subjective considerations 
rooted in style and character.  I maintain that Nietzsche’s point is that general guidelines and 
generic rules of thumb are fine, and in fact good, for the herd, but they shouldn’t be allowed to 
hamstring the higher noble types.  As it was argued in Chapter 3, the nobles are defined by the 
fact that they tend to flourish precisely where rules are lacking.  By contrast the average plebeian 
needs to invent/obey rules that satisfy the need to be commanded. 
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 However, despite all this, Kant too rejected sanction-based moral systems and also 
emphasized the importance of intentions rather than consequences.  Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
accuses Kant of in fact furthering these kinds of religious moral imperatives under the guise of a 
secularized morality.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Nothing is rarer among moralists and saints than honesty...  The philosophers are 
merely another kind of saint, and their whole craft is such that they admit only of 
certain truths – namely those for the sake of which their craft is accorded public 
sanctions – In Kantian terms, truths of practical reason.  They know what they 
must prove; in this they are practical.  They know what they must prove (TI 42). 
 
 
Nietzsche however hedges this point in Dawn where he concedes that: 
 
 
It goes without saying that I do not deny – unless I am a fool – that many actions 
called immoral, ought to be avoided and resisted, or that what many call moral 
ought to be done and encouraged – but I think the one should be encouraged and 
the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto.  We have to learn to think 
differently – in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more to feel 
differently (D 103). 
 
Passages like this where Nietzsche talks about the reasons behind actions, suggest that, like Kant, 
Nietzsche is equally concerned with motives.  Unlike Kant however, Nietzsche did not see duty 
as a good alternative to sanction-based hypothetical imperatives.  He considers that just a new 
form of the same old ‘social straitjacket’ (GM II 2).  Rather, he implores us to think differently.  
As the above passage suggests, for Nietzsche to think differently is ultimately, in the end, to feel 
and value differently.  To reiterate an earlier point, the value of values comes from one’s 
affirmation of them – which is to say, the value of values is a product of how we comport 
ourselves to them. 
 So what does Nietzsche offer in place of such imperatives?  First, the above passage 
highlights the importance of honesty and authenticity.  Other important motivators that we have 
already explored are responsibility and autonomy – the virtues of the free spirit and sovereign 
individual (GS 335).  It seems clear then that Nietzsche wants to move beyond reward and 
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punishment, sanction-based (or hypothetical imperative based) moral systems that focus on 
actions, and towards values rooted in self-knowledge that focuses on individuals.  As previously 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 this is the basic structure of master morality – its values apply to 
individuals as representative types rather than to actions (self-knowledge is important in this 
regard and will be discussed shortly).  The problem is that, while Kant may deserve some credit 
for this, his deontological ethics is still firmly rooted in the schema of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.  But to 
move beyond ‘good’ and ‘evil’ means that we must overcome all moral systems that involve the 
schema of good and evil.  This of course does not mean to move beyond ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
however (GM I 17).  From Nietzsche’s perspective the most recent incarnation of this traditional 
form of morality was Kant’s deontological ethics.  To move beyond good and evil, and towards 
good and bad, means to transcend not only Christian morality but also Kantian.   
 
 
ii.  Free Will, Autonomy, and Kant 
When it comes to Nietzsche contra Kant, the status of free will and nature of responsibility are 
clearly ground zero.  In fact Nietzsche’s notion of responsibility is at the very heart of his 
conception of free will.  Freedom and responsibility are things that have to be won and achieved.  
Nowhere is this clearer than in the section of Genealogy of Morals where he discusses ‘the long 
story of how responsibility originated’.  There he says: 
 
The task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises evidently 
embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a 
certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently 
calculable...  With the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man 
was actually made calculable (GM II 2). 
 
The free spirit, or sovereign individual, is then best understood as an individual with the strength 
to break out of these old oppressive forms of morality.  The herd, which is composed of 
individually weak wills, becomes strong as a whole through the use of strict rules governing 
 132
actions that make them predictable and calculable.  This kind of moral system is like a “social 
straitjacket” – especially for the strong-willed individual.  In order to become free and a 
sovereign individual this kind of oppressive morality must be overcome.  Nietzsche thus adds: 
 
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last 
brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what 
they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the 
sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of 
custom, autonomous and supramoral (GM II 2). 
 
 There is, according to Nietzsche, a certain weakness that accompanies faith in free will as 
opposed to the strength that is required to become a free spirit or sovereign individual.  In a 
sense he diagnoses faith as a weakness of will.  A free spirit is a will that is strong enough to 
command itself as opposed to a will that is ‘free’ but needs to be commanded (as discussed in 
Chapter 3).  He says in The Gay Science that: 
 
Wherever we encounter a morality, we also encounter valuations and an order of 
rank of human impulses and actions.  These valuations and orders of rank are 
always expressions of the needs of a community and herd... Morality is the herd 
instinct in the individual (GS 116). 
 
Here again the concern is that the values of the herd will have the tendency to hamstring the 
noble higher types.  Instead they should be allowed to explore and experiment with the nuanced 
details of every unique situation and the aesthetic significance that accompany them.  They 
should be afforded the freedom to bend the rules, as it were, and make exceptions of themselves. 
 Kant, of course, would disagree with this idea.  What this suggests is that, while both 
Kant and Nietzsche stress the importance of autonomy with respect to morality, Nietzsche’s view 
of autonomy and its relationship to morality is very different from Kant’s.  Not surprisingly, 
however, the differences no doubt stem from the fact that Kant tended to approach the topic of 
morality in a highly theoretical way whereas Nietzsche approaches it in a highly pragmatic and 
historical way.  There is indeed a very complex dialectic that must be unpacked and unraveled 
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when it comes to Nietzsche’s and Kant’s critiques of traditional forms of morality.  According to 
Nietzsche, slave morality is essentially characterized by the conditional hypothetical imperatives 
(to use Kant’s terminology) of the herd.  When it comes to the concept of free will one thing is 
clear from the beginning: the tension between Nietzsche and Kant on the topic of free will 
revolves around the issue of autonomy.  Since Nietzsche views autonomy as something that can 
only be achieved by a select few ‘free spirits’, whereas Kant understands autonomy as something 
that is inherently present in any rational being, it should come as no surprise that they draw 
radically different normative conclusions.  The term in fact picks out a different phenomenon for 
both.  For Kant the idea is that ought implies can124 and therefore autonomy is already present in 
any moral (i.e. rational) agent.  For Nietzsche, however, autonomy is something that must be 
won.   
 The difference plays out in the following way: Kant says to consider your actions with 
respect to the whole of humanity, whereas Nietzsche says to consider your actions in contrast to 
humanity as a whole (i.e. individually).  The idea is that if freedom and real autonomy are things 
that can only be achieved by a select few, by in fact overcoming the prejudices of morality, it is 
not surprising that, as previously observed, Nietzsche understands ethics as primarily about 
knowing when to make an exception of yourself.  “The taste of the higher types is for exceptions” 
(GS 3).  Nothing however could be further removed from the ideal of the categorical imperative.  
The following passage from Dawn sums up, quite succinctly and directly, this common theme in 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant.  
 
If an action is performed not because tradition commands it but for other motives 
(because of its usefulness to the individual, for example), even indeed for 
precisely the motives which once founded the tradition, it is called immoral and is 
felt to be so by him who performed it (D 9). 
 
 It is clear that both Nietzsche and Kant place the highest value on autonomy.  But the 
difference is that Kant treats autonomy as a given and a presupposition, whereas Nietzsche sees 
                                            
124 See Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 8: 287 [CPR]. 
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it as something that has to be fought for and earned since many all too human obstacles stand in 
its way.  In terms of Kant’s predominantly theoretical treatment of morality, he maintained that it 
presupposes freedom and autonomy for the simple fact that ought implies can.  In a sense it is a 
weak transcendental argument that takes the following form: if morality is essentially about what 
one ought to do then in so far as morality is even possible or intelligible it requires that humans 
are, minimally, capable of being autonomous and freely acting.  In other words, formally, ought 
implies and presupposes can, and both are preconditions for the very intelligibility of morality.  
Thus, for Kant, morality essentially culminates in terms of autonomy.  The general metaphysical 
schema in Kant’s deontology is that the true supreme moral law is unconditional and universally 
binding – which is to say it is categorical in nature as opposed to hypothetical.  Accordingly he 
argues that it can only be rooted in something like reason.  It is no coincidence for Kant that 
humans are not only the only rational animals but also the only ones that are capable of making 
moral evaluations – rationality and morality are intimately related for Kant.  Since both reason 
and our will belong to the noumenal realm of things in themselves, reason is universal and 
unconditional, and our will is free since it stands outside the fully determined causal nexus of the 
phenomenal realm125.  Accordingly, simply in virtue of our rationality, we can know what we 
ought to do (in virtue of the categorical imperative), and we can in fact do so (since our will is 
free) – in other words, a good will is possible, and it is possible for humans to do the right thing 
simply because it is the right thing.  A good will is in essence a will that is fully actualized in 
itself – which is to say, a will that is as unfettered as possible from the inclinations and desires of 
the phenomenal realm.  A good will is therefore a fully autonomous will.  This is why Kant 
stresses so much that it is not enough that one act in accordance with duty, one must act from the 
motive of duty for their action to have any moral worth126. 
 In contrast to Kant, Nietzsche seems to define autonomy and freedom, not as the 
metaphysical preconditions for the intelligibility of morality, but rather, as the act of overcoming  
                                            
125 Kant Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals 4:452, 4:457 [GMM]. 
126 Kant GMM 4:397-398. 
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‘Morality’ (slave morality) so as to attain genuine freedom and become worthy of responsibility 
by taking ownership of and creating values.  Recall however that this overcoming is non-reactive 
in nature – it is rather an affirmative act. 
 
Master morality affirms not just as instinctively as Christian morality denies... 
These contrasting forms of the optics of value are both necessary: they are ways 
of seeing which are unaffected by reasons and refutations.  One does not refute 
Christianity, just as one does not refute a defect of the eyes (CW Epilogue). 
 
So if slave morality is understood as a defect then overcoming it is not reactive in the way that 
slave morality is with respect to master morality.  Consider that the nobles are indifferent to the 
plebeians – they just don’t want them getting in the way.  The slaves however completely react 
to the nobles (GM I 13).  They define the good in opposition to the nobles.  In Nietzsche’s 
words, “Slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is 
‘not itself’; and this No is its creative deed” (GM I 10).  Freedom and autonomy are prizes to be 
won by overcoming this reactive negativity. 
 For Kant, however, freedom and autonomy are givens that render the very project of 
morality possible; accordingly, Kant begins with the concepts of freedom and autonomy and 
ends with the moral law.  Nietzsche however begins with morality and customs and ends with 
freedom and autonomy as values, which must be earned, won, and achieved, and are essentially 
not givens.  Nietzsche says as much in the following passage from Twilight of the Idols:  
 
What is freedom?  That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself...  
The human being who has become free – and how much more the spirit who has 
become free – spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by... 
Christians...  The free man is a warrior.  How is freedom measured in individuals 
and peoples?  According to the resistance which must be overcome, according to 
the exertion required, to remain on top.  The highest type of free man should be 
sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome (TI 38). 
 
Thus Nietzsche’s unique conception of free will is antithetical to Kant’s.  Though their 
respective critiques of morality cross paths in terms of the significance of autonomy, its direction 
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of fit with respect to responsibility and morality is likewise reversed for Kant and Nietzsche.   
For Kant, the moral imperative is designed to never allow an individual to make an exception of 
themselves; whereas for Nietzsche, the most important question (at least for the nobles) is 
precisely when one should (prudentially) make an exception of themselves and throw out general 
rules.  Unlike Kant, for Nietzsche this is the way in which one in fact becomes autonomous. 
 Another major recurring theme in Nietzsche’s philosophy is that even the genius of Kant 
was not able to escape the historical prejudices of morality – as a result he simply reinvented 
them.  Thus Nietzsche declares, “Kant’s success is merely a theologian’s success” (A 10-11).   
There is no shortage of passages where Nietzsche argues exactly this point. 
 
The tartuffery, as stiff as it is it is virtuous, of old Kant as he lures us along the 
dialectical bypaths which lead, more correctly, mislead, to his ‘categorical 
imperative’ – this spectacle makes us smile, we who are fastidious and find no 
little amusement in observing the subtle tricks of old moralists and moral-
preachers (BGE 5)127. 
 
By referring to Kant as an “old moralist” in connection with his categorical imperative, 
Nietzsche is no doubt observing that in addition to sharing the same objectionable moral 
postulates with Christian morality, Kant’s deontology is also guilty of focusing on actions (i.e. 
universalizable actions) as opposed to individuals128 – as such the moral categories of ‘good’ and 
‘evil’ are better adapted to Kant’s morality than the categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  Nietzsche 
criticized Kant for attempting to preserve the moral postulates of ‘God’, ‘soul’, and ‘free will’ 
through his notion of practical reason even though Kant himself argued in the first Critique that 
none of the theoretical proofs for such postulates work.  The very notion of practical reason, 
according to Nietzsche, is, by Kant’s own admission, a reinvented form of faith.  The following 
famous passage from the preface of the Critique makes it clear that Kant indeed desired to 
preserve these notions.  There Kant says: 
 
                                            
127 See also A 10-11, and GS 193. 
128 This was first discussed in section one of Chapter 1. 
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the assumption – as made on behalf of the necessary practical employment of my 
reason – of God, freedom, and immortality is not permissible unless at the same 
time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions to transcendent insight...  I 
have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for 
faith (CPR B xxx).129  
 
And if that is not enough, Kant’s deontology also shares the dogmatic quality of Christian 
morality in the sense that perfect duties and the unconditioned moral law revealed by the 
categorical imperative seem also to declare “I am morality itself, and nothing is morality besides 
me!” (BGE 202).130   
 I submit that one of sharpest ways to see the contrast between Kant and Nietzsche is by 
comparing the categorical imperative with Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return.  In the words 
of Nietzsche’s demon in The Gay Science, the thought experiment is imagine:   
 
This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in 
your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence (GS 
341).  
 
It should be noted that for our present purposes I will only be discussing one aspect of the eternal 
return – namely its element of universality which it shares in common with Kant’s categorical 
imperative.  However the role it plays and the direction of fit with regard to the individual is 
precisely opposite.  The categorical imperative demands that you consider the maxims of your 
actions as universal laws for all.  The eternal return however forces an agent to universalize the 
significance of their actions.  Particular actions are given universal significance qua the 
individual as an individual under the eternal return.  By contrast the maxim of a particular action 
is given universal significance qua the individual as a token human representative.  So the shift is 
back to individuals (considered holistically) rather than actions (considered universally).  Here 
again an essentially aesthetic element emerges – the evaluative criteria for individuals is 
                                            
129 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Norman Kemp Smith translation). 
130 See discussion of B moralities in section one of Chapter 1. 
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aesthetic in nature.  It forces one to consider what type of life would be worth reliving – 
presumably it would be one with great style.  In other words, it forces us to rethink the things we 
value in life and the ways in which we value them.  What makes this contrast so interesting in 
contrast to Kant is that wants, interests, and desires are factored back into the equation with 
Nietzsche but precisely not in the superficial manner of hypothetical imperatives and sanction-
based moralities since they have now been given universal significance.  So while the categorical 
imperative is engineered to remove such contingent elements, the eternal return is engineered to 
render them universal in nature.  In this manner, we move beyond good and evil – though not 
beyond good and bad. 
 In his article “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual”131 
Gemes also touches on the idea that there is an aesthetic element involved.  He argues that 
Nietzsche has a naturalistic account of the will in which humans are understood as collections of 
“disparate forces” and strong wills “actively collect, order and intensify some of those disparate 
forces and create a new direction for them, thereby, in fortuitous circumstances, reorienting, to 
some degree, the whole field of forces in which they exist”  – in so doing they “exercise a form 
of free will and genuine agency”132.  Gemes rightly concludes that “Nietzsche, then, should not 
be seen simply as one who rejects received metaphysical notions of free will, autonomy, agency, 
personhood, and soul, but as one who replaces them with immanent naturalistic accounts”133.  
According to Gemes this naturalistic account includes an aesthetic element and states, 
“Nietzsche offers what might be called, a naturalist-aestheticist account: To have a genuine self 
is to have an enduring coordinated hierarchy of drives”134.  Most people fail to have this element 
of style (GS 290) and are just a “jumble of drives” – or average plebeian types.  But the 
sovereign individual is able to rise above all this.  
                                            
131 In Gemes and May (2009) Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NFASI]. 
132 Gemes NFASI 42. 
133 Gemes NFASI 45. 
134 Gemes NFASI 46. 
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 To understand how this works, let us focus on this aesthetic element specifically.  First, 
what is it exactly?  Second, why is this aesthetic feature necessary?  I submit that it goes back to 
the issue of responsibility and the significance of particulars.  Consider the previously discussed 
case of Sartre’s soldier.  He found himself in unique and complicated circumstances.  Sartre’s 
soldier had no specific rules or guidelines to consult.  However, he took seriously the particulars 
of his circumstances.  Accordingly he took ownership of the situation and became responsible 
for his actions.  The idea is to consult one’s conscience and, through self-knowledge (GS 335), 
question it, and then finally act.  Conscience plays an important role but not a decisive one for 
the sovereign individual.  The conscience should be considered only an internal interlocutor with 
whom one can have a dialogue about the appropriate course of action.  I would argue that an 
over-dependence on the conscience can lead to what the behavioral economist Dan Ariely calls 
“self herding”135.  Though Nietzsche does not describe it in these terms, I am confident that he is 
concerned with the same phenomena.  The problem is that if one takes their conscience only at 
face value, they neglect the prehistory that established it.  Self herding results when one allows 
their past actions to arbitrarily dictate future behavior.  Moreover, past actions may not even be 
relevant to every situation, and in such cases the conscience actually does more to obfuscate the 
prudent course of action than inform it.   
 Consider Sartre’s soldier.  How useful is his conscience going to be in deciding what to 
do?  It’s such a unique and difficult case that it probably won’t be of much assistance.  This is 
not to say that the soldier’s conscience will be neutral.  Far from it, it could probably push for 
either course of action.  But even if it did favor one course of action over the other, it would 
probably be due to something arbitrary.  For instance, maybe he recently heard a story of a 
heroic soldier in the news – or a story of a fallen soldier killed by friendly fire.  The arbitrary fact 
that he recently heard one story or the other should not influence his decision one way or the 
other, and yet if he uncritically listens to his conscience it likely will.  Sartre’s account of the 
                                            
135 Ariely, Dan (2010) The Upside of Irrationality. 
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soldier presents him as an agent in a contextual vacuum, burdened by the weight of his radical 
free will.  Nietzsche’s view however would be that the soldier isn’t confronted with his own 
radical free will but the thoroughly messy entanglements of his own conscience and prehistory.  
For Nietzsche, individuality emerges precisely out of one’s engagement with their conscience.  
So these are the three steps involved in moral actions discussed in Chapter 1 in connection with 
GS 335.  Nietzsche’s concern is that people all too frequently neglect the middle step and take 
the immediate voice of their conscience as gospel.  The problem is that when this happens one 
neglects to consider the origins of that voice and that it has a “pre-history in your instincts, likes, 
dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences”; accordingly, “there are a hundred ways in which 
to listen to your conscience” and so if one is not careful they may end up “accepting blindly what 
you have been told ever since your childhood was right” (GS 335).  This is important because it 
involves an exercise of creativity, and freedom, and therefore also of power. 
 In his article “Nietzsche’s Freedoms”136 Richardson asserts that “Power is Nietzsche’s 
ur-value”137 and appropriately cites GM II 2, and WP 770.  He also emphasizes the idea that 
freedom is always evolving according to Nietzsche138.  In Richardson’s words: 
 
Freedom is not, it becomes.  It must be studied as a long cultural process, within 
which we now discover ourselves to stand at a certain point.  Freedom now means 
what its history has shaped it to mean – and the latter is what genealogy discovers.  
But freedom is still becoming, and we can participate in this, by carrying out a 
revaluation of it in the light of that genealogy (Richardson NF 132). 
 
I think these two points (that power is Nietzsche’s ur-value and freedom is an evolving process) 
are indispensable for understanding Nietzsche’s notion of autonomy and the sovereign 
individual.  Richardson goes on to describe this evolving process in three stages.  First, the 
unifying of drives or ‘drive synthesis’.  The unifying of drives involves the element of style (GS 
290) discussed in Chapter 2, and is synonymous with Gemes’ naturalistic-aestheticist account.  
                                            
136 In Gemes and May (2009) Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [NF]. 
137 Richardson NF 129. 
138 Richardson NF 130. 
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The second stage according to Richardson is the ‘deliberative self’ where an agent becomes 
aware of the cultural prehistory of their values and the way in which they value – the idea is to 
‘demoralize’ them and naturalize them.  In light of this analysis an agent consciously chooses 
their direction.  The problem with slave moralities is that they confuse both stages of this process 
according to Richardson.  In his words: 
 
The development and rise to dominance of slave morality – which Nietzsche often 
just calls ‘morality’ – has made such masterly harmony between drives and 
agency much harder and perhaps impossible.  Where morality is strong, it makes 
agency (conscious thinking and choosing) an avowed enemy to the drives; agency 
has the task of repressing and indeed eliminating these drives...  Nietzsche thinks 
that we moderns have been drive-damaged by morality’s long rule (Richardson 
NF 144). 
 
The inability to assess and organize drives makes the third stage, ‘self-genealogy,’ nearly 
impossible.  The final stage is to engage with one’s own prehistory and how one comports 
oneself to one’s values – as Nietzsche discusses in GS 335.  However, if slave morality is 
overcome, this evolving process culminates in freedom.  Richardson describes it as follows: 
 
Most broadly, freedom is something historical: an ability – with a linked idea of 
itself – that has been built very gradually through human history, and in such a 
way that earlier stages are layered beneath more recent ones.  To say freedom ‘is’ 
we must tell this history, and also show how this history is now embodied in us, in 
a layered capacity that works in our drives, in our agency, and now also in our 
genealogical insight into that agency (Richardson NF 149). 
 
I think Richardson’s analysis is exactly right and highlights the fact that, much like Nietzsche’s 
views of the will, his account of freedom and autonomy is complicated and messy.  Unlike with 
Kant, there are no absolutes when it comes to autonomy; rather, the very concept is highly 
contextual and relative.  Nevertheless, the achievement of freedom is a singular process (of 
organizing drives) and once obtained it is an ever evolving state. 
 Earlier in this chapter I tentatively agreed with Richardson’s notion that power is 
Nietzsche’s “ur-value” but I maintain that an important, though frequently neglected, 
 142
qualification needs to be made.  Nietzsche may speak at times as if power has purely intrinsic 
value (A 2, BGE 36) but I think this is misleading.  If power for power’s sake were truly 
Nietzsche’s highest value then he would have no grounds to criticize Paul, nor would he have 
any grounds to reject the rising force of German nationalism throughout the 19th century.  
Nietzsche had to be aware of this.  Accordingly, as discussed in Chapter 2 in connection with 
Reginster, I maintain that it is not just that resistance is to be overcome for Nietzsche, but 
resistance in the face of a choice-worthy end.  So what makes one end choice-worthy and 
another not?  I think for Nietzsche it is whether or not the desired end promotes health or not.  
Therefore Nietzsche would not regard Paul as a free spirit despite his accomplishments (many of 
which were difficult) and his creation of new values and a new type of man.  He was for 
Nietzsche, in the final analysis, merely a sick “improver” of mankind.  Power is simply measured 
by the ability to achieve desired ends.  For Paul, this desire was to spread his particular vision of 
Christianity; and he was clearly very successful in that endeavor.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, what matters is not just the difficulty of desired ends, but their value.  This is where 
the question of health versus sickness emerges yet again.  Paul’s legacy has been a long and far-
reaching one but since his values were unhealthy and sick it is objectionable.  
To reiterate a point from the first chapter, given the nature of valuing and the essential 
element of affirmation, if individuals are not determining their values for themselves, someone 
else or some institution is doing it for them – often under the guise of so-called ‘absolute’ values.  
So the problem is that, when this happens, the agent comes to see the voice of their conscience as 
a “condition of their existence”; and since everyone has a right to exist such values immediately 
become “right” in their estimation.  “Moral strength” he argues is really a form of stubbornness 
and a fear of new ideals (GS 335).  In this way, one precisely does not take responsibility for 
themselves and their values.  This is one of the fundamental features of slave morality in 
whatever form it takes.  Consider now our cardinal case types previously discussed.  The ascetic 
obeys his sick conscience blindly, the malcontent throws it out completely and acts always in 
direct opposition to it, and individuals like Paul attempt to modify and exploit it.  Paul 
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established a new way to relate to one’s conscience.  Over time, with the creation of a new type 
of man that is to be valued, a new conscience was created.  This is why Nietzsche insists that we 
must learn not just to think differently but to “feel differently” (D 103).  Nietzsche’s liberated 
free spirit, however, merely questions it and this is what sets him apart.  I maintain that it is this 
direct engagement with values that lies at the heart of Nietzsche’s revaluation of values, and 
allows the free spirit to win his autonomy and become self-actualized. 
 By its very nature this type of questioning is aesthetic in nature.  Consider it in the 
context of the eternal return previously discussed.  Is a life where one lived precisely according 
to the book of averages and generalizations worth reliving?  Certainly not according to Nietzsche 
– it wouldn’t even be worth living in a single iteration.  Rather, the life of the free spirit is 
defined by a lack of averageness and mediocrity.  To put it another way, the life of a methodical 
‘go by the book’ agent is profoundly boring and uninteresting – there is nothing creative about it.  
Consider that creative art, by its nature, either challenges received assumptions or carves out new 
territory in unprecedented contexts.  So it is with the free spirit and, much like art and aesthetics, 
the project of becoming a free and self-actualized spirit is never brought to completion.  
Moreover, the very essence of aesthetics is meaning and significance.  In music, for instance, the 
aesthetic significance arises out of the interplay between harmony and discord.  Likewise for 
Nietzsche the significance of life arises out of the interplay of joy and suffering – a piece of 
music without discord is pointless, and, for Nietzsche, a life without suffering is meaningless.  
“As deeply as man sees into life, he also sees into suffering” (Z III “Riddle” 1).  Just as a great 
piece of music resolves its discord in creative ways, so too must a great life overcome suffering 
in a way that elevates and justifies joy.  Life-affirmation is essentially holistic in nature.  In 
Nietzsche’s words: 
 
Have you ever said Yes to a single joy?  O my friends, then you said Yes too to 
all woe.  All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one 
thing twice, if ever you said, “You please me, happiness!  Abide, moment!” then 
you wanted all back.  All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored – 
oh, then you loved the world.  Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to 
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woe too, you say: go, but return!  For all joy wants – eternity (Z IV “The Drunken 
Song” 10). 
 
By contrast, the ascetic, in his sick state, is able to endure the suffering of their present only 
because of the promise of paradise.  Accordingly it is the ascetic who gnashes his teeth and 
curses the demon for speaking of the eternal return (GS 341) – it renders him forever trapped in 
his flesh and his suffering.  Unlike the free spirit their suffering is not overcome but 
psychologically fled from.  In Nietzsche’s words, “It was suffering and incapacity that created all 
afterworlds...  Weariness that wants to reach the ultimate with one leap, with one fatal leap, a 
poor ignorant weariness that does not want to want any more: this created all gods and 
afterworlds” (Z I “Afterworldly”).  Interestingly enough, to carry the analogy between life and 
music one step further, is not the measure of the aesthetic value of a piece of music the degree to 
which it cries out “da capo!”?  Likewise, the greatness of a life can be measured by the degree to 
which it would be worth reliving.  The eternal return therefore serves as a litmus test for life 
affirmation.  “How well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave 
nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” (GS 341).  And this is 
where it all finally comes together.  In order to be properly disposed to life (i.e. healthy) one 
must first become disposed to oneself (i.e. question their conscience and obtain self-knowledge).  
These elements are intimately connected because becoming disposed to oneself involves 
adopting a view of life – for instance, the view that life is “ ‘will to power’ and nothing else” 
(BGE 36).  This is what it means to be responsible and self-actualized – one embraces rather than 
flees from the particulars of themselves and their life circumstances.  It is only in this way that 
suffering is overcome and life truly affirmed. 
 So what can we conclude about how power, aesthetics, and autonomy come together for 
Nietzsche?  First, just as there is an aesthetic element involved in choice-worthy life, there is also 
an aesthetic element involved in choice-worthy actions.  Consider that the mark of the aesthetic 
or beautiful, across all cultures and sensibilities, universally involves symmetry and balance.  
When it comes to actions then, this symmetry and balance relate to a sense of justice and fairness 
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– or in more general terms, a choice-worthy act is attractive and desirable.  In many respects I 
think this view is similar to Hume’s sentimentalism.  The crucial difference however is that for 
Nietzsche we have to be skeptical and question our intuitions.  This explains his critique of pity.  
Pity is not wrong per se – the problem is that under slave morality the conscience is trained to 
overvalue things like pity.  So our aesthetic optics can become askew in the context of values – 
just as it can in more straightforward aesthetic arenas.  Consider the way Nietzsche reassesses his 
own aesthetic view of Wagner and concludes that all his early intuitions (articulated in The Birth 
of Tragedy) were wrong.  As he put it in the Case of Wagner “Only sick music makes money 
today” (CW 5).  I think Nietzsche’s choice of words is particularly telling.  It suggests that 
sickness is related to ugliness and health is related to beauty.  Once again, in any arena, the idea 
is not just to revaluate our values but to revaluate the very ways in which we value.  The 
sovereign individual then is like a skilled artist with highly refined intuitions that pushes the 
envelope of the received rules and boundaries.  What is important for Nietzsche is “the discovery 
of values for which no scales have been invented yet” (GS 55).  This is not to say that such an 
artist will simply throw out all the rules; rather, they will skillfully determine when it is prudent 
to make an exception of themselves and their art as they pioneer new territories of value and 
meaning.  Consider the following passage from The Gay Science: 
 
Examine the lives of the best and most fruitful people and peoples and ask 
yourselves whether a tree that is supposed to grow to a proud height can dispense 
with bad weather and storms; whether misfortune and external resistance... and 
violence do not belong among the favorable conditions without which any great 
growth even of virtue is scarcely possible (GS 19). 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, Nietzsche thinks that adversity and resistance are essential 
when it comes to the production of great and noble individuals.  This sort of adversity 
presumably includes difficult, complex, and unique circumstances in which an agent must make 
tough decisions.  Consider for instance Sartre’s example of the soldier.  It is up to him and him 
alone to determine what few rules (if any) apply or do not apply to him in the course of making 
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an incredibly difficult decision.  If he wants to be autonomous he has no alternative other than to 
critically consult his conscience and pre-history.  If anything can prepare an individual to make 
difficult decisions, it is previous adversity and uniquely complex circumstances. 
 There is no question that power was a core value for Nietzsche but is it truly his only “ur-
value” as Richardson maintains?  I think my analysis of Paul, the ascetic, and slave morality 
suggests that it is not.  What it has revealed is the equal importance of health, and the problem of 
sickness.  As discussed in Chapter 4 Nietzsche would not be able to critique Paul in the way that 
he did simply in terms of power.  Wills for Nietzsche are simply functions of power (BGE 36) 
but irrespective of power they can be healthy or sick.  So, while power is necessary for any 
revaluation of values (including Paul’s) it alone is not sufficient for the type of revaluation 
Nietzsche envisages.  The entire project of revaluing is essentially filtering the healthy values 
from the sick.   Nietzsche in fact describes his highest type and highest ideal in terms of health. 
 
The great health – Being new, nameless, hard to understand, we premature births 
of an as yet unproven future need for a new goal also a new means – namely, a 
new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any 
previous health.  Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole 
range of values and desiderata to date, and to have sailed around all the coasts of 
this ideal “mediterranean”… needs one thing above everything else: the great 
health (GS 382). 
 
In this passage it is clear that the highest values are rooted in health.  So power and health are the 
core for Nietzsche but other significant values/virtues orbit around them.  The constellation 
includes many we have discussed: autonomy, responsibility, individuality, aesthetics, and style.  
Health and power are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the most noble of free spirits 
(Übermensch).  They must also be autonomous, and have the self-knowledge that can only be 
won by critically engaging with their own pre-history and conscience.  This is what sets them 
apart from Paul’s ideal man, or the ascetic, or the malcontent, or the plebeian.  It’s not only about 
health and power but also about style.  So ultimately what allows them to overcome slave 
morality is their willingness to not only question their values but the value of those values.  
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Unlike the ascetic who desires to be commanded, such an agent is a liberated sovereign 
individual, and is marked by ‘great health’. 
So how are the values Nietzsche affirms different from the MPSs (in particular B 
moralities) Nietzsche rejects?  Recall from Chapter 1 that B moralities have a number of 
distinguishing features.  First they are born out of retaliation to some external stimuli.  Second, 
they are robust forms of moral realism.  Third, they operate with the absolute moral categories 
‘good’ and ‘evil,’ which are thought to be ontologically rooted.  Fourth, they are non-reflective 
and refuse to acknowledge its own prejudices and arbitrariness.  And fifth, they declare 
themselves as morality itself and insist on an absolute monopoly when it comes to moral values 
(i.e. BGE 202).  Also, unlike A moralities, moral values and facts are not understood as products 
of interpretation; rather, moral values and facts are seen as dictated from without (usually in 
religious contexts). 
Despite his talk of “higher moralities,” Nietzsche in fact does not offer a normative 
theory to replace MPSs.  While it is clear that Nietzsche endorsed certain values (i.e. health, 
strength, self-overcoming, and power etc.) I maintain that a mere set of values does not constitute 
a moral system.  To qualify as a moral system, a specific normative principle has to be 
articulated and established.  Nietzsche never attempts this.  But even if one endeavored to derive 
a normative principle from Nietzsche’s constellation of values after the fact, I submit that it 
would fail for a couple of reasons.  First, to qualify as a normative principle it has to apply 
universally.  Superficially it may seem that willing power would be an obvious candidate for a 
universal norm according to Nietzsche; but one must immediately consider that Nietzsche is an 
unapologetic elitist.  According to him, the majority of individuals simply do not have the 
capacity to be exceptional – they are either sick or plebeian in nature.  Thus, pragmatically, 
morally, or otherwise, it is simply not the case that everyone can or ought to pursue power in the 
healthy way Nietzsche envisages.  Second, the only individuals Nietzsche implores to engage in 
self-overcoming and express the will to power are the noble higher types.  So any attempt to 
derive a principle from this notion would make for a very disjointed, jarring, and dissonant, 
 148
normative principle – and again, Nietzsche himself never attempted to do this.  Ironically, 
however, I submit that this is just how Nietzsche would have it be.  In the final analysis, 
Nietzsche considers himself an ‘immoralist’ precisely because he does not offer his own unique 
normative principle to compete with other moral systems.  In contrast, he simply advocates a 
constellation of values that emphasize the importance of health, power, and strength for a 
specific set of individuals – this is what he means by a revaluation of values.  I submit that, 
though Nietzsche himself never puts it this way, one of the most pernicious prejudices of 
morality is that any value worthy of value must be explicitly normative in nature.  In the final 
analysis, Nietzsche is clearly engaged in moral psychology, but does not offer a new moral 
system or normative theory. 
 
 
iii. Conclusions 
Unfortunately we will never know exactly how Nietzsche would have further developed these 
ideas.  He had just begun his great positive work on the revaluation of all values when he 
collapsed in Turin in 1889.  One thing however we can say for sure is that Nietzsche is not a 
nihilist.  In fact he himself saw much of his philosophical project as a direct confrontation with 
nihilism and discovering life-affirming ways to overcome it.  In Beyond Good and Evil 
Nietzsche describes this confrontation: “When you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes 
into you” (BGE 146).  Clearly he is optimistic about this project and views the death of God as a 
positive phenomenon.  “The meaning of our cheerfulness. – The greatest recent event – that 
‘God is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable” (GS 343).  For 
Nietzsche this is a liberating event.  He views the dominance of Christianity in Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages as a dark, and oppressive age that had kept humanity in a 
perpetually sick state with the plebeians at the helm.  Its foundations however were finally 
collapsing under their own weight.  Consider that, if the concept of God was nothing but a 
manmade conjecture and idol into which man had invested all meaning and value to human 
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existence, then value and meaning would not perish with it; rather it would in fact be liberated – 
hence the title of his book Dawn.  Nihilism would only follow the death of god for the Christian 
with no God.  But Nietzsche’s whole point is that the revaluation all values forces us to abandon 
not only the Christian God but also all of Christian metaphysics – including the schema of good 
and evil.  The problem with Kant and others is that they simply found new ways to reinvent old 
moral categories and concepts.  I submit that this is why Nietzsche has the self-proclaimed non-
believers in the marketplace mock the madman as he speaks about the death of God (GS 125).  
Enlightened 19th century Europeans may have paid a lot of lip service to the trendy notions of 
atheism and agnosticism but they failed to appreciate what it meant and entailed.  They were not 
ready to revaluate any values at all. 
 So what does our analysis of Paul tell us about the revaluation of values?  For one, it has 
taught us that it’s not all just about a singular notion of brute power.  Rather there are many 
dimensions of power.  So it’s all about how we value and how those values relate to power.  Paul 
himself pursued, won, and retained much power in his own day and was instrumental in 
establishing an institution that has profoundly affected the world for the last 2000 years.  This 
makes Nietzsche’s criticism unique and unlike his critique of, say, Socrates or even Kant.  Paul 
did have power in one sense.  He could not be considered impotent like Nietzsche considers most 
priests to be (GM I 7).  He had power in the very general sense that he achieved desired ends but 
this alone does not entail health for Nietzsche.  His critique of Paul made it clear that power even 
when coupled with the rich element of style can still be destructive and unhealthy if the values 
promulgated are sick and at odds with the will to power.  Once again, it all comes back to health 
and sickness for Nietzsche.   
 While Nietzsche is clearly focused on Paul’s slave morality, there is no shortage of 
examples in history of the oppression of slave morality.  Particularly throughout the Middle Ages 
the huge vacuums in understanding created a great many gaps to be filled in by God.  The 
consensus was that any question could be answered by either consulting the Bible, Aquinas, or 
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Aristotle’s metaphysics.  As a result, anyone who challenged any part of this world-view 
threatened the whole system.  During this long period of time countless brilliant minds were 
likely snuffed out and suppressed or were simply too afraid to publicly challenge the accepted 
worldview.  Fortunately there were numerous great minds like Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton 
that did stand up and challenge the powers that be but it was not easy, and Galileo in particular 
paid a heavy penalty.  Even more contemporary figures paid a price for their progressive views.  
Hume was never able to hold a teaching position because of his “dangerous ideas”139.  And 
Darwin was deeply concerned about the backlash he would face after publishing Origin of 
Species and even delayed its publication.   
 Nietzsche’s general view of history is that the early Greeks were on the brink of 
incredible breakthroughs and discoveries, and had also developed a healthy and life-affirming 
way of dealing with suffering (BT).  However their healthy values began to turn with Socrates 
and before they could come to fruition the corrupted form of Judaism that became Christianity 
swept across Europe and plunged it into the dark ages.  There were brief moments where this 
oppressive morality was challenged by a spontaneous life-affirming movement like the 
Renaissance but they were quickly suppressed.  The pressure however continued to build 
throughout the modern period until at last Christianity’s strangle-hold on Europe was challenged 
by the Enlightenment (TI “History of an Error”).  This is what ushered in the death of God and 
made it possible at last for humanity to get back on track.  Although many Enlightenment values 
also had to be overcome according to Nietzsche, they nevertheless set the stage for the possibility 
of this revaluation.  For this reason, as previously discussed, Nietzsche views this period 
optimistically.  Nietzsche envisions a time when the nobles and elites are no longer hamstrung by 
the morality and dictates of the herd.  Instead they are free to excel and flourish without fear of 
the oppression of slave morality.  Nietzsche poetically describes his optimism as follows:  
 
                                            
139 This was the title of a pamphlet circulated by the principal of the University of Edinburgh that cost Hume a 
teaching appointment because of his atheism. 
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Indeed, we philosophers and “free spirits” feel, when we hear news that “the old 
god is dead,” as if a new dawn shone on us... at long last the horizon appears free 
to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships my venture out 
again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is 
permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never been 
such an “open sea” (GS 343)140. 
 
The new and open horizons in passages like this clearly represent the possibilities available to 
the noble free spirits and lovers of knowledge once the herd is deposed. 
 As optimistic as Nietzsche was, however, history did not unfold exactly as he had hoped.  
While Europe did become progressively more secular, new forms of slave moralities emerged 
throughout the 20th century.  Nietzsche would have no doubt been horrified by the rise of the 
Third Reich and everything it stood for – especially his unfortunate and unfounded association 
with it.  Consider that he famously referred to himself as a “good European” because he detested 
German nationalism.  And his falling out with Wagner was due not only to his increasing 
nationalistic beliefs but also his Antisemitism.  Nietzsche clearly had no patience with 
Antisemitism.  Venting frustration with Antisemitism Nietzsche ended one of the last letters he 
ever wrote, to his lifelong friend Franz Overbeck, with the proclamation that, for his sake, “I 
have just had every Antisemite shot”141.  I have no doubt that Nietzsche would have viewed the 
entire Nazi movement as slave morality par excellence.  It was born out of retaliation and swept 
through Germany like a sick virus – like a herd, for the most part, the masses simply followed 
orders under the dictates of a new morality.  In Nietzsche’s own prophetic words he cautioned: 
“one day my name will be associated with the recollection of something frightful – with a crisis 
such as there never has been on earth before” (EH IV 1).  For similar reasons I am confident 
Nietzsche would have detested the 20th century’s attempts at communism and socialism.  If for 
no other reason than Nietzsche’s commitment to elitism, he would have rejected the idea of 
absolute equality.  While he may have endorsed its critique of religion, he would have 
                                            
140 See also GS 124, 283, 289, and 291. 
141 Hollingdale, R. J. (1999) Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy (Cambridge University Press) 238. 
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considered the empowerment of the herd as just another form of slave morality and likely 
scoffed at the very notion of a classless society.  In Nietzsche’s words, “Socialism is the fanciful 
younger brother of the almost expired despotism whose heir it wants to be” (HAH 473).   
With respect to slave moralities in the 20th century in America, Nietzsche would have no 
doubt been highly critical of the tent revivals that swept across the United States in the early part 
of the last century.  And even today we are not free of slave moralities.  Recently yet another 
form of slave morality has spontaneously emerged – namely the Tea Party movement.  Clearly 
born out of negation, this party of No has rallied the herd in an attempt to hamstring the current 
administration.  The pervasive tactic is to rely on the principle that it is hard to prove a negative.  
For instance, they employ arguments like: you can’t prove President Obama’s healthcare plan 
won’t lead to rationing of care and “death panels”, and you can’t prove that his other policies 
won’t bankrupt the country.  The result is a purely obstructionist movement that avoids critique 
by simply abstaining from offering any positive ideas – the ultimate “party of no” as it were.  
Such movements are the reason Nietzsche is so skeptical about democracy.  Like John Stuart 
Mill, he feared the tyranny of the majority – especially when that majority is mediocre and 
largely misinformed.  Consider, for instance, the manufactured “debate” between evolution and 
creationism, and politicians’ attempts to force intelligent design into school textbooks – an 
alarming 40% of Americans do not believe in evolution.  The same sort of tyranny has recently 
rewritten the history books in Texas, pushing Thomas Jefferson out of the discussion of the 
Enlightenment because of his agnostic sentiments and separation of church and state rhetoric. 
 All of these contemporary examples resonate with Nietzsche’s belief that most people 
(including philosophers) are not interested in the truth.  Rather than rigorously pursuing it, the 
majority filter experience through a pre-established filter so as to justify an ideology, narrative, 
or dogma.  In Nietzsche’s words: 
 
I do not believe a ‘drive to knowledge’ to be the father of philosophy, but that 
another drive has, here as elsewhere, only employed knowledge (and false 
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knowledge!) as a tool…  For every drive is tyrannical: and it is as such that it tries 
to philosophize (BGE 6). 
 
The idea is that, whether conscious or subconscious, everyone is driven by an agenda and a 
narrative, which shape their perception of knowledge and truth.  Such narratives (much like the 
need to be commanded) simply make life easier and reduce anxiety.  They also draw a decisive 
and black and white line between perceived friend and perceived foe.  All of this however at 
once invites obfuscation and cognitive dissonance.  Consider the remarkable fact that the Tea 
Party movement is composed largely of a schizophrenic marriage between middle class 
Evangelical Christians and Ayn Rand Objectivists,142 who agree that nothing is more important 
than tax cuts for the rich and slashing all government spending, save funding the military-
industrial-complex. 
 Slave moralities are everywhere in history and continue to emerge today.  Given 
Nietzsche’s own concession that the mediocre herd will always make up the majority, slave 
moralities in various forms will always plague human societies.  The hope however is that by 
better understanding the psychological mechanics at work in them, the breadth of their sway can 
be mitigated and the negative effects minimized.  Nietzsche’s great hope was that the death of 
God would open up room for a resurgence of the will to truth which, in turn, would allow us to 
finally revalue the very ways in which we value and supplant sick moral values with healthy life 
affirming secular values.  Once again Nietzsche does not view the death of God as a negative and 
nihilistic event, but rather as an optimistic event and a turn towards the will to truth.  As he puts 
it in the Genealogy, atheism has no ideal “except for its will to truth” and concludes that “as the 
will to truth gains self-consciousness, morality will gradually perish” (GM III 27).  In such 
rarified air the free spirit, sovereign individual, and Übermensch will be free to flourish.  “At 
long last the horizon appears free to us again…  At long last our ships may venture out again, 
                                            
142 Rand and Objectivists are a committed group of atheists who believe that no one has any moral obligations to 
help anyone else whatsoever, and refer to Christianity pejoratively as a “morality of self sacrifice”. 
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venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the 
sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an ‘open sea’” (GS 343). 
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